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Foreword 
I believe that drugs have destroyed many lives, but 
bad government policies have destroyed many 
more. A criminal record for a young person for a mi-
nor drug offence can be a far greater threat to their 
wellbeing than occasional drug use. What the Unit-
ed Nations Office on Drugs and Crime has called 
‘unintended consequences’ of our policies over the 
last 50 years include mass incarceration and the cre-
ation of a huge, international criminal black market 
that fuels violence, corruption and instability. Sadly, 
drug policy has never been an area where evidence 
and effectiveness have driven decisions. All too of-
ten it appears to be ideological arguments which 
prevail. However, the original intent of drug policy, 
according to the UN Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 
was to protect the ‘health and welfare of mankind’. 
We need to refocus policy on this objective.
In 2011, the Global Commission on Drug Policy set 
out to break the taboo on debate of drug policy re-
form in mainstream politics. We concluded that the 
global ‘war on drugs’ has not succeeded. We need to 
accept that a drug-free world is an illusion and focus 
instead on ensuring they cause the least possible 
harm to the least possible number of people. This 
means making sure that fewer people die from drug 
overdoses, not that more small time offenders end 
up in jail where their drug problems become worse. 
The use of drugs is harmful and reducing those 
harms is a task for the public health system, not 
the courts.
We have argued that it is scientific evidence and a 
deep concern for health and human rights which 
must shape drug policy. It is time for a smarter, 
health-based approach to drug policy. This means 
ending the criminalisation and demonisation of 
people who use drugs and non-violent, low-level 
drug offenders. These people should be offered 
support, not punishment. We need a balanced sys-
tem which emphasises public health, human rights 
and development as well as law enforcement. 
At this moment in time, we are at a crossroads in 
how the world responds to the issues of drugs. The 
UN General Assembly Special Session on drugs in 
April 2016 is an important milestone on the jour-
ney towards a more humane and more effective 
approach. I congratulate the International Drug 
Policy Consortium on its tireless work to guide this 
journey, providing a collective voice and visibility 
for its civil society members and a wide range of 
partners – including the Kofi Annan Foundation in 
its work on drug policies in West Africa. The role of 
civil society in questioning, evaluating and influenc-
ing drug policies has grown immeasurably in recent 
years. Indeed, the Consortium is celebrating its 10th 
anniversary this year, and has become an estab-
lished and valuable source of analysis and expertise 
on drug policies, and an asset for many government 
officials and policy makers around the world.
I therefore welcome the third edition of the In-
ternational Drug Policy Consortium’s Drug Policy 
Guide. This edition of the Drug Policy Guide is the 
culmination of a decade of analysis and experience 
in the field – a most comprehensive repository of 
best practice on drug policies which reflect the 
three pillars of the United Nations: peace and secu-
rity; development; and rule of law and respect for 
human rights. The Drug Policy Guide represents the 
collective work of authors from around the world 
who bring together a wealth of evidence and expe-
rience into a concise and readable format for policy 
makers. This guide will be a valuable help as they 
approach the task of reviewing and modernising 
their drug policies and programmes.
Credit: Eric Lefeuvre
Kofi Annan 
Chairman and founder of the Kofi Annan Foundation
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It brings us great pleasure to present the third edition 
of the IDPC Drug Policy Guide as the IDPC network cel-
ebrates its 10th anniversary. This edition is more com-
prehensive and forward looking than ever before, and 
embodies the breadth and diversity of the consortium, 
which has grown both geographically and in thematic 
diversity since IDPC’s inception ten years ago.
This Guide brings together global evidence, best prac-
tice and experiences to provide expert analysis across 
the spectrum of drug policy. This analysis has been 
made possible through the contributions from many 
IDPC members – including networks of key affected 
populations – and is the only document of its kind to 
provide such a broad and comprehensive investigation 
of what works and what doesn’t in drug control policies.
The need for constructive policy analysis and guid-
ance that builds on evidence and experience is greater 
now than ever in a rapidly changing and reforming 
drug policy environment. It is an exciting time as the 
calls for the reorientation of drug policies to ensure 
alignment with human rights, public health, develop-
ment and human security are stronger now than they 
have ever been, and progressive reforms have been 
implemented, or are being considered, in a number of 
countries around the world. 
Yet, in too many cases, drug policies remain driven by 
ideology rather than science and evidence. Govern-
ments have tended to give too great an emphasis on 
reducing the illicit drug market through largely puni-
tive and repressive measures, despite the lack of pro-
gress that has been achieved through this approach. 
The inconvenient truth is that drugs are more widely 
used, and are more easily available, as affordable and 
as potent now as they have ever been – it has proven 
impossible to significantly and sustainably impede 
illicit drug markets despite the billions of dollars in-
vested towards this end. Furthermore, the serious 
collateral damage caused in pursuit of eradicating the 
global drug trade can no longer be justified. This col-
lateral damage includes, but is not limited to, HIV and 
hepatitis epidemics among people who inject drugs; 
the mass incarceration of millions of people for minor, 
non-violent drug offences; the erosion of basic liveli-
hoods of subsistence farmers growing crops destined 
for the illicit market; and in some parts of the world 
widespread violence and insecurity fuelled by a “mano 
dura” government response to drug cartels.
Governments have a responsibility to develop policies 
and programmes that represent the most effective 
use of public funds to protect the health and welfare 
of their citizens, and to ensure that policy responses 
do not exacerbate social and economic vulnerability 
or result in violations of human rights. It is therefore 
time to modernise our responses to the contemporary 
and rapidly diversifying global drug market.  
The evidence shows that drug-related harms can be 
effectively managed through more balanced and 
humane policies that prioritise public health and 
human rights. This requires revisiting national drug 
control laws and policies – a process which this Guide 
is intended to support – as well as shifting narratives 
around drugs, and making the international drug con-
trol system fit for purpose.
In each section, we provide recommendations and 
further reading intended to help a wide audience of 
policy makers and civil society partners to promote 
effective, balanced and humane drug policies at the 
national, regional and international levels.
Each chapter of the Guide introduces a specific 
policy challenge or principle, and presents advice 
and recommendations:
• Chapter 1 describes the five core policy principles to 
which all IDPC members agree as the basis for our 
collective advocacy work
• Chapter 2 outlines the key issues related to public 
health – from scheduling and access to essential 
medicines, to drug prevention, harm reduction and 
treatment services.
• Chapter 3 offers guidance on the criminal justice 
system – including alternatives to incarceration, 
proportionate sentencing, regulated markets and 
decriminalisation, as well as policies in prisons.
• Chapter 4 finally turns to development, alternative 
livelihoods and the rights of indigenous groups.
Through its global network of members and experts, 
IDPC can also provide policy makers with specialist 
advice and support for local contexts – including 
written materials, presentations, dialogues with policy 
makers, study tours, and capacity building. For more 
information, please contact us at contact@idpc.net. 
We look forward to your feedback about the Guide, 
and are committed to continuing to update, refine and 
improve this document.
Introduction from IDPC’s  
Executive Director and Chair  
of the Board
Ann Fordham Mike Trace
Chapter 1: 
Policy principles
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IDPC promotes five core policy principles for 
the design and implementation of national 
and international drug policy, which will be 
analysed in detail in this first chapter. All guid-
ance and recommendations proposed in the 
IDPC Drug Policy Guide were developed on the 
basis of these principles:
• Policy principle 1: Drug policies should 
be developed through an objective assess-
ment of priorities and evidence
• Policy principle 2: Drug policies should 
focus on reducing the harmful consequenc-
es of illicit drug use and markets, rather than 
on reducing their scale
• Policy principle 3: Drug policies should 
be undertaken in full compliance with inter-
national human rights law
• Policy principle 4: Drug policies should 
promote the social inclusion of marginalised 
groups, and not focus on punitive measures 
towards them
• Policy principle 5: Drug policies should 
be developed and implemented based on 
open and constructive relationships with 
civil society.
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The complexity of factors that affect the levels and 
patterns of drug production, supply and use in any 
particular territory means that governments need 
to take a comprehensive approach to developing 
effective and balanced drug policy responses. The 
process for policy making at the national level 
should include the following components:
Researching the problem
There is a severe lack of data around levels and 
patterns of drug production, trafficking and use 
across the world. In order to develop an informed 
drug policy, it is necessary to collect as much data 
as possible on the illicit drug market through wide 
consultation. This should include government of-
ficials, but also experts, academia, NGOs and those 
people most directly affected by drug policy (such 
as people who use drugs and subsistence farmers).
Identification of high-level objectives
The pursuit of a drug-free world or nation is unre-
alistic and counter-productive: no country has even 
come close to achieving this objective. However, 
a policy focus on eradication and elimination of 
illicit drug markets leads to widespread negative 
consequences, collateral damage, human rights vi-
olations and public health harms. Given that drug 
markets are not inherently dangerous or harmful, 
the objectives of drug policies should flow from an 
assessment of which consequences of drug markets 
and use are most harmful to society in a specific 
context. An assessment of the main drug-related 
harms, and therefore the selection of priorities for 
action, should be done with the participation of 
civil society and affected communities, in particular 
representatives of people who use drugs and sub-
sistence farmers. 
Selection of the activities that the government 
will pursue and support to meet these 
objectives
There is growing evidence to guide policy makers 
in developing policies and programmes that are 
most effective in achieving the outcome objectives 
described above. For example, the availability of 
a range of evidence-based drug treatment pro-
grammes can reduce dependence and property 
crime (see Chapter 2.5),1 while needle and syringe 
programmes have reduced HIV and hepatitis C in-
fections (see Chapter 2.4).2 Although the range and 
extent of activities will inevitably be constrained 
by available resources, the provision of effective 
measures will lead to greater savings by reducing 
the financial costs associated with health and social 
problems and crime – and will achieve better health 
and social outcomes.3
Clarification of the role of departments or 
agencies responsible for these activities, and 
coordination mechanisms between them
A society’s drug problems cannot be solved by 
one government department or agency alone. A 
comprehensive and integrated strategy requires 
cooperation and coordination between many 
government bodies, including the departments of 
health, social affairs, justice, education and foreign 
affairs. Successful programme delivery should take 
place in partnership with local authorities, com-
munity and faith groups, civil society organisations, 
and affected communities such as people who use 
drugs and subsistence farmers. 
Allocation of resources to support these 
activities
National drug strategies differ significantly in terms 
of the resources allocated to drug control and its 
different components. Furthermore, expenditures 
on areas such as general healthcare, education, 
criminal justice and law enforcement may be hard 
to ascertain, and their impact on achieving drug 
strategy objectives may not be explicitly evaluated. 
Policy makers need to take account of the ‘proactive’ 
amount spent on funding drug policy measures 
(i.e. law enforcement activities, prevention pro-
grammes, harm reduction and drug dependence 
treatment services), and the consequent savings 
that could be made on ‘reactive’ expenditure (i.e. in 
responding to drug-related crime, loss of economic 
activity, treatment for HIV and other blood-borne 
diseases, etc.). In most settings, the largest share 
Policy principle 1: 
Drug policies should be developed through an  
objective assessment of priorities and evidence
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of available funds is provided to law enforcement 
agencies – with tens of billions of dollars estimated 
to be spent globally on enforcement-led policies 
each year.4 Other sectors, such as public health, 
often receive far less attention – leading to a global 
funding crisis for evidence-based harm reduction 
services.5 Yet shifting just a fraction of the drug law 
enforcement expenditure towards public health 
would have huge impact on drug-related harm.6 
Articulation of the scope and timescale of the 
strategy
Learning from drug policy successes and failures 
requires that strong mechanisms be established to 
assess the impact of drug strategies. This involves 
setting goals and timescales, and committing to 
carrying out objective and structured reviews on a 
regular basis (e.g. every five years). Although some 
countries have created comprehensive national 
drug strategies that include clear objectives, very 
few have reviewed their strategy in a systematic, 
objective and transparent manner. The absence of 
scientific evaluations can lead to the continuation 
of ineffective policy measures, and missed oppor-
tunities to introduce more effective approaches. 
Since no country has managed to fully resolve the 
problems associated with illicit drug markets and 
use, policy makers should continuously search for 
better policy responses, by referring to evidence and 
experience instead of being influenced by ideology, 
political interests or a reluctance to change.
Identification of adequate indicators to evaluate 
progress
The evaluation of drug policy achievements has 
tended to focus on indicators of process in imple-
menting drug law enforcement strategies – that 
is, the number of arrests, seizures or punishments. 
These have not proven to be a good guide to the 
achievement of real reductions in drug-related 
health or social problems. Even the rise or fall in 
overall drug use does not in itself indicate whether 
health and social outcomes are being achieved. De-
pending on local contexts, these priority outcomes 
for a national drug strategy should be framed in 
terms of minimising health and social problems, and 
maximising social and economic development (see 
Policy principle 2 below for more details).
Outreach testing during Hepatitis Testing Week 2015, IN-Mouraria Harm Reduction Centre, NGO GAT, Lisbon, Portugal
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Governments have focused much of their drug 
control efforts on reducing the scale of drug markets 
through punitive means, believing that this would 
eventually reduce drug-related harms.7 At the time 
of the drafting of the UN drug conventions, these 
health and social objectives were assumed to be best 
achieved through stopping the illicit supply of drugs, 
and incarcerating people who use, produce or supply 
drugs. These attempts have been unsuccessful: 
despite all the political and financial investment in 
repressive policies over the last 50 years, interna-
tionally controlled substances are more available and 
more widely used than ever before.8 Theoretically, 
reductions in the scale of drug markets could lead 
to a reduction in harms, but in practice the opposite 
has generally occurred. For example, successful 
operations against a dealing network can increase 
violence as competing gangs fight over the vacant 
‘turf’;9 and an action against a particular substance 
can lead people to switch to substances that may be 
more harmful.10
Government data also show that there is very little 
correlation between the numbers of arrests, seizures 
or crops eradicated, and the price and purity of 
drugs on the street.11 The correlation is even more 
absent for outcomes that matter to people and 
communities – such as better public health, in-
creased security, and community well-being. Simply 
pursuing the long-term objective of a ‘drug-free 
society’ is not a sustainable policy and has led to 
the misdirection of attention and resources towards 
ineffective programmes, while the health and social 
programmes that have been proven to reduce 
drug-related harms are starved of resources and 
political support. 
In consumer markets, the mass arrest of people who 
use drugs does not decrease drug use, but does cause 
or exacerbate health and social problems. Criteria 
such as the number of arrests, or of clampdowns on 
particular drugs or dealing networks, are therefore 
of little relevance to the achievement of the desired 
outcomes. Policies should aim instead to reduce 
drug-related crime, improve community safety, 
and reduce drug-related health problems such as 
overdoses, HIV and hepatitis C infections.
Similarly, crop eradication campaigns in producing 
countries do not stop the flow of drugs into consumer 
markets, but do lead to significant social, economic, 
health and environmental problems in the commu-
nities where crops destined for the illicit drug market 
are cultivated. The process measures applied in the 
field of supply reduction – the size of areas of crops 
eradicated, and levels of drug production – are also 
poor indicators of achievement. As these eradication 
programmes have ebbed and flowed in their local 
Drug policies should focus on reducing the harmful 
consequences of illicit drug use and markets, rather  
than on reducing their scale
Policy principle 2: 
Field of coca crops fumigated in Guaviare, Colombia
Credit: Adam
 Schaffer, W
O
LA
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When understanding the effectiveness of dif-
ferent drug strategies and programmes, it is 
important to be clear from the outset on the 
objectives that the policy is designed to achieve. 
Drug policy is best viewed as a contributor to 
wider social goals under the headings of health, 
development and security. Governments are 
encouraged to articulate a set of objectives and 
outcome indicators that are appropriate to their 
particular circumstances, but a general guide to 
possible domains would include:
• Health – A reduction in the number of deaths 
from overdose; a reduction in drug-related HIV 
or hepatitis infections; a reduction in the num-
ber of citizens experiencing drug dependence; 
and better management of pain relief and palli-
ative care through improved access to essential 
medicines.
• Human rights – The elimination of the impo-
sition of the death penalty for drug offences; 
the closure of compulsory centres for people 
who use drugs; improved access to justice for 
victims of human rights abuses linked to drug 
law enforcement operations; improved access 
to gender- and youth-sensitive health and so-
cial services.
• Development – Strengthened governance 
and legitimate authorities; the development 
of licit economies; relief of poverty in areas 
of concentrated drug production, trafficking 
or retail sale – via rural and urban develop-
ment strategies that encompass access to 
education, employment, land, social support, 
improved infrastructure and better access to 
licit markets, etc.
• Security – A reduction in drug market-related 
violence; a reduction in the power and reach 
of organised crime; a reduction in corruption 
and money laundering; a reduction in inter-
nal displacements related to supply reduction 
measures; a reduction in the numbers and 
proportion of people imprisoned for minor, 
non-violent drug offences; a reduction in prop-
erty and violent crimes associated with drug 
dependence – with a focus of law enforcement 
efforts on the most harmful aspects of the il-
licit drug market, rather than on low-level and 
non-violent dealers, people who use drugs and 
vulnerable farming communities. 
Any drug control strategy or programme should 
be explicitly evaluated on the extent to which 
they achieve (or contribute to) these outcomes.
Box 1 What success looks like: Outcome indicators for national     
drug strategies
impact, the overall market for the drugs produced 
remains largely unaffected, as the areas and methods 
of production improve and move around in response 
to law enforcement action. 
People involved in the lowest levels of the traf-
ficking chain have also borne the greatest costs of 
prohibitionist policies. These policies have led to 
mass incarceration and have exacerbated poverty 
and social exclusion – disproportionately affecting 
women involved in the illicit market as drug mules,12 
as well as for youth and ethnic minorities (see 
Chapter 3.4 for more details).13 
In this context, policies should aim to reduce 
violence by targeting the most violent and 
damaging aspects of illicit drug markets instead of 
focusing on those at the lowest levels of the drug 
chain. Drug policies should also seek to improve the 
social and economic development of vulnerable 
and marginalised communities.
The concept of harm reduction – best defined as a 
set of ‘policies, programmes and practices that aim 
primarily to reduce the harms of drug use without 
necessarily reducing drug consumption itself’14 
– has been shown to be effective in improving 
health and social outcomes for people who use 
drugs, and should be applied to all aspects of drug 
policy. Policy makers should be explicit in articu-
lating the specific harms that they are aiming to 
reduce; should design and provide resources for 
policies and programmes that have a reasonable 
evidence base for reducing these harms; and 
should evaluate them to ensure that they deliver 
the desired outcomes.15
This requires moving away from law enforcement 
process measures (such as arrests and seizures) 
to indicators of actual harm – such as levels of 
violent crime and corruption associated with drug 
trafficking, social and economic development 
indicators for communities in drug cultivation 
areas, and improvements in health and social- 
economic welfare.
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Drug control bodies and governments are bound by 
the overarching obligations created under articles 
55 and 56 of the 1945 UN Charter, which promote 
universal respect for, and observance of, human 
rights and fundamental freedoms.16 Human rights 
stem from the dignity and worth of the individual.17 
They are universal, interdependent, interrelated, 
indivisible and inalienable,18 which means that they 
cannot be taken away from a person because they 
might be growing, transporting, dealing or using 
internationally controlled drugs, or living with HIV. 
As the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, 
Navanethem Pillay proclaimed in 2009: ‘individuals 
who use drugs do not forfeit their human rights’.19
Human rights are not only a statement of principle 
– states also have binding obligations under inter-
national law to respect, protect and fulfil them.20 
This means that governments should not violate 
the human rights of their citizens (including people 
who are using and/or growing drugs) nor allow 
others to do so. They should also adopt appropriate 
legislative, constitutional, budgetary and other 
measures to fully protect and realise the human 
rights of all their citizens.
Drug policies should be undertaken in full  
compliance with international human  rights law
Policy principle 3: 
And yet, governments and law enforcement au-
thorities have paid insufficient attention to fun-
damental rights and freedoms in the design and 
implementation of national drug policies (see Table 
1 below). UN human rights agencies have contin-
uously raised concerns on the human rights abuses 
that continue to proliferate under the auspices of 
drug policy.21 In 2015, the Office of the High Com-
missioner for Human Rights published a report 
which offers a solid analysis of the negative effects 
of drug control on the fulfilment of human rights.22 
Moreover, the Human Rights Council hosted a panel 
discussion on the human rights impact of the world 
drug problem at its 30th Regular Session, to highlight 
key areas of concern and opportunities for reform.23 
Both are significant steps towards addressing the 
human rights violations that are taking place in the 
name of drug policy. 
There is little doubt that human rights are now rec-
ognised as an issue that can no longer be ignored 
in any consideration of drug control policies. A 
paradigm shift is needed, whereby human rights 
law is recognised as a core element of the legal 
framework for drug policy.24
A palliative care nurse and paralegal from Nyeri Hospice provide legal services and pain medicines to a cancer 
patient in Nyeri, Kenya
Credit: Sven Torfinn/Panos, O
pen Society Foundations
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Human right International human rights convention Violations in the name of drug 
control
Right to life • Article 4 of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, 1948
• Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights, 1966
• Use of the death penalty for drug 
offences25
• Extra-judicial killings by law enfor-
cement agencies26
Right to the 
highest attai-
nable standard 
of physical and 
mental health
• Constitution of the World Health Organisation, 
1946
• Article 25 of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, 1948
• Article 12 of the International Covenant on Eco-
nomic, Social and Cultural Rights, 1966
• Restricted access to essential 
medicines, including those for pain 
relief27
• Restricted access to humane and 
evidence-based drug dependence 
treatment, including opioid substi-
tution therapy28
• Restricted access to harm reduc-
tion services that would prevent 
overdoses and the transmission of 
blood-borne infections such as HIV 
and hepatitis C29
Right not to be 
subjected to 
arbitrary arrest 
and detention
• Article 9 of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, 1948
• Article 9 of the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights, 1966
• Targeting of people who use drugs 
by law enforcement officers to meet 
arrest quotas30
• Arbitrary detention of people who 
use drugs31
• Police harassment and sexual abuse 
of people who use drugs32
Right to a fair 
trial
• Article 10 of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, 1948
• Article 6 of the European Convention of Human 
Rights, 1950
• Denial of parole, pardon, amnesty 
or alternatives to incarceration for 
people convicted of a drug crime33
• Use of pre-trial detention, mandato-
ry sentencing and disproportionate 
penalties against people involved in 
minor drug offences34
• Referral to compulsory centres for 
drug users without due process or 
trial35
Right not to be 
subjected to 
torture or to 
cruel, inhuman 
or degrading 
treatment or 
punishment
• Article 5 of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, 1948
• Article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights, 1966
• Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from 
Being Subjected to Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 
1975
• Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhu-
man or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 1984
• Abuses in compulsory centres for 
drug users36
• Use of corporal punishment for 
drug offenders, including caning, 
flogging, lashing and whipping37
Table 1. Violations of human rights in the name of drug control
Continued overleaf
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Right not to be 
held in slavery
• Article 4 of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, 1948
• Article 8 of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights, 1966
• Use of forced labour in the name of drug 
treatment38
Social and 
economic 
rights
• Article 22 (and next) of the Universal  
Declaration of Human Rights, 1948
• Articles 6 and 7 (and next) of the Interna-
tional Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, 1966
• Convention concerning Indigenous and 
Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, 
1989
• Implementation of forced crop eradica-
tion campaigns, leaving many farmers 
with no means of subsistence39
• Destruction of land, food crops and water 
supplies due to aerial spraying40
• Denial of the right of indigenous groups 
to use controlled substances for traditio-
nal and religious purposes41
Right to be 
free from 
discrimination
• Article 7 of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, 1948
• Article 26 of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights, 1966
• International Convention on the Elimina-
tion of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 
1965
• Convention on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Discrimination Against Women, 1979
• Discriminatory application of drug control 
laws, notably towards minority ethnic 
groups,42 indigenous people, young 
people and women43
Right to 
privacy44
• Article 12 of the Universal Declaration on 
Human Rights, 1948
• Practice of stopping and inspecting 
people, including school children, suspec-
ted of carrying drugs45
• Forced urine testing46
• Practice of including people who use 
drugs in official government registries47
• Sharing of confidential medical informa-
tion of a person caught for drug use or 
undergoing drug dependence treatment 
with the police48
Right to be 
protected from 
illicit drug use
• Article 33 of the UN Convention on the 
Rights of the Child, 1989
• Denial of harm reduction services targe-
ted at young people49
• Use of ineffective and stigmatising drug 
prevention measures50
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Drug policies should promote the social inclusion 
of marginalised groups, and not focus on punitive 
measures towards them
Policy principle 4: 
The prevalence of drug use among different 
social groups varies from country to country. 
Nonetheless, a trend seems to persist in all societies 
– drug-related harms remain strongly concentrated 
among the most marginalised groups. This is 
unsurprising, as evidence shows that harsh living 
conditions and the associated trauma are major 
factors contributing to drug dependence.51 
Similarly, the cultivation of crops destined for the 
illicit drug market is concentrated in the poorest 
areas of the world,52 while people engaging in 
micro-trafficking are also generally from poor and 
socially marginalised backgrounds.53 Large-scale 
drug trafficking operations are also more likely to 
target underdeveloped nations and regions with 
weaker governance and capacity.54
While governments and the international com-
munity may be focused on improving the living 
conditions of marginalised groups and integrating 
them more strongly into the social and economic 
mainstream, many aspects of national drug control 
policies have the opposite effect:
• The widespread stigmatisation of drug use (and, 
by extension, people who use drugs) margin-
alises individuals and entire communities
• The widespread criminalisation of drug use 
means that people (especially young people) 
caught using, or in possession of, drugs are often 
left with criminal records which can lead to their 
exclusion from education or employment – in-
creasing their vulnerability to health, social and 
economic problems
• Programmes that focus on arrests and harsh 
criminal sanctions for people who use drugs and 
subsistence farmers have little deterrent effect, 
and only serve to increase exposure to health 
risks, criminality and violence
• Drug law enforcement activities and abuses can 
deter people who use drugs from accessing the 
health and social programmes that have been 
designed to help them
• Forced crop eradication programmes undermine 
the basic livelihoods of subsistence farmers who 
grow crops destined for the illicit market, and 
drives them deeper into poverty
• Harsh criminal sanctions imposed on drug mules 
and micro-traffickers – in particular women – 
have exacerbated their poverty and vulnerability, 
hindering their access to licit employment and 
social services.
Social marginalisation can be minimised by re-
ducing the reliance on widespread arrest and harsh 
punishments for people involved in low-level drug 
offences, and adopting policies and programmes 
that challenge the marginalisation and stigmati-
sation of vulnerable groups. In order to address 
these issues, many countries are now leaning 
towards less punitive drug policies such as: decrim-
inalisation (the offence is no longer punished by a 
criminal sanction); depenalisation (criminal pen-
alties for drug offences are reduced); alternatives to 
incarceration; and reviews of laws and sentencing 
guidelines to ensure more proportionate pen-
alties. Others are considering regulated markets 
for some substances. More information on these 
policy options can be found in Chapter 3. The ob-
jective is to reduce the securitisation of drug control 
to move towards policies based on health, human 
rights and development (see Chapters 2 and 4 for 
more details). For example: 
• Drug laws and enforcement strategies should avoid 
measures that worsen the social marginalisation 
of people engaged at the lower levels of the 
drug trade – including people who use drugs, 
subsistence farmers involved in the production 
of crops destined for the illicit drug market, and 
micro-traffickers
• Drug dependence treatment programmes should 
be evidence-based and focused on facilitating an 
individual’s self-determined goals for recovery, 
and on supporting their social inclusion within 
their communities
• Harm reduction programmes should be adopted, 
supported, adequately funded and scaled-up – 
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and should be enshrined in an enabling policy 
environment
• Law enforcement measures against low-level 
offenders should rely on alternatives to incar-
ceration and the provision of services to address 
the root causes of involvement in the drug trade. 
This is particularly important for offenders with 
children and other dependents
• Drug strategies in drug cultivation areas should 
focus on properly sequenced rural development 
approaches 
• Representatives of the groups most affected by 
drug policies have a right to be involved in the 
design and implementation of drug policies and 
programmes that concern them. This is to ensure 
that these policies are informed, effective and do 
not lead to unintended negative consequences 
(see Chapter 1.5).55
Alternative livelihoods in Lao People’s Democratic Republic
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Box  1  Extract from INPUD 
Consensus statement on  
drug use under prohibition59
 
Right 10: People wo use drugs have the 
right to assemble, associate, and form  
organisations
• Demand 20: People who use drugs must be 
respected as experts on their own lives and 
lived experiences.
• Demand 21: Participation of people who 
use drugs in debate and policy formulation 
must be meaningful, not tokenistic.
• Demand 22: The wellbeing and health of 
people who use drugs and their communi-
ties must be considered first and foremost 
in the formulation of laws and policies re-
lated to drug use.
For the purposes of this Guide, the term ‘civil society’ 
encompasses the people and communities most 
affected by drug policy (such as people who use 
drugs, people living with HIV, growers of crops 
destined for the illicit drug market, indigenous 
people, young people and women), harm reduction 
service providers, NGOs, faith-based organisations, 
academics working on drug policy, etc.
Across most areas of social policy, it is widely rec-
ognised that the participation of affected people 
and communities is critical for an effective and sus-
tainable response. In the HIV sector, for example, the 
need to meaningfully engage people living with the 
virus was acknowledged at an early stage as a core 
component of any efforts to tackle the epidemic. In 
these arenas, affected populations – and civil society 
more broadly – perform essential functions in the 
conceptualisation, researching, design, implemen-
tation and evaluation of policies and programmes 
at all levels, as well as in ensuring the transparency, 
good governance and accountability of govern-
mental and intergovernmental agencies.
In the field of drug policy, civil society organi-
sations play an increasingly important role in 
analysing drug-related issues and in delivering 
and evaluating programmes and services. Because 
of their knowledge and understanding of drug 
markets and drug-using communities, as well 
as their ability to reach out to the most margin-
alised groups of society, civil society constitutes 
an invaluable source of information and expertise 
for policy makers. This is particularly true for or-
ganisations representing people who use drugs 
and subsistence farmers involved in illicit crop 
production. However, political sensitivities around 
drugs have often led policy makers to disregard 
or avoid the (sometimes very challenging) per-
spectives of civil society, or to view civil society 
participation as a problem itself.56
Increasingly, the UN drug control system has started 
to recognise the added value that civil society or-
ganisations have brought to the drug policy debate. 
For example, in 2008, a structured mechanism was 
Drug policies should be developed and 
implemented based on open and constructive 
relationships with civil society
Policy principle 5: 
created for civil society engagement in the review of 
drug policies 10 years after the UN General Assembly 
Special Session (UNGASS) on drugs in 1998 (which 
was held under the banner: ‘A drug-free world – we 
can do it!’). The ‘Beyond 2008’ initiative – an initiative 
of the Vienna NGO Committee on Drugs (VNGOC) in 
association with the New York NGO Committee on 
Drugs (NYNGOC) – saw civil society representatives 
from around the world come together to discuss the 
issues and agree on a declaration.57 
A similar initiative was coordinated in the lead up 
to the 2016 UNGASS on drugs, with the creation 
of a Civil Society Task Force, which includes civil 
society representatives from every region of the 
world, as well as representatives of the key affected 
populations.58 Meanwhile, civil society partici-
pation has significantly improved over time at the 
annual sessions of the UN Commission on Narcotic 
Drugs (CND) in Vienna – with NGOs being invited 
onto some government delegations, greater coor-
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policy and programme design, implementation, 
monitoring and evaluation.
Respectful, strategic, constructive, transparent 
and accountable lines of communication should 
therefore be created between governments and 
civil society representatives, in order to ensure 
meaningful exchanges of information and per-
spectives. However, conditions for a truly open, 
respectful and meaningful dialogue with those 
most directly affected by drug policy will only be 
created if governments remove criminal sanctions 
for people who use drugs and subsistence farmers 
engaged in illicit crop production.64 
dination amongst civil society, and increasing op-
portunities to present in, and access, the debates 
that take place. 
The involvement of the International Network of 
People who Use Drugs (INPUD) and other regional 
and national networks of people who use drugs 
has been instrumental in promoting humane and 
evidence-based drug policy in these international 
forums, as well as at the national level.60 Networks 
of people who use drugs are essential for the elab-
oration of effective and humane harm reduction 
and treatment policies. Meaningful participation 
in harm reduction, treatment and wider healthcare 
services is a key quality assurance measure and 
safeguard. Peer outreach and support has been 
instrumental in reaching out to marginalised com-
munities of people who use drugs with targeted 
and accurate harm reduction messages and life-
saving services.
Associations of illicit crop growers have also 
emerged, and several declarations have been drafted 
to map out the concerns related to drug policies in 
cultivation areas and to offer recommendations on 
alternative policies.61 Discussions between policy 
makers and subsistence farmers have taken place, 
for instance, in countries such as Bolivia and Co-
lombia, ensuring that policies targeted at cultivation 
areas address the issues which local communities 
are facing, and do not cause additional harm (see 
Chapter 4.2 for more details).62 
The positive involvement of civil society in drug 
policy debates is highly beneficial for policy makers to:
• set objectives and priorities, and formulate bet-
ter-informed policies based on practical advice 
and experience
• facilitate communication between policy makers 
and key civil society stakeholders, ensuring that 
people and communities are involved in planning 
interventions that will affect them
• establish mutually beneficial partnerships with 
civil society organisations to undertake joint 
programming and/or act as programme imple-
menters to reach out to the most vulnerable and 
marginalised groups
• create a vibrant network of civil society organ-
isations that can continue to support effective 
Box  2  Extract from the 
Political declaration of the 
Global Forum of Producers  
of Crops Declared Illicit63
Concerning social organization and rela-
tions with the state 
• Producers’ associations/organizations of 
plants declared to be illicit are, in some 
regions, strong but in others incipient, in-
existent or prohibited by the State. 
• In many countries, relationships with 
government authorities are conflictive be-
cause the authorities do not comply with 
signed agreements. 
• Geo-political influence by world powers 
creates negative relationships between 
producers and their governments. 
• Producers’ organizations should be rec-
ognized, should take part in debates 
and decision making at all levels, with 
their own governments, donors and  
the UN. 
• International organizations and govern-
ments should recognize and respect that 
each country has a different reality and 
that this should be taken into account 
when proposing policies.
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Health policies
and programmes
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The Preambles of the 1961 and the 1971 UN drug 
conventions establish, as the primary objective 
of the treaties, the need to protect the health 
and welfare of mankind.1 The right to health 
is also protected in a number of international 
human rights instruments. Protecting health 
should therefore be at the centre of any nation-
al drug policy. The UN drug control treaties also 
impose a dual obligation on member states: 
that of prohibiting the production, sale and 
use of internationally controlled substances for 
recreational purposes on the one hand, while 
ensuring their access for medical and scientific 
purposes on the other. In practice however, the 
focus has been placed on reducing the scale of 
the illicit drug market through prohibition-led 
drug policy, with far less attention paid to the 
need to ensure the availability of controlled 
substances for medical and scientific purposes. 
Scheduling is at the heart of any drug control 
policy. It is the mechanism through which pol-
icy makers place controlled substances in di-
verse schedules according to their level of harm 
and potential for medical and scientific usages. 
However, scheduling has posed many political, 
technical and ideological issues. Chapter 2.1 
will review available practices and evidence 
on scheduling – with a specific focus on can-
nabis, khat, ketamine and new psychoactive 
substances – in an attempt to provide guidance 
on how best to overcome the main challenges 
of scheduling. 
The scheduling of controlled substances has a 
significant impact on whether a substance will 
be made available for medical and scientific 
purposes – one of the two core objectives of the 
UN drug control system. However, as Chapter 
2.2 highlights, 5.5 billion people currently live 
in countries with limited or no access to con-
trolled medicines. The chapter provides a set of 
practical recommendations on how to remove 
the legislative, technical and ideological barri-
ers that are currently hindering access to con-
trolled medicines for medical usage. 
Chapter 2 then turns to the health policies and 
programmes targeting people who use drugs. 
Drug use may lead to a number of preventable 
health consequences, including the transmis-
sion of infections such as hepatitis B and C and 
HIV, overdose deaths, and an exacerbation of 
existing psychiatric or physical illnesses. It is 
therefore essential that a comprehensive health 
approach is developed to address drug use 
and dependence.
Chapter 2.3 offers guidelines on how to de-
velop effective and evidence-based drug pre-
vention programmes, focusing on identifying 
objectives, methods and settings, on the basis 
of the international quality standards on drug 
prevention that have so far been developed.
Chapter 2.4 reviews international evidence on 
harm reduction and provides a list of principles 
and interventions that should be developed to 
address the health, social and economic harms 
associated with drug use. 
Finally, Chapter 2.5 turns to drug dependence 
treatment, offering guidance on how to devel-
op and implement a comprehensive menu of 
effective, voluntary and evidence-based drug 
dependence treatment programmes – with de-
tailed recommendations on treatment referrals, 
methods, settings and associated social sup-
port services. 
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Introduction
Although a complex technical issue, scheduling is 
at the heart of drug control. Both international law 
as embodied in the UN drug control conventions 
and national legislation systems include hierarchi-
cal classifications based on the degree of risk and 
the level of medical usefulness associated with 
controlled substances. 
These hierarchies are often known as schedules, 
and their objective is to assign appropriate levels 
of control to a given set of substances. They are 
intended to apply the tightest control measures to 
those substances considered the most dangerous. 
Similarly, substances believed to carry the low-
est levels of risk are assigned to the least restric-
tiveschedule. The medical utility of drugs is also 
factored into the decision to assign a substance to 
the appropriate schedule in drug laws and policies. 
Whether these classifications are appropriate in 
practice is, however, a matter of considerable dis-
pute – often the scheduling is based on unexam-
ined cultural beliefs or historical accidents instead 
of scientific evidence.2
The mandate for scientifically reviewing substanc-
es proposed for international control lies with the 
World Health Organisation (WHO), while at the 
national level many countries have set up spe-
cialised agencies to advise their governments on 
the appropriate schedules for substances. It is of 
great importance that the principle of scientific 
review is maintained, which should be independ-
ent of governments, and that its assessment of 
Scheduling and classifying substances
2.1
Key recommendations
• International drug control bodies and na-
tional-level policy makers should attain the 
proper degree of balance between restriction 
of harm and the medical usefulness of a sub-
stance when making a scheduling decision 
• The UN drug control regime should urgently 
review its scheduling processes to ensure 
that these reflect the latest evidence and the 
needs of the contemporary drug response. 
An expert group should be assigned this task, 
and the resulting advice should be passed on 
to governments to assist them in re-design-
ing their national scheduling processes
• The role of scientific reviews – conducted by 
the WHO’s ECDD – should be strengthened 
and protected as part of international sched-
uling processes at the UN level, including man-
datory periodic reviews of currently controlled 
substances (including cannabis) to reflect any 
emerging evidence and make the necessary 
adjustments to the policy response
• Where they do not already exist, policy mak-
ers should establish national advisory com-
mittees composed of scientific and social 
scientific experts to recommend appropri-
ate classifications for substances proposed 
for control
• Policy makers should be bound by the recom-
mendations of their advisory committees. If 
governments reject the advice of their expert 
committees, the grounds for doing so should 
be systemically and transparently articulated, 
and must be based upon evidence
• The unique problems presented by NPS 
should be embraced as an opportunity for 
better scheduling approaches based on evi-
dence. For example, the approach originally 
adopted by New Zealand should be re-es-
tablished and its results monitored and stud-
ied to examine the potential of replicating 
it elsewhere.
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substances proposed for control is carried out on 
a scientific basis. However, governments are often 
unwilling to take the advice of their own advisory 
bodies, fearing public reactions to scientific rec-
ommendations on drug control or holding ideo-
logical positions on substances that run counter to 
scientific advice. 
Scheduling has recently become a more complex 
issue due to the emergence of large numbers of 
new psychoactive substances (NPS). These sub-
stances have generated a sense of panic among 
many governments. The proliferation of these new 
substances – and the dynamic ways in which they 
are produced and brought to market through the 
internet and social networking – have led to the 
conclusion that the customary processes of sched-
uling involving detailed scientific reviews are too 
slow and unwieldy to meet the control require-
ments of this novel situation.
Legislative/policy issues 
involved
Evidence-based hierarchies of harm
Attempts should be made to base scheduling on both 
hierarchies of harm, and a balance between those 
harms and medical usage. Figure 1 below represents 
an alternative pattern of scheduling derived from the 
work of Professor David Nutt in the UK.3  It compares 
an ‘independent expert assessment of harm’ with the 
current classification within the international drug 
control system administered by the UN. It is notable 
that the two lists vary widely; cannabis, for example, 
is included in the most dangerous drugs (and with 
no medical value) within the UN system, while Nutt’s 
system places it in the low risk category. A similar dis-
sonance applies to LSD and ecstasy. 
In general, the UN system classifies many more 
substances as ‘most dangerous’, which is arguably 
a result of cultural and historical factors at work 
during the early and mid-20th century, during which 
period colonial judgements and values, as well as 
xenophobia and racism, tended to prevail.
In 2007, the Nutt classification placed ketamine 
very close to the most dangerous drugs in its scale,4 
whereas, for the moment, the substance is not 
scheduled in the UN system. Proposals to schedule it 
are being debated, as will be discussed below – but 
even if these efforts are successful, ketamine will be 
classified as a low-risk substance because of its high 
medical value. This demonstrates the difficulty of 
assigning scientific schedules to psychoactive sub-
stances through an objective and evidence-based 
assessment of both harms and medical benefits. The 
best practice at the moment involves recommenda-
tions made by expert committees of scientists to ad-
vise governments based on available evidence, and 
for governments to base policy decisions on these 
recommendations. 
Assessing the medical usage of substances
The campaign against the non-medical consump-
tion of controlled substances, which was waged 
Ketamine 
Credit: W
ikipedia
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through much of the 20th century, has resulted in a 
bias against the supply of controlled substances for 
medical purposes, demonstrating once more the 
imbalance within the international system and in 
many countries’ domestic policy contexts.
At the 58th Session of the Commission on Narcotic 
Drugs (CND) in March 2015, it was proposed that 
ketamine be controlled under schedule IV of the 
1971 UN Convention on Psychotropic Substances.6 
This move was motivated by the expansion in the 
recreational use of ketamine, particularly in China 
and South East Asia, and increases in associated 
harms such as ketamine bladder syndrome, and pat-
terns of dependence that had not previously been 
seen among populations using the substance for 
recreational purposes. A campaign by medical and 
clinical professionals, drug policy NGOs and some 
governments was initiated to resist the proposal to 
schedule ketamine, because the substance is a vital 
anaesthetic in both human and animal medicine, 
particularly in rural districts of low and middle in-
come countries. The restriction on ketamine stem-
ming from international control would probably not 
adversely affect wealthy countries, but developing 
states would lack the economic, administrative 
and technical resources necessary to meet the re-
quirements of international drug control – even if 
the substance were included in the least restrictive 
schedule IV of the 1971 Convention.7 For these de-
veloping countries, it would be much cheaper and 
simpler to effectively ban the substance altogether. 
Valium and Phenobarbital represent equivalent cas-
es, and are extremely difficult to obtain in rural Asia 
and Africa, despite being classified under schedule 
IV of the 1971 Convention.
Figure 1. Classification of drugs: Levels of control vs. levels of harm5
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At the 2015 CND, the proposal to schedule ketamine 
was deferred owing to the controversy over its ef-
fect on the availability of this important anaesthetic. 
However, the proposal is likely to return at the next 
CND session. The WHO, which has the mandate to 
recommend on scheduling within the international 
regime, has critically reviewed the substance four 
times and found that it does not need to come 
under international control. Furthermore, the WHO 
has stated that the scheduling of ketamine would 
constitute a ‘public health crisis’.14 The WHO position 
recognised that there are far more effective ways 
than scheduling to address the harms associated 
with ketamine use while avoiding restrictions in ac-
cess for this vital anaesthetic substance.15
The controversy of the scheduling status of keta-
mine, which is on the WHO’s Model List Of Essen-
tial Medicines,16 goes beyond the particular sub-
stance. If the UN drug control system is to meet its 
rhetorical claims to be a more health- and human 
rights-focused regime, it needs to demonstrate its 
new orientation by shifting the balance toward 
medical applications in the field of scheduling, as 
well as listening to the advice of its expert com-
mittee. Individual countries should take similar 
steps to assign proper importance to the medical 
and therapeutic capacities of substances proposed 
for scheduling.
Implementation issues 
involved
Conflicts between expert groups assembled to pro-
vide guidance on the classification of substances 
on the one hand and those making the political 
decisions on the other have arisen both at national 
levels and in the international, UN-administered sys-
tem. The following case studies, on cannabis, khat 
Box 1  The UK and the Dutch approaches to khat
In the Netherlands, a risk assessment was un-
dertaken in 2007 by the Co-ordination Centre 
for the Assessment and Monitoring New Drugs 
(CAM), the official government advisory body for 
such matters, which concluded that ‘khat poses 
little risk to the health of the individual user, and 
it presents no appreciable risk to Dutch society 
as a whole. There is therefore no reason to pro-
hibit its use in the Netherlands’. According to the 
CAM, a ban would stigmatise the Somali com-
munity, without any prospects of a significant 
reduction in demand. Discouraging use through 
education was considered sufficient to increase 
the awareness to the potential negative social 
consequences and adverse health effects of  
excessive use.8 
Another report was requested, from the Trimbos 
Institute, to look into the social impact of khat in 
the Somali migrant community, stories of public 
nuisance in some cities around the khat trade 
and the international context, since the Nether-
lands had also become an important hub for Eu-
ropean imports and Scandinavian countries that 
had banned khat started to complain. 
In January 2012, the Dutch government sent 
the Trimbos study to the parliament with the 
announcement that it had decided to put khat 
on List II, despite neither the Trimbos report nor 
the CAM making such a recommendation.9 Un-
der the Dutch Opium Law, List II contains drugs 
with ‘an acceptable degree of addictiveness or 
physical harm’, such as cannabis. This allows for 
prosecutorial discretion when it comes to use 
and possession, but it does make the importation 
and domestic trade of khat illegal and subject to 
active law enforcement.
In the case of the UK, where khat is estimated to 
be used by around 90,000 people from the Somali 
and Yemeni communities, the ACMD concluded in 
January 2013 ‘that the evidence of harms associat-
ed with the use of khat is insufficient to justify con-
trol and it would be inappropriate and dispropor-
tionate to classify khat under the Misuse of Drugs 
Act 1971’.10 However, UK Home Secretary Theresa 
May decided six months later to ban it, saying the 
risks posed might have been underestimated.11 
In November 2013, the Home Affairs Committee 
found that the ban on khat was not based on any 
evidence of medical or social harm and must be 
stopped before it becomes law. The parliamen-
tarians concluded that the potential negative 
effects, both on the diaspora communities in the 
UK, and on the growers who cultivate it in Africa, 
outweighed any possible benefits of the ban. The 
Home Secretary continued to justify the ban by 
stating that most European Union (EU) countries 
had already banned khat so there was a danger 
of the UK becoming a regional hub for illegal 
onward trafficking to those countries.12 The ban 
took effect on 24th June 2014.13
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and new psychoactive substances (NPS), illustrate 
these frictions. A similar case on the coca leaf is dis-
cussed in Chapter 4.3.
Scheduling controversies around cannabis
This has been particularly the case for discussions 
around the scheduling of cannabis. For example, 
the UK’s Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 established the 
Advisory Council for the Misuse of Drugs (ACMD) 
– an independent expert scientific group which 
advises the government on scheduling matters.17 
In 2007, when cannabis had been re-scheduled as a 
‘Class C’ drug (the least harmful category) under the 
2001 Misuse of Drugs Regulation, the government 
requested the ACMD to review this classification 
based on reports of severe mental health effects 
from high-strength ‘skunk’ preparations of the sub-
stance. The government wished to return cannabis 
to its earlier ‘Class B’ classification, but after exten-
sive review the ACMD recommended that the drug 
remain in ‘Class C’.18 Nevertheless, in 2008, cannabis 
was re-scheduled as a ‘Class B’ substance. 
Then, in February 2009, the UK government once 
more rejected an ACMD recommendation, this time 
that ecstasy be downgraded from ‘Class A’ to ‘Class 
B’. The government’s justification for this decision at 
the time was: ‘It is our view that the system should 
be based on evidence, but it should also be based 
on the considered view of those responsible for 
policy making, and should take into consideration 
the impact that changes in classification are likely 
to have on the use of, and harms caused by drugs 
and the impact that that has on the criminal justice 
system. That is why it will remain the case that our 
advisers will advise us, and we will decide’.19
The UK government is legally entitled to reject the 
ACMD recommendations, as the statutory framework 
only requires conscientious consultation by the gov-
ernment with the ACMD on classification decisions, 
not that its recommendations be followed. However, 
relations between the government and the ACMD, 
and parts of the scientific community more generally, 
became further strained following the sacking of the 
ACMD Chair, Professor David Nutt, over his views on 
the relative safety of ecstasy and cannabis compared 
to alcohol and tobacco.20 The Home Secretary wrote 
to the Professor explaining that, ‘it is important that 
the government’s messages on drugs are clear and 
as an advisor you do nothing to undermine public 
understanding of them’.21 A total of six members of 
the ACMD resigned over the sacking and the issues it 
raised. Later in 2010, the UK government once again 
discarded the ACMD recommendations when it an-
nounced its ban on mephedrone. 
Scheduling controversies around khat
Khat – a plant with leaves that are chewed for their 
mild stimulant properties – is not subject to interna-
tional control at present. The Advisory Committee 
on the Traffic in Opium and Other Dangerous Drugs 
of the League of Nations first discussed khat in 1933, 
and the substance has appeared on the internation-
al agenda repeatedly since then. Several studies, 
including by the UN Narcotics Laboratory, subse-
quently identified a number of phenylalkylamine 
alkaloids as the major psychoactive compounds 
in the khat plant: cathinone and cathine (norpseu-
doephedrine), and to a lesser degree norephedrine. 
Cathinone is unstable and undergoes decomposi-
tion rapidly after harvesting and during drying of 
Khat leaves
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Box 2  The European Union’s approach to NPS
In Europe, the first formal action to respond to 
the growing problem of NPS was the creation, in 
2005, of the EU ‘Early Warning System’ and struc-
tures that went with it. Through this, EU member 
states could register new substances of concern. 
Their risks were then assessed by the EU insti-
tutions (principally the European Monitoring 
Centre on Drugs and Drug Addiction, EMCDDA), 
and a decision made on whether or not to rec-
ommend the substance for control measures. 
In practice, this process was only fully used in a 
small number of substances.22 Furthermore, in 
most cases it took a long time and considerable 
resources to produce a recommendation. This 
naturally led to concerns about how the pro-
cess could respond to the growing number of 
substances coming onto the market. As a result, 
the European Commission (EC or Commission) 
initiated a process to evaluate the existing early 
warning mechanism. At the beginning of 2010, 
amidst the emergence of mephedrone and the 
reports of deaths associated with its use – par-
ticularly in the UK and Ireland – the Commission 
started the preparatory work.
In July 2011, the EC published its assess-
ment,23  concluding that there were three major 
shortcomings when it came to submitting NPS to 
Europe-wide control measures. First, the existing 
system was unable to tackle the large increase in 
the number of NPS on the market because it ad-
dresses substances one by one, through a lengthy 
process. Second, it was seen to be overly reactive 
since substances brought under control measures 
were quickly replaced with new ones with sim-
ilar effects, often through small modifications of 
their chemical composition. And third, it lacked 
a range of effective options for control measures 
that would allow for rapid and targeted action. 
Driven by these conclusions, and coinciding with 
discussions of the issue in the Informal Council 
on Justice and Home Affairs, the Commission en-
gaged in a consultation process to propose to EU 
member states a mechanism to replace a system 
that was deemed ‘no longer fit for purpose’.24 
The Commission’s proposal aims to speed up the 
‘Union’s ability to fight’25 NPS by providing for:
• A quicker procedure: It currently takes a 
minimum of two years to ban a substance in 
the EU. Under the new structure, the EU will be 
able to act within 10 months. In some cases, the 
procedure would be shorter since it will also be 
possible to withdraw a substance immediate-
ly from the market for a year. This measure is 
intended to ensure that the substance is no 
longer available to customers while a full risk 
assessment is being conducted. The current 
system does not allow temporary measures, 
with proposals to restrict substances having to 
wait for a full risk assessment. 
• A more proportionate system: It is intended 
that the new system will allow for a gradu-
ated approach where substances posing a 
moderate risk will be subject to consumer 
market restrictions and substances posing 
high risk to full market restrictions. Only the 
most harmful substances posing severe risks 
to consumers’ health will be submitted to 
criminal law provisions. This is a significant 
departure from the current system since it 
only provides for binary options – taking no 
action at EU level or imposing full market 
restrictions and criminal sanctions. This lack 
of options means that at present, the Un-
ion does not take action in relation to some 
harmful substances.26 It is hoped that the new 
system will allow the EU to tackle more cases 
and deal with them more proportionately, by 
tailoring its response to risks involved and tak-
ing into account legitimate commercial and  
industrial uses.27
The proposal now needs to be adopted by the 
European Parliament and by EU member states 
in the EU Council in order to become law. This 
may not be a straightforward process since it is 
becoming clear that, as is often the case within 
the EU, there is no universal agreement on the 
issue.28 Beyond this, it remains likely that EU insti-
tutions and national governments will continue 
to lag behind drug designers and the changing 
nature of the NPS market.29 Moreover, intro-
ducing the concept of proportionality and the 
option of regulating – rather than prohibiting 
– NPS within the new system raises interesting 
questions about the relative harm of organic 
substances, such as cannabis, that are currently 
under the strictest controls within the UN-based 
international scheduling framework. 
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On the other side of the planet, New Zealand 
was faced with a flood of NPS that lay beyond 
the scope of existing drug control legislation.30 
New Zealand passed what appeared to be the 
ground-breaking Psychoactive Substances Bill 
in July 2013.31 The resultant Act set up a legal 
framework for the testing, manufacture, sale and 
regulation of previously uncontrolled psychoac-
tive products, placing the responsibility on man-
ufacturers to prove a product poses a ‘low risk’ 
before it can be sold. To this end, it established 
a Psychoactive Substances Regulatory Authori-
ty within the Ministry of Health, responsible for 
ensuring that products met appropriate safety 
standards before they could be distributed in 
New Zealand. 
Underpinned by a belief in pragmatism, ev-
idence and the protection of health, the Act 
acknowledged the demand for psychoactive 
substances and consequently focused on at-
tempting to ensure that this was met in a low-
risk manner. Unlike earlier legislation, it provided 
alternatives to a criminal justice approach and 
sought to protect the health of the user ‘without 
undue emphasis on illegality and punishment’.32 
As such, offences within the Act predominantly 
focused upon illegal manufacture and/or sup-
ply. It also contained an inbuilt five-year review 
mechanism to allow for aspects of the legislation 
to be revisited if it was felt that they were not 
operating as intended. Furthermore, while the 
legislation removed the onus of proof regarding 
the level of risk away from the government and 
placed it with manufacturers, authorities re-
tained oversight by being able to quickly remove 
a product from the market. It was the intention 
that the legislative framework would also incen-
tivise manufacturers to make low-risk products 
rather than constantly seeking to circumvent the 
law by producing chemical variants of unknown 
harm potential. Approved products would only 
be available in certain outlets, would come with 
health warnings and be subject to restricted ad-
vertising at the point of sale only. 
Under the Act, 41 of the lowest-risk substances 
were assigned temporary approval; however, in 
April 2014, the government suspended these 
approvals. According to Health Minister Peter 
Dunne, this sudden reversal in policy was prompt-
ed by increased reports of harmful side-effects of 
the substances in question. The terms of the Act 
were subsequently amended, bringing to an end 
the interim or provisional product approvals that 
had enabled certain substances to be sold prior 
to full testing. All interim licences to retail NPS 
have been revoked, and it is now illegal to supply 
and possess the products. 
The reversal in New Zealand’s policy was driv-
en by fears of an underground economy and 
mass drug use and an attempt to prevent harm 
through the application of controls. Ironically, 
the Act probably represented the best available 
method of regulating the market, and its amend-
ment – which is effectively an abandonment of 
its principles – means that in reality the state has 
little, if any, control over the market, which has, 
after a promising start, reverted into the hands 
of criminals.
Box 3  New Zealand’s Psychoactive Substances Act
the plant material. This is the main reason why fresh 
khat leaves are preferred by chewers. Dried leaves, 
which contain much lower levels of cathinone, are 
more often used to make tea, known as Abyssinian 
or Arabian tea.
Cathinone and cathine are alkaloids with similar 
effects on the central nervous system to those of 
amphetamine, though less potent. In the early 
1980s, all amphetamine-type stimulants (ATS) have 
been placed as a group under international con-
trol. Cathinone and cathine were, based on a 1985 
recommendation of the WHO Expert Committee 
on Drug Dependence (ECDD), added to the list of 
controlled substances of the 1971 UN Convention 
on Psychotropic Substances, respectively to Sched-
ules I and III.33 Norephedrine was subsequently in-
cluded in the list of precursors controlled under the 
1988 UN Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic 
Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, as it was often 
used in the illicit manufacture of amphetamines.
The WHO ECDD concluded in 2006 on the basis of 
a critical review of khat that scheduling of the plant 
itself was not required: ‘The Committee reviewed 
the data on khat and determined that the poten-
tial for abuse and dependence is low. The level of 
abuse and threat to public health is not significant 
enough to warrant international control. Therefore, 
the Committee did not recommend the scheduling 
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of khat. The Committee recognized that social and 
some health problems result from the excessive use 
of khat and suggested that national educational 
campaigns should be adopted to discourage use 
that may lead to these adverse consequences’.34
Scheduling controversies around new 
psychoactive substances 
By December 2014, the United Nations Office on 
Drugs and Crime (UNODC) had received notice of 541 
different NPS, compared to just 126 in 2009. This pro-
liferating class of drugs has resulted in panic among 
many national governments, and put immense 
strain on the traditional methods of review and clas-
sification that take place prior to scheduling. NPS 
can be developed extremely rapidly, and are often 
marketed via the internet and social networks. Once 
one substance is scheduled, chemical variations of it 
can often be produced and marketed which are not 
covered under the scheduling decision, and there-
fore circumvent the law. It is problematic – and often 
impossible – for governments and law enforcement 
agencies to keep up. A number of new approaches 
have therefore been attempted, in particular at EU 
level (see Box 2) and in New Zealand (see Box 3). 
Cannabis at a Colorado dispensary
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Key resources
• Advisory Council on the Misuse of Drugs (2013), 
Khat: A review of its potential harms to the indi-
vidual and communities in the UK, https://www.
gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/
attachment_data/file/144120/report-2013.pdf 
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azepam, ephedrine, ergometrine, hydromorphone, 
lorazepam, midazolam, methadone, morphine, ox-
ycodone and phenobarbital.38 These represent the 
‘minimum medicine needs for a basic healthcare 
system’ and ‘the most efficacious, safe and cost-ef-
fective medicines’.39 A number of countries also 
apply similar national controls to other essential 
medicines outside of those proscribed by interna-
tional law – such as ketamine40 (see Chapter 2.1 for 
more details). 
Although ensuring the adequate availability of con-
trolled substances for medical and scientific purpos-
es is one of the fundamental aims of the UN drug 
conventions, the UN system and UN member states 
have so far failed at fulfilling this objective. The WHO 
estimates that 5.5 billion people live in countries 
with low or non-existent access to controlled med-
icines, and that tens of millions of people in these 
countries experience moderate to severe pain with-
out access to treatment every year, including 5.5 
million people with terminal cancer and a million 
people with late-stage HIV/AIDS.41
The international drug control regime also interferes 
with scientific research into potential medical uses 
of controlled substances. An increasing body of ev-
idence suggests that substances such as cannabis 
and cannabinoids, heroin, ketamine, ketobemidone, 
LSD and MDMA, have medical uses in the treatment 
of a variety of conditions, including pain, multiple 
sclerosis, drug dependence, glaucoma, depression, 
post-traumatic stress disorder, and Parkinson’s dis-
ease.42 Yet, the fact that these substances are listed in 
schedules that recognise no medical or scientific use 
in the drug control treaties creates significant regu-
latory and financial obstacles to further research and 
the development of new medications.43
Legislative/policy issues 
involved 
The 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs and 
the 1971 UN Convention on Psychotropic Substanc-
es articulate a dual obligation for states with respect 
Introduction
Some substances controlled under the international 
drug control treaties are routinely used in health-
care in diverse fields of medicine, such as anaes-
thesia, drug dependence, maternal health, mental 
health, neurology, pain management and palliative 
care. For example, the World Health Organisation 
(WHO) has included 12 medicines that contain in-
ternationally controlled substances in its Model List 
of Essential Medicines: buprenorphine, codeine, di-
Key recommendations
• National drug control regulations should 
be reviewed using WHO’s 2011 guidance35 
to ensure that they do not needlessly inter-
fere with the availability and accessibility 
of controlled medicines, especially opioid 
analgesics
• The adequacy of annual estimates for med-
ical and scientific needs of controlled sub-
stances should be reviewed in accordance 
with the INCB and WHO’s Guide on estimat-
ing requirements for substances under in-
ternational control,36 and estimates should 
be adjusted as needed
• Adequate training for current healthcare 
workers should be provided on the use of 
controlled medicines, and incorporated 
into undergraduate and graduate curricula 
for all relevant healthcare workers
• National health strategies should be re-
viewed, including for cancer, non-commu-
nicable diseases and HIV, to ensure that 
they adequately address the need for pal-
liative care
• More scientific research should be encour-
aged, conducted and funded on the medi-
cal value of cannabis and psychedelics.37
Ensuring access to controlled substances for  
medical and scientific purposes
2.2
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Dr. Gloria Dominquez Castillejos, pain clinic director, speaks with a patient in Hospital Doctor Angel Leano in 
Guadalajara, Mexico 
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to controlled substances and their medical use: 
countries must ensure their availability for medical 
and scientific use, and prevent their use and diver-
sion for other uses (i.e. recreational and non-medical 
use).44 The Single Convention formulates four basic 
requirements for national regulations of opioid 
analgesics, which are in the strictest schedule for 
substances with medical uses:
• Individuals dispensing the medication must be 
licensed, either by virtue of their professional li-
cense or through a special licensing procedure
• Only authorised institutions or people may 
handle and transfer these medications
• The medications can only be dispensed to a 
patient upon a medical prescription 
• Records on the movement of these medica-
tions are kept for no less than two years.45
The 1971 Convention contains similar provisions for 
psychotropic substances. However, both the 1961 
and the 1971 conventions explicitly open the door 
for countries to adopt measures of control stricter or 
more severe than those provided by the drug con-
trol treaties, including a special prescription form for 
controlled medications, if they deem it necessary.46 
In contrast, specific operative paragraphs requiring 
states parties to ensure access to controlled medi-
cines are conspicuously absent.
Many countries have adopted regulations around 
controlled substances that go far beyond the re-
quirements of the 1961 Convention or the 1971 
Convention. Often, these regulations directly in-
terfere with medical practice and make controlled 
medicines inaccessible for patients. Common barri-
ers in national legislation include: 
• requirements for special prescription forms
• limitations on the number of days a prescrip-
tion can cover
• limitations on which healthcare workers can 
prescribe controlled substances
• requirements for additional licenses for hospi-
tals, pharmacists and healthcare workers
• additional record keeping or reporting require-
ments
• limitations on the daily doses that can be prescribed. 
Furthermore, the laws on controlled substances of 
some countries impose harsh criminal punishments 
for healthcare workers, sometimes even for unin-
tentional errors in handling them. 
The WHO,47 the International Narcotics Control 
Board (INCB),48 the Commission on Narcotic Drugs 
(CND),49 the United Nations Office on Drugs and 
Crime (UNODC),50 and the World Health Assembly 
(WHA)51 have repeatedly called on UN member 
states to review their regulations on controlled 
substances to ensure they do not needlessly inter-
fere with medical use. The WHO has also published 
guidance for countries on reviewing their national 
policies on controlled substances.52
Implementation issues 
involved
Regulatory barriers are not the sole reason why the 
availability of controlled medicines, especially opi-
oid analgesics, is so limited in much of the world. 
Few  governments have put in place effective sup-
ply and distribution systems for these medications; 
they have no relevant health policies or guidelines 
for practitioners; they do not ensure that healthcare 
workers get instructions on the use of controlled 
medicines as part of their training; and they do 
not make sufficient efforts to ensure that they are 
affordable.53 Myths about controlled medicines 
among both healthcare workers and the public, as 
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Box 1  Mexico reviews its prescribing and dispensing system for 
opioid analgesics
Doña Remedios and her daughter, Orlanda Hernandez Ramirez, 44, take a very early morning 
journey to receive palliative care at the National Cancer Institute in Mexico City, 2014
Credit: Ed Kashi/VII / H
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On 15 June 2015, Mexico introduced a new 
system for prescribing and dispensing opioid 
analgesics in response to concerns that the old 
system was so cumbersome that it deprived 
people with advanced illnesses of access to 
essential pain medicines. The new system al-
lows physicians to download special prescrip-
tions from a secure website with bar codes 
required for prescribing opioid pain relievers. 
It also introduces electronic record keeping  
for pharmacies.54 
Before June 2015, physicians had to travel in per-
son to state capitals to obtain the bar-code stick-
ers that Mexican law requires for prescriptions of 
opioid analgesics. This highly time-consuming 
requirement discouraged many physicians from 
prescribing these medicines. Moreover, phar-
macies had to record all transactions involving 
these medicines in multiple log books, posing a 
significant bureaucratic burden. A 2014 Human 
Rights Watch report found that Mexico’s regula-
tions were so burdensome that the vast majority 
of doctors, especially those living outside state 
capitals, simply did not prescribe these medica-
tions and that very few pharmacies kept them  
in stock.55
Apart from simplifying the prescription of opioid 
analgesics, the electronic system also improved 
government oversight of their use. Previously, 
pharmacies were unable to scan the bar-code 
stickers on prescriptions for opioid analgesics to 
authenticate them because they were not linked 
to a central system. Thus, the requirement for 
bar codes, which was intended to allow close 
monitoring of prescribing and dispensing opioid 
analgesics, did not actually help prevent their 
misuse, but did create a major barrier to legiti-
mate medical use.
Under the new system, pharmacies will be able 
to authenticate prescription forms using the bar 
code, and scripts will be automatically cancelled 
once they have been scanned. The new system 
for prescribing opioid analgesics is one of a se-
ries of measures by the Mexican government to 
improve access to palliative and end-of-life care. 
Pain treatment is an important component of 
this kind of healthcare.
In December 2014, the Ministry of Health issued 
guidelines to its healthcare system to put into 
effect provisions on end-of-life care as outlined 
in Mexico’s 2009 health law and created a de-
partment to advance palliative care. In January 
2015, the government adopted an inter-agency 
agreement on palliative care, which made it 
mandatory and instructed medical schools to 
include it in their curricula.
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well as often unfounded fears of diversion for illicit 
purposes, are key factors blocking improved access 
to controlled medicines. 
In the case of pain management and palliative care, 
these factors combine to create a vicious cycle of 
under-treatment in many countries. Because pain 
treatment and palliative care are not policy priori-
ties, healthcare workers do not receive the neces-
sary training to assess the medicines necessary to 
treat moderate to severe pain. This leads to wide-
spread under-treatment and to low demand for opi-
oid analgesics. Similarly, the complex procurement 
Box 2  Kenya’s improved 
access to opioid analgesics
Kenya has made significant progress in im-
proving access to opioid analgesics in the last 
five years, with morphine consumption jump-
ing more than three-fold over that period. In 
2010, access to opioid analgesics was very lim-
ited and available in just a few Kenyan hospi-
tals. According to a 2010 Human Rights Watch 
report, Kenya recognised oral morphine as an 
essential medicine but its central pharmaceu-
tical supplier – the Kenya Medical Supplies 
Agency, which procures essential medicines 
for public hospitals – did not purchase or 
stock oral morphine. Hospitals therefore had 
to negotiate individually with pharmaceutical 
companies to obtain the medication. More-
over, the government levied an import tax 
on morphine powder pushing up the price.56 
As Kenya’s drug law prescribed heavy prison 
sentences for illicit possession of morphine 
and provided no detailed guidelines on law-
ful possession for healthcare workers and 
patients, many healthcare providers viewed 
morphine as a dangerous substance rather 
than as an essential medicine for pain. 
Since 2010, Kenya has taken significant steps 
toward improving access to opioid analgesics. 
It has integrated palliative care into the public 
health system, developed clinical guidelines, 
and introduced multiple training curricula 
that include the use of opioid analgesics. In 
2013, the Kenya Medical Supplies Agency be-
gan to procure morphine centrally for public 
hospitals, and the government removed the 
tax on morphine powder. As a result, 43 public 
hospitals offered palliative care by late 2014, 
and all had a steady supply of morphine.57
and prescription regulations, as well as the threat 
of harsh punishment mentioned above, discour-
age pharmacies and hospitals from stocking these 
medicines, and healthcare workers from prescribing 
them, again resulting in low demand. This, in turn, 
reinforces the low priority given to pain manage-
ment and palliative care. This low prioritisation is 
not a function of low prevalence of pain, but of the 
invisibility of its sufferers.
To break out of this vicious cycle, governments and 
the international community should: 
• take a multipronged approach that focuses on 
eliminating regulatory barriers and criminal 
sanctions for legitimate medical uses of con-
trolled medicines
• develop health policies, such as national strat-
egies on cancer or on non-communicable 
diseases, that identify palliative care as an 
objective, and integrate such services into the 
healthcare system
• overcome gaps in training on the use of con-
trolled medicines for healthcare workers
• take action to ensure an adequate supply and 
distribution system.
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Introduction 
Drug prevention can be defined as any activity, cam-
paign, programme or policy aimed at preventing, 
delaying or reducing drug use and/or its negative 
consequences – either in the general population or 
within targeted sub-populations. 
A myriad of interventions have so far been devel-
oped in the field of drug prevention. In many coun-
tries, such interventions have been guided by the 
Key recommendations 
• Drug prevention programmes should be 
based on available evidence of effectiveness 
and cost-effectiveness, and be in line with 
international minimum quality standards
• Drug prevention should be considered as 
an integral part of – and never as a substi-
tute for – a comprehensive health-centred 
approach towards drug use and depend-
ence, alongside harm reduction, drug de-
pendence treatment, care and support
• The objectives of drug prevention should be 
realistic and based on an honest assessment 
of local realities and available resources
• Drug prevention should focus on minimis-
ing the risk factors and strengthening the 
protective factors in the lives of targeted 
individuals and/or groups
• Drug prevention must take care to avoid 
increasing the social stigma and marginal-
isation of people who use drugs 
• Drug prevention programmes should be 
subjected to short- and long-term scientific 
evaluations of processes and outcomes to 
measure the effectiveness and impact of 
the interventions, and should include mech-
anisms to adapt the programmes to new 
patterns of use and realities on the ground.
principle of deterrence – the belief that people will 
not use drugs if they are told about the negative ef-
fects of use and the harsh penalties they risk by us-
ing them. However, despite a consistent allocation 
of substantial government resources towards these 
interventions, available evidence indicates that 
the rates of drug use among young people remain 
high,58 and are largely unaffected by the prevention 
approaches tried so far. 
The failure of these interventions (often taking the 
form of mass media campaigns) can be explained 
by the fact that they do not have a resonance with 
young people’s lived experiences, might increase 
normative beliefs (i.e. that drug use is normal and 
widespread), and that they do not target the factors 
that mostly impact on people’s decisions around 
drug use – fashion and perception of social norms, 
peer pressure or peer selection, emotional well-be-
ing, social and community equality, etc.59 
Investing in evidence-based drug prevention not 
only reduces the individual, family and community 
harms associated with illicit drug use, but it can also 
greatly reduce costs to society. A growing body of 
evidence over the last 20 years demonstrates that 
well-designed and targeted prevention efforts can 
led to significant savings.60
The key challenge for policy makers is therefore 
to develop and implement drug prevention pro-
grammes that are based on the available evidence of 
effectiveness and cost-effectiveness, that respond to 
local needs and contexts, and that are relevant and 
meaningful to the population(s) being targeted. 
Legislative/policy issues involved 
Setting realistic objectives for prevention 
interventions
The first challenge for policy makers is to establish 
clear objectives for what prevention interventions 
are seeking to achieve. A common misconception is 
that effective drug prevention need only consist of 
informing – generally warning – young people about 
the dangers associated with drug use. Prevention is 
Drug prevention
2.3
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then often equated with scare tactics enshrined in 
mass media campaigns. However, there is currently 
no evidence to suggest that this approach has had 
an impact on drug use behaviours. On the contrary, 
some costly mass media programmes, in particular 
a well-evaluated cannabis mass media campaign in 
the USA, had no impact on levels of use, and was 
counterproductive for certain subgroups by giving 
the impression that cannabis use was more normal 
and widespread than it actually was.61 
As stated above, one of the primary objectives of 
drug prevention is often to help people avoid or de-
lay the initiation of drug use – or, if they have already 
started using drugs, to prevent their drug use from 
becoming problematic. However, in reality the chal-
lenge of prevention is much broader – it should aim 
to contribute to the positive engagement of children, 
young people and adults with their families, schools, 
workplaces and communities, and to build impor-
tant life skills and capacities that will help individuals 
respond to multiple influences in their lives, such as 
social norms, interaction with peers, living conditions 
and their own personality traits.62 
Available evidence collected over the past 20 years 
in the field of prevention offers a more complete 
understanding about:
• What makes people more vulnerable to experi-
encing problems with drug use – the so-called 
‘risk factors’. These include personality traits, 
mental health problems, family neglect and 
abuse, poor attachment to school and the com-
munity, social norms and environments that re-
inforce drug use, and growing up in marginalised 
and deprived communities 
• What makes people less vulnerable to experi-
encing problems with drug use – the so-called 
‘protective factors’. These can include greater 
psychological and emotional well-being, greater 
personal and social competence, a stronger at-
tachment to caring families, accessible economic 
opportunities, and schools and communities that 
are well resourced and organised.63 
Some of the factors that make people vulnerable 
(or, in contrast, more resistant) to initiating drug 
use or experiencing problematic use differ ac-
cording to age – with risk and protective factors 
evolving through infancy, childhood and early 
adolescence (e.g. family ties, peer pressure, etc.). 
At later stages of the age continuum, schools, 
workplaces, entertainment venues and the media 
may all contribute to make individuals more or 
likely to use drugs and engage in risky behaviours. 
Most importantly, there is a dynamic interaction of 
vulnerability factors at the personal (biological and 
psychological) and environmental (family, society, 
school, etc.) levels. 
A significant reduction in the overall level of drug 
use in society is unlikely to be achieved through a 
prevention intervention alone. However, evidence 
shows that some prevention interventions have 
achieved positive results in delaying the onset of 
drug use and strengthening individuals’ ability to 
avoid drug problems. 
Choosing the right prevention method
There are four broad categories of prevention inter-
ventions,64 some of which have proven more suita-
ble than others in certain situations or for a specific 
group of people:
Blue, yellow and red pills, India, 2011
Credit: Private
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1. Universal prevention – i.e. intervening with 
populations. This is the broadest approach to 
prevention, targeting the general public without 
any prior screening for their risk of drug use. These 
interventions therefore assume that all members 
of the population are at equal risk of initiating use. 
Universal prevention interventions should target 
skills development and interaction with peers and 
social life, and can be implemented in schools, 
communities or workplaces. Available evidence 
shows that mass media campaigns are costly, 
and have not been effective at reducing levels of 
use, while often accentuating the already high 
levels of stigma experienced by people who use 
drugs.64 Nevertheless, some well-designed and 
well-funded universal prevention programmes 
targeting school children and using an interactive, 
skills-building approach have had some impact on 
levels of drug use (see Box 1). 
2. Selective prevention – i.e. intervening with 
(vulnerable) groups. These interventions target 
specific sub-populations whose risk of starting 
using drugs or experiencing drug dependence 
is significantly higher than average. Often, this 
higher vulnerability to drug use stems from social 
exclusion (e.g. young offenders, school drop-
outs, marginalised ethnic minorities, etc.) or from 
certain social contexts (youth in party settings). 
Selective prevention interventions therefore usu-
ally target the social risk factors (such as living 
conditions and social environment) that make 
this specific group more vulnerable to drug use. 
Available evidence shows that selective pre-
vention interventions using multi-component, 
peer-led and interactive programmes focusing 
on teaching social and coping skills have showed 
a slight positive effect in delaying drug use initi-
ation, as well as improving cognitive capabilities 
and self-worth (see Box 2).65
3. Indicated prevention – i.e. intervening with 
(vulnerable) individuals. These programmes 
target high-risk individuals who are identi-
fied as being at greater risk of experiencing 
problems with drug use. Criteria for such risks 
might be mental illness, social failure, antisocial 
behaviour, hyperactivity and impulsivity. The 
aim of indicated prevention is not necessarily 
to prevent initiation of drug use, but rather to 
prevent the development of dependence. In 
this regard, prevention interventions are most 
effective when they seek to address those issues 
other than drug use by focusing on the social 
context and behavioural development of the 
targeted individual.66 
4. Environmental prevention – i.e. intervening 
with societies and systems. These interven-
tions and strategies are aimed at altering the 
immediate cultural, social, physical and eco-
nomic environments in which people make their 
choices about drug use. This perspective takes 
into account the fact that individuals do not 
become involved with drugs solely on the basis 
of personal characteristics, but rather that they 
are also influenced by a complex set of factors in 
their environment, what is expected or accepted 
in the communities in which they live, national 
legal contexts and the price, quality and availabil-
Box 1  Universal prevention 
at school: The Unplugged 
programme
Unplugged is a school-based drug pre-
vention programme which was developed 
Europe-wide and has been subject to a 
number of evaluations. The objective of the 
programme was to reduce the prevalence 
of use of illicit substances, alcohol and to-
bacco among youth, delay initiation and 
stop transition towards problematic use. The 
programme is based on a comprehensive 
social influence and interactive approach 
that includes training and the strengthening 
of social and coping skills. It consists of 12 
one-hour long sessions delivered weekly by 
school teachers. The teachers were provided 
with a detailed handbook to guide them in 
the organisation of the sessions, including 
practical suggestions for communication, lis-
tening skills and promoting dialogue with the 
pupils. Teacher training was a crucial compo-
nent of Unplugged to ensure a high-quality 
implementation of the programme.67 
The programme was evaluated between 
2004 and 2007 in Austria, Belgium, Germany, 
Greece, Italy, Spain and Sweden, involving 
143 schools and 7,079 pupils. The evaluation 
showed that Unplugged had reduced canna-
bis use – an effect which was prolonged over 
an 18-months follow-up period. Following 
the evaluation, Unplugged was reviewed 
and a second phase of the project included 
a revised teacher handbook, as well as re-
designed cards to be used in the interactive 
sessions with the pupils.68 
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Box  2   Selective prevention programme among vulnerable 
families in Portugal: ‘Searching family treasure’ 69
Searching family treasure was launched in 2004 
in Portugal to reduce the family risk factors and 
increase family protective factors related to illicit 
drug use. The programme targeted vulnerable 
families with children aged 6 to 12 years old, and 
aimed to prevent drug use, but also delinquen-
cy, violence and mental health problems. It was 
composed of parent sessions, child sessions and 
family sessions. The objectives of the programme 
included:
• decreasing parental use of harsh or inadequate 
discipline
• improving parent/child relationships with bet-
ter parenting skills
• increasing parental supervision and monitor-
ing
• increasing family communication quality, 
strengths and resilience
• decreasing children’s hyperactivity or inatten-
tion, emotional symptoms and peer problems
• increasing children’s social behaviour.70
The programme was organised around a family 
treasure hunt through which families learned 
and discovered their strengths and trained in 
parenting skills and children’s life skills – using 
attractive materials and activities including skills 
trainings, group discussions, role-play, comic 
books, games, storytelling, etc.71 
About 192 professionals were trained since 
2004 and about 15 training programmes were 
implemented in Portugal, as well as one in 
Spain.72 An evaluation of the programme by the 
participants themselves showed that 57% of 
the children benefited/benefited greatly from 
the programme, and most parents reported im-
plementing the skills gained in the programme 
back home. The families considered that the 
programme had improved their relationship 
with their children, increased their abidance to 
family rules, and reduced inattention problems. 
All parents reported being satisfied (37.5%), or 
very satisfied (65.5%), with the programme. In 
terms of impacts on substance use, while 91% of 
the participants consumed alcohol four or more 
times a week before the programme, upon its 
completion 62.5% of the parents reported total 
abstinence, 25% used alcohol once a month and 
only 12.5% consumed alcohol more than twice 
a month. Meanwhile, the perception of risks as-
sociated with illicit drug use largely increased 
among the children involved in the programme, 
and parents reported low levels of use for all sub-
stances among their children.73 
ity of drugs. Environment prevention strategies 
notably include taxation, advertising bans, as 
well as restricting availability in specific settings 
via retailer licencing, restricting retailers’ opening 
hours, etc. These have been largely applied for 
alcohol and tobacco – where governments have 
the opportunity to implement regulatory poli-
cies to effectively shape and structure the legal 
market. Similar policies are currently being estab-
lished in regulated cannabis markets in Uruguay 
and some US states.74
Enshrining prevention in broader health policies
Drug prevention is just one of the fundamental com-
ponents of a health-centred drug policy, alongside 
harm reduction (see Chapter 2.4) and drug depend-
ence treatment (see Chapter 2.5). In this respect, an 
effective drug prevention system should be: 
• Embedded in – and never be a substitute for – a 
comprehensive and health-centred system of 
drug control focused on providing treatment 
and care for people who use drugs, and on pre-
venting the health and social consequences of 
drug use (e.g. HIV/AIDS, hepatitis C, overdoses, 
marginalisation, etc.)
• Based on an understanding that not all drug use 
is problematic 
• Based on the understanding of drug depend-
ence as a complex health condition with a mix of 
biological, psychological and social causes
• Based on evidence of effectiveness and cost-ef-
fectiveness
• Mandated and supported at the national level 
by appropriate regulations and public health 
strategies: including national standards, training 
for practitioners, and requirements for schools, 
workplaces and health and social agencies to im-
plement relevant prevention interventions.
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Implementation issues involved
A series of minimum quality standards have been 
developed in the field of drug prevention, which can 
be useful to consider when designing and imple-
menting a drug prevention programme (see Box 3).76
Among these quality standards, policy makers 
should consider several specific issues which are 
exposed below.77
Conducting a needs assessment of drug use and 
community needs 
This is the first step to undergo for an effective pre-
vention intervention, in order to gain a thorough 
understanding of the needs, local contexts and tar-
Box 3   The European drug prevention quality standards75
The EMCDDA proposes a number of stages and 
components to ensure that drug prevention pro-
grammes are effective and of good quality. 
These are exposed below:
1. Cross-cutting considerations:
• Sustainability and funding
• Communication and stakeholder involve-
ment
• Staff development
• Ethical programme
2. Needs assessment: 
• Knowing drug-related policy and legislation
• Assessing drug use and community needs
• Describing the need and justifying the inter-
vention
• Understanding the target population
3. Resource assessment:
• Assessing the target population and com-
munity resources
• Assessing internal capacities
4. Programme formulation:
• Define the target population
• Use a theoretical model
• Define aims, goals and objectives
• Define the setting
• Refer to evidence of effectiveness
• Determine the timeline
5. Intervention design:
• Design should respond to quality and effec-
tiveness
• Option of selecting an existing intervention
• Tailor the intervention to the target popula-
tion
• Plan final evaluations
6. Management and mobilisation of  
resources:
• Plan the programme
• Plan financial requirements
• Set up the team
• Recruit and retain participants
• Prepare the programme materials
• Provide a project description
7. Delivery and monitoring:
• Option of conducting a pilot intervention
• Implementing the intervention
• Monitoring the implementation
• Adjusting the implementation
8. Final evaluations:
• Option of conducting an outcome evalua-
tion
• Option of conducting a process evaluation
9. Dissemination and improvement:
• Deciding whether the programme should 
be sustained
• Disseminating information about the pro-
gramme
• Producing a final report
get populations or groups, and assessing how best 
to address them. This entails assessing drug use 
patterns among the general population and specific 
groups, using quantitative and qualitative data and 
studies. This data should be used to prioritise evi-
dence-based programmes and carefully adapt pre-
vention interventions when necessary to respond to 
new patterns of use and new socio-economic and 
cultural contexts. Risk and protective factors should 
be carefully studied, as well as other relevant issues, 
such as social marginalisation and inequalities. 
According to the EMCDDA, ‘A good understanding 
of the target population and its realities is a pre-
requisite for effective, cost-effective and ethical 
drug prevention’.78 
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Some examples of quality standards: 
• The main needs of the population are described, 
and if possible, quantified
• The organisation is aware of existing and recent 
drug prevention programmes
• The programme complements other health pro-
motion or drug prevention programmes locally, 
regionally, and/or nationally
• The target population’s culture and perspectives 
on drug use are included in the needs assess-
ment.
Conducting a resource assessment 
Depending on their design and scale, prevention 
programmes can be very cheap or extremely expen-
sive. It is therefore important to conduct an assess-
ment to gain a better understanding of what can 
realistically be achieved within available resources 
(including staff and financial resources), and what 
the type and scope of the programme should be. In 
resource-poor settings, it is important to avoid rush-
ing into eye-catching campaigns that show imme-
diate action, but have little short- or long-term im-
pact (such as mass media campaigns). In addition, 
the success or failure of a prevention programme 
largely depends on whether the target group and 
other relevant stakeholders are willing and able 
to take part in, or support, the programme and 
its implementation. 
Some examples of quality standards: 
• Sources of opposition to, and support of, the pro-
gramme are considered
• The ability of the target population to participate 
in, or support, the programme is assessed
• Internal resources and capacities (i.e. human re-
sources, organisational, technological, financial 
resources) are assessed.
Evaluating the effectiveness and cost-
effectiveness of prevention interventions 
Any drug prevention programme should include 
a scientific monitoring and outcome evaluation 
component to assess whether the prevention inter-
ventions being evaluated have achieved the desired 
outcome, and are evidence-based. In some cases, 
governments may choose to test the intervention 
first with a pilot project, which can help identify the 
practical issues and weaknesses of the project’s im-
plementation. Once sufficient evidence is available 
around the impacts of the project, it can then be 
implemented on a broader scale after, if necessary, 
having been adapted to respond to any issues aris-
ing out of the pilot phase. While being carried out, 
the programme should be regularly monitored to 
help identify any need for modification. Outcomes 
and results should be carefully analysed on a regular 
basis to ensure that the programme is of high qual-
ity. The implementation of the programme should 
remain flexible to ensure that it can be adjusted in 
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People injecting heroin in Herat, Afghanistan
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Key resources 
• European Monitoring Centre on Drugs and Drug 
Addiction (2011), European drug prevention qual-
ity standards, http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/
publications/manuals/prevention-standards
• Hawks, D., Scott, K., & McBride, M. (2002), Pre-
vention of psychoactive substance use: A selected 
review of what works in the area of prevention (Ge-
neva: World Health Organisation)
• United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (2013), 
International standards on drug use prevention, 
http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/prevention/
prevention-standards.html
• World Health Organisation, Prevention publica-
tions, http://www.who.int/substance_abuse/
publications/prevention/en/
line with the findings of the monitoring process. If 
such modifications are made, they should be well 
documented and evaluated to help understand 
their impact on the programme. 
Some examples of quality standards:
• The intervention is implemented with high qual-
ity and an orientation towards participants
• The implementation of the intervention is ade-
quately documented and adjusted if necessary
• Outcome and process data are collected 
frequently and reviewed frequently and 
systematically
• The conclusions of the evaluation indicate if 
and what elements of the programme need 
to be modified to complete the programme 
successfully
• Adjustments to the programme are well-justified 
and reasons for adjustments are documented.
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Key recommendations
• Harm reduction approaches and principles 
should be integrated across all areas of drug 
policy, and all services that work with peo-
ple who use drugs – including across the 
health, social and security sectors
• The UN-endorsed package of harm reduc-
tion interventions should be expanded to 
address harms other than HIV, and deliv-
ered to scale and in a way that is acceptable 
and accessible for people who use drugs
• Governments and international donors 
should ensure sufficient funding to deliv-
er the optimal harm reduction response. 
Funds should be diverted from punitive 
drug law enforcement practices and into 
harm reduction, where the returns on in-
vestments will be greater
• Legal impediments to harm reduction 
and other health services (including an 
over-reliance on incarceration and repres-
sive drug policies) should be removed. Law 
enforcement practices undermining harm 
reduction services should be addressed and 
rectified
• Harm reduction should be delivered in a 
way that empowers communities and peo-
ple who use drugs, and also meaningfully 
engages them in programme design, deliv-
ery and evaluation
• Harm reduction programmes should en-
sure that they are gender-sensitive and ac-
cessible and relevant for young people who 
use drugs. This may require the creation of 
specialist services or programmes for wom-
en, young people and other specific groups
• Harm reduction services must be made 
available in prisons and other closed set-
tings, as well as in the community.
Introduction 
Harm reduction has emerged as an evidence-based, 
highly effective and cost-effective response to drugs 
around the world in the last 30 years. This approach 
currently sits alongside other pillars of drug policy 
– such as demand reduction and supply reduction 
– and is distinct from these in that the primary focus 
is on reducing harms, even if this does not result 
in a reduction in the prevalence of drug use or the 
scale of the illicit drug market. Harm reduction is a 
pragmatic response to drug use that accepts that 
while abstinence may be a worthy goal, it may not 
be appropriate or desirable for some individuals. 
Harm reduction has been best defined by Harm Re-
duction International as ‘policies, programmes and 
practices that aim primarily to reduce the adverse 
health, social and economic consequences of the 
use of legal and illegal psychoactive drugs without 
necessarily reducing drug consumption’.79 In some 
contexts, this approach is referred to as ‘harm mini-
misation’ or ‘risk reduction’.
Harm reduction applies to all types of substances 
and drug use. Historically, it has been overwhelm-
ingly associated with interventions aimed to reduce 
the health harms associated with the injection of 
opioids. This has resulted in a lack of attention for 
harm reduction interventions targeting other types 
of drugs and use – in particular stimulant use. As 
patterns of drug use and routes of administration 
are changing rapidly, there is an urgent need to re-
dress this situation. 
Harm reduction can most usefully be conceived as 
a set of principles rather than a list of interventions 
(see Box 1). It is both a public health and human 
rights concept, but also one that focuses on public 
safety and security: the harms to be targeted may 
include overdose, infections, over-incarceration, po-
lice violence, stigmatisation, marginalisation or har-
assment, to name just a few – while harm reduction 
should also seek to empower and engage people 
who use drugs in the formation, delivery and evalu-
ation of policies and programmes. 
Harm Reduction
2.4
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The concept of harm reduction has been highly 
politicised in drug policy debates, with a large num-
ber of countries strongly in favour, some countries 
strongly against, and others preferring to refer to in-
dividual interventions rather than a harm reduction 
approach per se. Yet harm reduction is now widely 
endorsed and recommended by the UN General 
Assembly, the Joint United Nations Programme on 
HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS), the World Health Organisation 
(WHO), the United Nations Office on Drugs and 
Crime (UNODC), the Human Rights Council, the 
Global Fund, and many others.85 It is also endorsed 
in national policy documents in 91 countries, and 
such high-level endorsement (often through na-
tional HIV/AIDS policies) can be important for en-
suring the funding and scale-up of these services.86
Globally, the coverage of harm reduction services 
for people who inject drugs remains woefully inade-
quate: for example, just two needles are distributed 
per person who injects drugs per month, and only 
8% of people who inject opioids had access to opi-
oid substitution therapy (OST).87 In many settings, 
this is a consequence of a lack of political will to 
scale-up and endorse harm reduction programmes, 
and a global funding crisis for this approach.88 As 
highlighted above, people who use stimulants have 
even more limited access to harm reduction servic-
es that respond to their specific needs.
In some settings, the coverage of harm reduction 
is actively undermined by laws or law enforcement 
practice. For example, the delivery of needle and 
syringe programmes (which provide sterile inject-
ing equipment to people who use drugs to prevent 
blood-borne virus transmission through the re-use 
of unsterile items) face severe barriers in countries 
where the possession of needles and syringes is 
deemed as evidence of drug use, or outlawed in 
its own right. Similarly, OST using methadone, bu-
prenorphine or other medicines is prohibited in 
some countries.89 The WHO has therefore clearly 
stated that ‘Countries should work toward develop-
ing policies and laws that decriminalize the use of 
clean needles and syringes (and that permit NSPs) 
and that legalize OST for people who are opioid-de-
pendent’.90 Similar legislative reforms may also be 
required for other harm reduction interventions – 
including drug consumption rooms/safer injecting 
facilities, and pill or drug checking services. A wide 
range of UN agencies have now called for the de-
criminalisation of drug use in order to support harm 
reduction responses (see Chapter 3.1).
In many countries, harm reduction workers (especial-
ly peer and outreach workers) are also targeted by 
law enforcement for ‘promoting’ or ‘facilitating’ drug 
Around the world, an estimated 246 million people 
use internationally controlled substances.81 Of the 
8.5 to 21.5 million people who inject drugs, around 
13.5% are living with HIV – far exceeding the preva-
lence in the general population.82 While a minority of 
people who use drugs develop dependence, most 
experience heightened risks as a result of criminal-
isation and marginalisation. An estimated 52% of 
people who inject drugs are living with hepatitis C, 
and there are thought to be nearly 200,000 drug-re-
lated deaths each year – primarily by overdose.83 A 
growing body of research also points to the harms 
associated with non-injecting drug use, in particular 
the snorting and smoking of cocaine and its deriva-
tives. In Latin America, there is increasing evidence 
that such use is associated with increased vulnera-
bility to HIV and hepatitis C, as well as lung infec-
tions.84 However, more data is required on the issue. 
Legislative/policy issues involved 
Available data and statistics clearly demonstrate 
the need for services and interventions which aim 
to protect the health and well-being of people 
who use drugs, prevent infections and prolong life, 
as well as policies to remove barriers to accessing 
health or justice.
Box 1  The principles of 
harm reduction80
• Harm reduction is targeted at risks and 
harms
• Harm reduction is evidence-based and cost 
effective
• Harm reduction is incremental, acknowl-
edging the significance of any positive 
change that individuals make in their lives 
• Harm reduction is rooted in dignity and 
compassion, and consequently rejects dis-
crimination, stereotyping and stigmatisa-
tion
• Harm reduction acknowledges the univer-
sality and interdependence of human rights
• Harm reduction challenges policies and 
practices that maximise harm – including 
criminalisation
• Harm reduction values transparency, ac-
countability and participation.
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Box  2  The Community Action on Harm Reduction (CAHR) 
Project
The CAHR project is an example of how harm 
reduction principles can be incorporated into 
a comprehensive programme. Funded by the 
Dutch Ministry of Internal Affairs (BUZA), via the 
International HIV/AIDS Alliance, the five-year 
project sought to expand access to harm re-
duction services for people who inject drugs in 
China, India, Indonesia, Kenya and Malaysia. The 
project was unique in its approach to develop 
and expand services to people who inject drugs 
by supporting grassroots community initiatives, 
building pragmatic partnerships with local 
stakeholders, and supporting international and 
national advocacy efforts to address the policy 
and structural barriers to programme sustaina-
bility.
By mid-2014, the project had reached 65,000 
people who inject drugs and 240,000 further 
beneficiaries (such as sexual partners and family 
members). More than 13,000 people across the 
five countries have received voluntary HIV test-
ing and counselling, 40,000 have benefited from 
psycho-social support, legal support, housing 
and/or income generation services, and 47,000 
have been reached by sexual rights and health 
services. Furthermore, 90% of people who inject 
drugs reported the use of sterile injecting equip-
ment the last time they injected.91 
The CAHR project also places a strong empha-
sis on  building the local capacity of communi-
ty-based organisations and sharing knowledge 
and experiences in order to introduce or improve 
essential harm reduction interventions. In Ken-
ya, for example, the project was instrumental in 
starting needle and syringe programmes (NSPs) 
and OST – despite major challenges from po-
lice crackdowns and some religious and com- 
munity leaders.
CAHR also has a strong policy agenda that is de-
fined by the pragmatic objective of developing 
effective HIV and drug use services based on 
available evidence. Experiences of the project 
on the ground are captured to influence policy 
debates both at the national and international 
level. Finally, CAHR objectives include the full 
and meaningful participation of people who use 
drugs in policy and programme design and a 
strong commitment to protecting and promot-
ing human rights – for example, the project ena-
bled the establishment of the Kenyan Network of 
People who Use Drugs.92
use. Wherever possible, it is important that harm re-
duction services are delivered with the agreement, 
understanding and collaboration of law enforce-
ment agencies to prevent such issues – whether 
this is negotiated at the local level, or formalised in 
national policy guidelines and protocols.93 Similarly, 
if law enforcement officers target harm reduction 
services to find and arrest people who use drugs, 
these services will not be used by their clients and 
the potential health benefits will be lost.
Implementation issues 
involved 
In 2009, the WHO, the UNODC and UNAIDS articulat-
ed a ‘comprehensive package’ of nine interventions 
to address HIV among people who inject drugs (see 
the first nine interventions listed below). These in-
terventions collectively ‘have the greatest impact 
on HIV prevention and treatment’ and a ‘wealth of 
scientific evidence supporting [their] efficacy’.94 
It has been widely acknowledged that this list of in-
terventions is not exhaustive. We therefore propose 
a number of additional evidence-based interven-
tions (interventions 10 to 21 below) – although even 
this list is not comprehensive as harm reduction is 
forced to evolve to respond to new patterns of use 
and harms. 
This list is predominantly focused on people who 
inject drugs and on HIV. However, in an effort to re-
spond to the urgent need to elaborate better harm 
reduction responses for non-opioid and non-inject-
ing drug use (for instance cocaine and ATS use,95 as 
well as the non-medical use of some pharmaceutical 
medications), we propose a set of harm reduction 
interventions specifically targeted at stimulant use 
(interventions 19 to 21).
1. Needle and syringe programmes: The supply 
of sterile injecting equipment (including needles 
and syringes, but also filters, spoons, cleaning 
swabs and sterile water) to reduce the spread of 
infections.96 Clients are also encouraged to return 
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their used equipment to allow for their safe dis-
posal, and should be provided with information 
and education on safer injecting techniques. 
NSPs have a very strong evidence base in terms 
of reducing HIV transmission, risk behaviours 
such as syringe sharing, and helping to signpost 
individuals into drug treatment where required.97
2. OST and other drug dependence treatment: 
WHO Essential Medicines such as methadone 
or buprenorphine can be used to substitute 
street opioids such as heroin – either in the long 
term (referred to as ‘maintenance’ therapy) or 
the shorter term. Some countries also prescribe 
pharmaceutical heroin (diacetylmorphine) for 
this purpose, particularly to patients who have 
not responded to the other medicines available. 
This heavily-researched intervention has been 
proven to reduce injecting, reduce criminality, 
support adherence to HIV,98 hepatitis C and 
tuberculosis99 treatment, and improve overall 
health and well-being.100 For more information, 
see Chapter 2.5.
3. HIV testing and counselling: This is targeted 
specifically at people who use drugs – but al-
ways on a voluntary and confidential basis, and 
ideally tied to efforts to connect newly diag-
nosed individuals to accessible care and treat-
ment services.
4. Antiretroviral therapy: People who use drugs 
should have the same access to HIV treatment, 
following the same recommendations as for 
all adults.101 In practice, they are often discrim-
inated against or perceived as likely to fail on 
treatment – yet when treatment is provided in a 
supportive environment, people who use drugs 
have similar outcomes to everyone else.102-103
5. Prevention and treatment of sexually trans-
mitted infections: For people who use drugs 
and their sexual partners, particularly be-
cause such infections – especially those that 
cause genital lesions – may increase the risk of 
HIV transmission.
6. Condom distribution: Targeted at people who 
use drugs and their sexual partners.
7. Targeted information, education and commu-
nication: Including safer injecting advice (also 
known as ‘behaviour change communication’). 
It is important to provide credible information 
on the effects and harms associated with differ-
ent substances, as well as objective information 
about different routes of drug administration. 
Information, education and communication 
should be up-to-date and adapt to changing 
patterns of drug use and purchase – for exam-
ple, the trend in some countries towards online 
drug sales provides opportunities for the provi-
sion of harm reduction advice through online 
forums and customer reviews.
8. Vaccination, diagnosis and treatment of viral 
hepatitis: The vaccine for hepatitis B is highly 
effective and should be made available to all 
people at risk, including people who use drugs, 
prisoners and harm reduction workers. There 
have been major advances in treatment for hep-
atitis C, which is a curable disease regardless of a 
person’s drug use.104
9. Prevention, diagnosis and treatment of 
tuberculosis: People who use drugs are at 
heightened risk of tuberculosis (and mul-
ti-drug-resistant tuberculosis) for a range of 
reasons – from frequent incarceration to the 
A peer educator collecting used needles in Vietnam
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compromised immune systems associated 
with HIV infections.
10. Basic health services, including overdose 
prevention and management:106 Overdose 
is a common experience for many people who 
use drugs, and a leading cause of death among 
people who inject drugs. Harm reduction pro-
grammes include the provision of naloxone – a 
WHO Essential Medicine which quickly and safe-
ly reverses the respiratory depression from an 
opioid overdose (see Box 3). Services may also 
focus on resuscitation techniques, and advice 
on how to prevent overdose in the first place. 
Additionally, medical amnesties and ‘good Sa-
maritan’ laws in many countries help to protect 
people who respond to overdoses from poten-
tial liability, increasing the likelihood of life-sav-
ing interventions.
11. Services for people who are drug dependent 
or using drugs in prison or detention: The 
whole suite of harm reduction services should 
be made available in prisons and other closed 
settings, just as in the community. Yet only eight 
countries have NSPs in prison (compared to 90 
countries with community programmes), and 
only 43 countries provide OST in prison settings 
(compared to 80 countries with community pro-
grammes). For more information, please refer to 
Chapter 3.6.
12. Advocacy: This is identified by UNAIDS as one 
of the ‘critical enablers’ for an effective HIV 
response, and covers a wide range of interven-
tions promoting and protecting the health and 
human rights of people who use drugs, and 
other affected populations. A key part of this is 
advocacy for drug policy reform and for harm 
reduction services.107 Efforts to reduce the stig-
ma associated with dug use are also crucial to 
remove key barriers faced by people who use 
drugs (see Box 4).
13. Psychosocial support: In order to meet the 
needs of people who use drugs, services should 
also be able to provide – or help clients to access – 
mental health, social and financial services where 
they are required. Psychiatric disorders such as 
depression, stress and post-traumatic stress dis-
order are more prevalent among drug using pop-
ulations.108 New York’s Lower East Side Harm Re-
Box 3  Overdose programmes   
in New York City
After years of increasing overdose mortality 
and the deaths of many friends and clients, 
three community-based harm reduction 
programmes launched New York City’s first 
overdose prevention programmes in 2004, 
including naloxone distribution to people 
who use opioids. The three groups covered 
a geographically diverse section of the city, 
included one harm reduction programme 
for young people, and quickly moved from 
an initially small-scale, periodic service to 
one that expanded to street-based training 
and saturated communities with information 
and tools to prevent and reverse overdoses. 
In mid-2006, following an evaluation of the 
first projects, the New York City government 
picked up the costs of the programme – con-
tributing enough funding to support over-
dose programmes at all of the city’s harm 
reduction organisations and to hire a full-time 
medical director for the programme. In the 
two years that followed, overdose mortality 
dropped by a further 27% across the city.105 
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duction Centre, for example, established a team 
of mental health professionals to support clients 
living with mental health issues, as well as hous-
ing services, legal support, and case management 
to coordinate health and social services.113
14. Access to justice/legal services: As an almost 
universally criminalised population, people who 
use drugs often find themselves in confronta-
tion with the criminal justice system. They may 
also be subject to human rights abuses, police 
abuse, mistrial and harassment. It is important, 
therefore, that they have access to legal support. 
For example, Release is a UK charity focused on 
drug laws and human rights, which provides a 
free helpline for people who use drugs to access 
confidential expert legal advice and support.114
15. Children and youth programmes: Although 
many young people use drugs, most services 
are designed for adults and may not even be le-
gally allowed to provide people under the age 
of 18 with services such as NSPs. Many other 
barriers exist that prevent young people from 
accessing harm reduction services, including 
parental consent in some countries. Yet many 
successful youth-oriented harm reduction 
programmes exist. For example, Vancouver’s 
Crystal Clear harm reduction project provides 
peer outreach, support and leadership devel-
opment, harm reduction education and health 
services, to support young people who use 
methamphetamine.115
16. Livelihood development/economic strength-
ening: This includes education, training and 
financial support for people to access employ-
ment, and micro-financing programmes to sup-
port people in generating legitimate incomes.
17. Drug consumption rooms/safer injecting 
facilities:116 These supervised facilities allow 
people to bring their pre-purchased drugs to 
be injected, smoked and/or snorted in a sterile, 
safe environment. The presence of medically 
trained staff ensures that overdoses and oth-
Box  4  Support Don’t Punish: A global show of force for harm 
reduction and policy reform
The ‘Support. Don’t Punish’ campaign109 is a global 
advocacy initiative calling for greater invest-
ments in the harm reduction response, and for 
the reform of ineffective drug policies. First con-
ceived as part of the CAHR project (see Box 2), 
the campaign comprises independent branding, 
an interactive website featuring open-access re-
sources, social media presence,110 an Interactive 
Photo Project where more than 7,000 support-
ers around the world have taken part,111 and a 
‘Global Day of Action’. For the latter, advocacy 
efforts are focused on 26 June – the United  
Nations Day Against Drug Abuse and Illicit Traf-
ficking – with the aim of reclaiming the media, 
the public narrative and the political discourse on 
this high-profile day. On 26 June 2015, activists 
in 160 cities around the world organised a wide 
variety of local actions – all using the ‘Support. 
Don’t Punish’ branding and messaging to raise 
awareness of the campaign issues, in particular 
allocating more funding for harm reduction, 
scaling up services, and removing political and 
legislative barriers to ensure better access.112 
Global Day of Action in Mauritius, 26th June 2015
Credit: Collectif U
rgence Toxida
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er health problems can be addressed quickly 
and effectively. As of 2015, there were 86 drug 
consumption rooms across seven European 
countries,117 plus additional services in Sydney, 
Australia and Vancouver, Canada. Despite many 
years of operation, and millions of injections 
overseen, there has never been a fatal overdose 
in these supervised facilities. The effects extend 
beyond the facilities themselves: deaths in the 
neighbourhood around Insite, Vancouver’s in-
jection facility, dropped by 35% in the year after 
it opened.118 In Switzerland, drug consumption 
rooms have also drastically reduced levels of dis-
turbance in the surrounding public areas.
18. Gender-sensitive services: Women who use 
drugs often face greater stigma, discrimina-
tion and risks than men, and their needs may 
differ significantly. For example, gender-sen-
sitive harm reduction services are those which 
provide, or make alternative arrangements for 
childcare, the prevention of mother-to-child HIV 
transmission, family counselling and support, 
programmes to reduce gender-based violence, 
sex work services, female condoms, and wom-
en-only spaces and/or times.119
19. Drug checking: In response to the harms asso-
ciated with stimulant use and the emergence 
of a diverse array of NPS, drug checking has 
Credit: João Luiz/SECO
M
Box  5  The Braços Abertos Programme in Sao Paulo
The ‘Braços Abertos’ (Open Arms) programme 
aims to address the significant health, social and 
security problems in Cracôlandia, a large open 
crack scene in Sao Paulo, Brazil. Launched in 2013, 
it is targeted at homeless people who use crack in 
the area. It provides housing in hotels contracted 
by the government, and offers access to health-
care, employment, clothing and one meal a day 
– without requiring abstinence from crack use. It 
is an example of a ‘Housing First’ approach – the 
objective being to support people with their drug 
problems by providing stable housing, hence en-
abling people to reduce a variety of harms associ-
ated with life on the street.120
The ‘Braços Abertos’ programme required coor-
dination across several municipal departments 
(health, culture, education, social welfare, envi-
ronment, labour and human rights), as well as 
close partnerships with civil society groups. It 
seeks to strengthen social networks and encour-
age the participation and support of society. 
Since its creation, the programme has empow-
ered participants to return to their families, 
gain formal employment or adhere to health 
treatments – and the Brazilian government has 
announced plans to scale up the approach in  
21 cities.121 
Participants of the Braços Abertos programme
Credit: João Luiz/SECO
M
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emerged to help people know what they are 
consuming, and avoid using unknown and 
potentially dangerous adulterants. This service 
also assists emergency medical staff and public 
health agencies in identifying trends in illicit 
drug markets to better tailor their harm reduc-
tion and treatment response. Organisations 
such as DanceSafe in North America provide 
drug checking services directly at electronic 
music events, with the cooperation of local pub-
lic health departments.122 
20. Distribution of smoking paraphernalia: Crack 
use continues to be associated with various 
health problems, including blisters, sores, cuts 
on the lips and gums, as well as HIV and hep-
atitis C infections. Harm reduction groups in 
Canada have recently promoted the distribution 
of sterile crack smoking paraphernalia which 
include glass pipes (which are heat-resistant 
and shatterproof ), mouthpieces, filters, alcohol 
swabs, screens and push sticks.123 
21. Social support services: Other relevant harm 
reduction services include housing, shelter and 
employment services (see Box 5).
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Drug dependence treatment
2.5
Key recommendations
• The primary objective of treatment systems 
for drug dependence should be to enable 
individuals to enhance autonomy and live 
fulfilling lifestyles
• Although abstinence may be a worthy goal, 
it may not be achievable or appropriate for 
some individuals, who should be given the 
right to remain under substitution therapy 
should they wish to do so, and as long as 
they deem it to be necessary
• Policy makers should make a long-term 
investment in treatment, in order to ade-
quately respond to drug dependence and 
reduce its associated health and social costs
• Investments in drug dependence treat-
ment should demonstrate a systemic 
approach rather than a w of isolated inter-
ventions: it should identify those most in 
need of treatment; offer a balanced menu 
of evidence-based services; and develop 
smooth mechanisms for individuals to 
move between different elements as their 
circumstances change
• Approaches that breach human rights stan-
dards (such as the compulsory detention 
of people who use drugs) should not be  
implemented. Not only are these unethical, 
they are also highly unlikely to achieve the 
desired aims and are not cost-effective
• More research should be conducted on the 
treatment of stimulant dependence
• It is necessary to constantly review and 
evaluate national treatment systems to 
make sure that they are operating effec-
tively and in accordance to global evidence. 
Services can be made more effective and 
responsive if they include the meaning-
ful involvement of clients in their design  
and delivery.
Introduction 
There is an increasing trend to view drug depend-
ence in health terms rather than as a criminal and/
or moral problem. Recent estimates suggest that in 
2013, approximately 246 million adults used con-
trolled drugs for non-medical purposes (range 162 
to 329 million).124 Of this total, just one in ten (ap-
proximately 27 million adults), were estimated to be 
dependent on drugs.125 
Evidence-based drug dependence treatment has 
proved effective in managing drug dependence, 
reducing drug-related harms and minimising so-
cial and crime costs. Available data demonstrate 
that opioid substitution therapy (OST) improves 
retention in treatment and reduces illicit opioid 
use,126 thereby reducing the incidence of injecting, 
and consequently exposure to blood-borne viruses 
such as HIV and hepatitis C.127 However, only one in 
six people dependent on drugs has access to evi-
dence-based drug treatment.128 In view of this situ-
ation, access to OST should be scaled up to address 
the unmet need that currently exists worldwide. 
The range of drugs available is itself increasing, 
and a model effective for one (for example opi-
oids) may not be effective for another (for example 
crack, methamphetamines, etc.). There is therefore 
an urgent need to give more prominence and at-
tention to substitution treatment options for other 
substances, in particular stimulants. Indeed, pilot 
studies on the treatment of methamphetamine de-
pendence using dexamphetamine, as well as on the 
use of cannabis to reduce crack dependence, have 
shown promising results. 
There is a clear economic case for expanding invest-
ments in drug dependence treatment, as invest-
ments can lead to large-scale savings in health, so-
cial and crime costs.129 A 2010 study by the UK Home 
Office estimated that for every £1 (US$1.40) spent 
on drug dependence treatment, society benefits to 
the tune of £2.50 (US$3.60).130 Research in the USA 
has estimated that the benefit return for metha-
done maintenance treatment is around four times 
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drug dependence, no single approach to treatment 
is likely to produce positive outcomes across soci-
ety. Therefore, policy makers should work towards 
a treatment system that encompasses a range of 
models that are closely integrated and mutually 
reinforcing – and that takes into account the choice 
and preferences of the person accessing treatment. 
The impact of the legal and physical environment 
means that effective treatment interventions 
should offer both medications and psychosocial 
services, while taking into account the impact of the 
social and cultural setting in which they do so. Such 
interventions, as part of an effective treatment sys-
tem, can enable an individual to live a healthy and 
socially constructive lifestyle.
Legislative/policy issues 
involved 
International obligations
The obligation on UN member states to provide 
drug treatment to their citizens is embedded in the 
international drug control conventions. Under Ar-
ticle 38 of the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic 
Drugs, and article 20 of the 1971 Convention on Psy-
chotropic Substances, signatory states are required 
to take practical measures for ‘the early identifica-
tion, treatment, education, aftercare, rehabilitation 
and social reintegration of the persons involved’.135 
Moreover, the right to treatment is included in the 
more general obligations relating to the right to 
the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard 
of physical and mental health (‘the right to health’). 
The right to health was first articulated in the Con-
stitution of the World Health Organisation in 1946, 
and mentioned in the Universal Declaration of Hu-
man Rights two years later.136 These are foundation-
al documents in the UN system, and the inclusion 
within them of the right to health demonstrates the 
importance with which the concept is endowed in 
international law. The preambles to the UN drug 
control conventions reinforce these principles; the 
first words of the 1961 Convention and the 1971 
Convention express member states’ concern ‘with 
the health and welfare of mankind’.137 And, as the 
former High Commissioner for Human Rights stat-
ed: ‘Individuals who use drugs do not forfeit their 
human rights’.138
Ensuring access to essential medicines for OST
Both methadone and buprenorphine are included in 
the WHO Model List of Essential Medicines.139 Accord-
ing to human rights treaties within which the right to 
health is protected, such as the International Covenant 
the treatment cost.131 Indeed, according to the Na-
tional Institute on Drug Abuse, ‘The average cost for 
1 full year of methadone maintenance treatment is 
approximately $4,700, whereas 1 full year of impris-
onment costs approximately $18,400 per person’,132 
concluding that ‘Research has demonstrated that 
methadone maintenance treatment is beneficial 
to society, cost effective and pays for itself in basic 
economic terms’.133
The impact of drug use on individuals depends on 
the complex interaction between the pharmacolog-
ical properties of the substance used, the attributes 
and attitudes of the person who uses drugs, and the 
environment in which consumption takes place. 
Treatment interventions need to consider each of 
these factors and how they interact. In all societies, 
the prevalence of drug dependence has been large-
ly concentrated among marginalised groups, where 
rates of emotional trauma, poverty and social exclu-
sion are highest.134 Given the many factors that drive 
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mosque in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia
  51IDPC Drug Policy Guide
Box  1  Heroin-assisted treatment (HAT) – the UK example
An estimated 5% of opioid users in substitution 
treatment do not respond well to treatment with 
methadone. They are often among the most 
marginalised of people who use drugs and may 
experience a range of severe health and psycho-
social problems. This may result in high costs in 
terms of welfare and engagement with the crim-
inal justice system. 
In the UK, there is a history of prescribing inject-
able heroin to people dependent on opioids. 
However, in the 1960s and 1970s, this practice 
became politically controversial, mainly because 
people collected take-away doses from pharma-
cies, with very little supervision. It is probable 
that this prescribing fed an illicit market. By the 
mid- to late-1970s, the prescribing of heroin 
ceased almost entirely. Nonetheless, there con-
tinued to be an unmet therapeutic need among 
a highly vulnerable section of people dependent 
on drugs, who did not progress with methadone 
and tended to purchase and use illicit supplies of 
heroin in addition to, or instead of, their metha-
done doses.
In recent years, a new and politically more ac-
ceptable regime of HAT was developed in Eu-
rope, especially in Switzerland.141 The UK began 
scientific trials of this method, in which clients 
received doses of injectable heroin in special 
clinical facilities, under controlled conditions, 
with close supervision and support from medical 
staff in a clean and secure setting.142 
Many of these clients found it to be a life-chang-
ing experience, and saw significant improvement 
in their health and social well-being, alongside 
large reductions in illicit drug use and associated 
criminal activity. The trials involved the clients in 
peer support and research assistant capacities. 
The researchers found that HAT enabled a hard-
to-reach and hard-to-treat population to access 
healthcare and support services, as well as meet-
ing political and public order objectives and the 
requirements of clinical safety.143
A recent systematic review and meta-analysis of 
randomised controlled trials with HAT has been 
carried out by some of the researchers involved 
in these trials. Those reviewed were carried out in 
Canada, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain, Swit-
zerland and the UK. The research concluded that 
‘heroin-prescribing, as a part of highly regulated 
regimen, is a feasible and effective treatment 
for a particularly difficult-to-treat group of hero-
in-dependent patients’.144
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the medicines 
that signatory states are obliged to make available 
must be ‘scientifically and medically appropriate’.140 
In countries such as the Netherlands, the UK and 
Switzerland, governments have developed success-
ful treatment programmes providing a large range 
of options, including substitution with methadone 
and buprenorphine, but also with morphine and 
heroin (see Box 1). It is essential that drug laws and 
policies be reviewed to ensure adequate access to 
these substances for OST.
In some countries, however, people who use drugs 
have lost their fundamental right to health. In Russia, 
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, for instance, the use 
of methadone is prohibited by law. This is despite 
the fact that the United Nations Office on Drugs and 
Crime (UNODC) estimates that 2.29% of the adult 
population of Russia are injecting drugs. A third of 
the global total of people who inject drugs living 
with HIV reside in Russia.145 The proportion of Russian 
AIDS cases linked to injecting drug use is estimated 
at 65%, while around 35% of people who inject 
drugs are living with HIV.146 The country is subject to 
epidemic levels of both injecting drug use and HIV, 
yet the availability of the treatment with the most ex-
tensive evidence base, OST, is blocked by the Russian 
government. In other countries where methadone 
is available, buprenorphine remains illegal, as is the 
case in Mauritius – leaving limited treatment options 
for people dependent on opioids. 
Ending compulsory detention 
In many countries, treatment systems for drug de-
pendence are non-existent or under-developed, 
or pursue models inconsistent with human rights 
standards and global evidence of effectiveness. Re-
search, experience and international human rights 
instruments indicate that certain treatment practic-
es should not be implemented. Some governments, 
for example, have introduced treatment regimes 
that rely on coercion, ill-treatment, denial of medi-
cal care, or forced labour.147
In China and South East Asia, including in Vietnam, 
Cambodia, Malaysia, Thailand and Lao People’s 
Democratic Republic, the use of compulsory centres 
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for drug users (CCDUs) as a mode of rehabilitation 
is a widely accepted and common practice.148 The 
use of compulsory detention is also found in Latin 
America and Central Asia.
CCDUs are generally run by the police or military 
rather than health authorities, and people caught 
using drugs are forced to stay in such facilities, fre-
quently without due legal process or judicial over-
sight, sometimes for several years. They are denied 
scientific, evidence-based drug treatment, and can 
be subjected to forced labour, which is either unpaid 
or paid well below minimum wage levels, as well as 
a range of punishment such as physical, psycho-
logical and sexual abuse, and solitary confinement. 
General medical healthcare is often non-existent, 
and diseases such as HIV and tuberculosis are wide-
spread among detainees. 
CCDUs are also very costly and ineffective. Relapse 
rates are very high (in Vietnam, for example, from 
80% to 97%)149 and detainees face challenges with 
social reintegration largely due to the stigmatisa-
tion associated with being detained for using drugs. 
Although certain governments in the region have 
recently introduced new drug laws that have modi-
fied the status of people who use drugs from ‘crimi-
nals’ to ‘patients’, such as China’s 2008 Anti-Drug Law 
and Thailand’s 2002 Narcotic Addict Rehabilitation 
Act, the humanitarian rhetoric of these legal texts 
is unrepresentative of the reality of life in the com-
pulsory centres, which impose cruel and dangerous 
punishments under the guise of treatment.150 These 
conditions violate scientific and medical standards, 
as well as international human rights law.
In 2012, a joint statement supported by 12 UN agen-
cies called for the closure of compulsory detention 
centres on the grounds that they violate human 
rights and threaten the health of detainees.151 The 
UNODC and the Joint United Nations Programme 
on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) have since run a series of 
consultations on compulsory centres. The third con-
sultation took place in September 2015, and was at-
tended by drug control, health and finance officials 
from Cambodia, China, Indonesia, Lao People’s Dem-
ocratic Republic, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, 
Thailand and Vietnam. These countries agreed to 
sign up to a ‘roadmap’ toward evidence-based sup-
port services for people who use drugs.152 
Nonetheless, there is a clear need to accelerate 
national-level transitions to voluntary, communi-
ty-based drug dependence treatment and support 
services, which require corresponding reforms to 
drug laws and policies in order to remove incarcer-
ation and other punitive responses for people who 
use drugs. Although the process may be a slow one, 
the UN and civil society stakeholders have worked 
hard to develop guidance and recommendations 
on the way forward, and elements of communi-
ty-based treatment have already been established 
in Cambodia, China, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand 
and Vietnam.153 
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wishing to access treatment. Moreover, treatment 
programmes should be thoroughly integrated with 
prevention and harm reduction services, and have 
effective linkage(s) with criminal justice, public 
health and social welfare services. 
Entering a treatment programme
There are a number of potential routes through 
which a person can approach treatment services 
without falling into the trap of coercive treatment 
models or compulsory detention: 
• Self-referral – Sufficient information should be 
available for people to be aware of the range of 
treatment services available
• Identification through general health and social 
service structures – Existing healthcare and social 
services will often be in an excellent position to 
recognise symptoms of drug dependence and 
encourage the person to ask for specialist help. 
For example, general practitioners are often trust-
ed by their patients and can play a key role, pro-
vided they have sufficient training on drugs and 
drug dependence
• Identification through specialist drug advice cen-
tres or street outreach services – These services 
can offer food, temporary housing, low-threshold 
harm reduction services, and mechanisms to re-
fer people to drug treatment programmes on a 
voluntary basis
• Identification through the criminal justice system 
– Through the illicit nature of their drug use, and 
the need to fund it, people dependent on drugs 
may come into contact with the criminal justice 
system. A range of referral schemes can be estab-
lished to offer people dependent on drugs who 
have committed low-level offences opportunities 
to attend a treatment programme (see Chapter 
3.4 for more information). 
Treatment methods
Multiple methods of evidence-based treatment 
should be available, ranging from substitution ther-
apy to psychosocial support and abstinence-orient-
ed approaches, so that those seeking treatment may 
select the most appropriate form for themselves. 
When the treatment method chosen is substitution 
therapy, it is essential that medical staff providing 
the treatment be adequately trained, and that the 
dosage of the substitution drug is adequate for the 
needs of the client.
As the range of substances being used is expand-
ing – and the demand for treatment for stimulant 
dependence is increasing – governments and 
Box  2  A community-based 
treatment model in Indonesia 
Rumah Singga PEKA (PEKA) is a local civil so-
ciety organisation based in Bogor, Indonesia, 
offering treatment options for people who 
inject drugs. The overall objective of PEKA is to 
improve the quality of life of people who use 
drugs. As such, it relies heavily on client-cen-
tred approaches to deliver tailored health 
services that adequately meet the needs of 
people who use drugs. Access to treatment is 
voluntary and people can withdraw from the 
programme at any time. Treatment includes 
both in-patient and community-based op-
tions. Clients can choose between an intensive 
two-months programme (involving detoxifica-
tion, peer counselling, psychosocial support, 
life-skills training, relapse prevention and 
social and vocational activities) or a non-inten-
sive four-months programme (involving coun-
selling, life-skills training, relapse prevention 
and social and vocational activities). 
Clients have the option of entering OST (with 
both methadone and suboxone), primary and 
reproductive healthcare, HIV counselling and 
testing, ART, testing and treatment for hepati-
tis C, tuberculosis and STIs. To do so, PEKA has 
established a comprehensive network of hos-
pitals, community health centres, health lab-
oratories and private psychiatrists to facilitate 
effective health referrals for clients. Sterile 
injecting equipment is available for all clients. 
Finally, PEKA mobilises people who use drugs 
to participate in advocacy interventions and 
campaigns. 
In 2013, PEKA reached a total of 786 people us-
ing drugs. Among those, 95 received inpatient 
treatment, and 691 were reached via commu-
nity outreach, 670 were referred to HIV coun-
selling and testing, and 13 to OST. In 2014, an 
additional 250 inmates received training and 
education sessions in four prisons.154 
Implementation issues involved 
The complexity of drug dependence is such that the 
response, setting and intensity of treatment need to 
be tailored to each person. It is therefore essential 
that a comprehensive menu of services is made 
available to suit the differing characteristics, needs, 
preferences and circumstances of each person 
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Effective aftercare support 
Many people dependent on drugs are economically 
vulnerable and socially excluded, mainly because of 
the high stigma and discrimination resulting from 
the criminalisation of drug use (see Chapter 3.1). A 
crucial objective of treatment is to improve people’s 
engagement in society. This means raising levels of 
education, facilitating access to employment and 
housing, and offering other social support. A key 
element of this process is the strengthening of so-
scientists are now playing catch-up to develop 
effective systems of treatment for methamphet-
amines (see Box 3), crack (see Box 4), and new 
psychoactive substances (NPS). Some countries 
have established extensive treatment systems over 
many decades, while others are just starting to de-
velop experience and understanding of this policy 
area. However, all countries have some way to go 
to achieve a sufficiently integrated range of treat-
ment services for drug dependence that makes 
effective use of available resources to maximise 
health and social gains.
Treatment success and recovery should not be un-
derstood only as abstinence from drug use. Recov-
ery encompasses any positive step or change that 
leads to the improvement of the person’s health, 
well-being and overall quality of life. This is particu-
larly true for people under substitution therapy,155 
but also for people who have learned to control 
their drug use in order to minimise the health and 
social harms associated with it (for example, see Box 
4).156 Recovery is therefore incremental, and it is up 
to each individual to decide what their goal towards 
recovery will be within their treatment programme. 
Treatment setting
As well as offering a variety of evidence-based in-
terventions, an effective treatment system should 
also deliver interventions in a range of environ-
ments. Treatment can be community-based (such 
as regular attendance at a clinic where clients 
receive prescribed medications, psychosocial 
support and counselling, etc.), residential, or de-
livered in other health services such as drop-in 
centres or harm reduction facilities. It is difficult 
to be prescriptive about which should receive 
the greatest emphasis, as this will vary according 
to the particular needs of the person, available 
resources, and the availability of trained medical 
professionals – for maximum coverage, a combi-
nation of all of these settings constitutes the best 
option. Community settings tend to be less costly 
in resource-constrained environment, and may 
be more appropriate where there is strong social, 
family and community support for the person de-
pendent on drugs. However, it can sometimes be 
better for the client to be treated away from their 
home area when these supports are absent. Such 
decisions should be made on an individual basis, 
by the client and therapist working in partnership, 
as part of a care plan. The chain of care should be 
thoroughly integrated – as clients may wish to 
move across all three of these settings during their 
treatment programme, according to their needs. 
Box  3  Treatment for 
amphetamine-type stimulants 
Methamphetamine and other ATS are the 
second most widely used drugs globally, after 
cannabis.157 These stimulants can be associat-
ed with considerable levels of health harms, 
including psychological problems and medi-
cal complications, many of which can be se-
vere in the case of heavily dependent use.158 
Current treatment for ATS use is predomi-
nantly behavioural, with cognitive behaviour-
al therapy amongst the most frequently given 
treatments. 
Substitution therapies are not widely availa-
ble to people who use ATS, as the evidence 
base remains nascent.159 Many prescribed 
psychostimulant substances have been pro-
posed and utilised, including modafinil and 
dexamphetamine. In addition, dopamine  
agonists, anticonvulsants, antidepressants 
and antipsychotics have been used in trials of 
treatments for amphetamine. In Melbourne, 
Australia, dexamphetamine was prescribed in 
a supervised setting to a group of long-term 
ATS injectors. They reported that dexamphet-
amine reduced their drug cravings, and alle-
viated the symptoms of withdrawal. Approx-
imately half became abstinent, according to 
self-report (although no urine analysis was 
carried out to confirm the abstinent status).160 
However, it is highly unlikely that a single sub-
stitute will be found suitable for treatment of 
the diverse range of ATS on the market. With 
ATS now a global commodity with prolific in-
dividual and social harms, it is important for 
researchers, pharmaceutical manufacturers 
and governments to cooperate in the urgent 
identification of new substitution treatments 
for ATS and other substances, such as cocaine.
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cial and community ties. The engagement of people 
who use drugs – current and former – in treatment 
settings can do much both to enhance feelings of 
self-empowerment and to improve the quality and 
responsiveness of services.
The goal of drug treatment should be, if possible, 
to assist a person dependent on drugs to achieve a 
high level of health and well-being. In this context, 
it is necessary to recognise that some people may 
find it impossible or undesirable to attain absti-
nence. However, this needs not preclude the main 
objective of treatment, that of helping clients to live 
happily and productively. Indeed, many people who 
are dependent on opioids are perfectly able to suc-
cessfully achieve this while remaining on OST. 
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Drug control has traditionally focused on impos-
ing criminal sanctions against all people involved 
in the illicit drug market, with the hope that harsh 
criminal sanctions would deter people from en-
tering the drug trade. As a result, governments 
have introduced severe and disproportionate 
criminal penalties for drug-related offences, 
ranging from incarceration to the death penalty.1
Recent estimates from the United Nations Office 
on Drugs and Crime show that one in five people 
currently in prison have been condemned for 
a drug possession or trafficking offence – with 
around 80% for possession alone.2 Nevertheless, 
global drug use prevalence remains high3 and 
this policy has created more harms than the sub-
stances they are meant to put under control. To 
respond to this situation, some countries have 
decided to decriminalise drug use. Although 
this policy presents certain challenges, it has 
been instrumental in reducing the incarceration 
of people who use drugs, as well as the stigma 
and discrimination that they face. Decriminali-
sation is also critical towards improving people’s 
access to life-saving harm reduction, drug de-
pendence treatment and other health and social 
services. This will be explained in further detail in 
Chapter 3.1.
Others have moved further, towards the legal 
regulation of certain substances – including 
cannabis, coca and some new psychoactive sub-
stances (NPS). These reforms are in conflict with 
the UN drug control treaties, which currently do 
not allow legal markets for the recreational use 
of internationally controlled substances. De-
spite these clear tensions with the global drug 
control regime, the need to protect the health 
of people who use drugs, to increase citizen se-
curity and to reduce social exclusion has been 
at the forefront of this approach. Chapter 3.2 
offers an overview of the different regulatory 
regimes that could be established, drawing les-
sons from experiences for cannabis, coca, NPS, 
alcohol and tobacco. 
An effective criminal justice system relies on the 
principle of proportionality – whereby sentences 
imposed for an offence should be measured in 
accordance to the harms caused by the offend-
er’s actions. Today, most people incarcerated for 
drug offences are in prison for lengthy periods 
of time, generally for low-level, non-violent drug 
crimes. Some are on death row as a minority of 
countries worldwide retain the death penalty 
for drug offences. Disproportionate punish-
ment has not led to a reduction in the scale of 
the illicit market, but has resulted in significant 
prison overcrowding, and related negative 
consequences. While Chapter 3.3 defines the 
concept of proportionality in more detail and 
offers guidance on how to implement it across 
the spectrum of drug offences, Chapter 3.4 
provides recommendations for the design and 
implementation of alternatives to incarceration 
for non-violent offenders – an essential policy 
option to reduce prison overcrowding and focus 
resources on those most harmful and violent of-
fenders operating in the illicit drug market. 
The effectiveness of the criminal justice system 
is very much dependent upon effective law en-
forcement. Chapter 3.5 analyses the failures of 
an overly prohibitive approach to tackle the illicit 
drug market, and offers guidance for a review 
and modernisation of current drug law enforce-
ment efforts, focusing on prioritising a reduction 
in violence, money laundering and corruption, 
fulfilling wider social objectives, promoting 
community policing, increasing partnerships be-
tween the police and health and social authori-
ties, and so on.
The last chapter of this section, Chapter 3.6, 
focuses on best practice for delivering health 
services in prison, in an attempt to reduce the 
health harms related to the continued incarcer-
ation of large numbers of people who use drugs. 
The chapter offers guidance and best practice on 
how best to deliver harm reduction, treatment 
and other healthcare services to prisoners. 
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Decriminalisation of people who use drugs
3.1
Key recommendations
• Drug laws, policies and practices should 
be reviewed to remove criminal penalties 
for drug use, possession of drugs for per-
sonal use, possession of drug use para-
phernalia and cultivation and purchase for  
personal use
• The gold standard of decriminalisation is the 
removal of all punishment for drug use, and 
the provision of voluntary health and social 
services, including harm reduction respons-
es and evidence-based drug dependence 
treatment programmes. If an administrative 
sanction is imposed for drug use, it should 
be applied as part of a framework encourag-
ing access to health and social services, and 
not lead to net-widening  
• Differentiating between personal use and 
intent to supply should be done via indic-
ative quantity thresholds, as well as an as-
sessment of all evidence available on a case-
by-case basis. Even if people are found in 
possession of quantities above the thresh-
old, mechanisms should be in place to iden-
tify whether possession is for personal use 
or intent to supply
• Trainings, sensitisation and guidance should 
be offered to police, prosecutors and judges 
on drug use, harm reduction, treatment and 
decriminalisation 
• Decriminalisation measures should be ac-
companied by investments in health and 
social programmes to ensure maximum 
health outcomes
Introduction 
The criminalisation of people who use drugs across 
the world has had severe impacts on their health 
and well-being and increased their exposure to 
health risks and criminal groups. Fear of incarcer-
ation drives people who use drugs away from the 
life-saving health and harm reduction services they 
need, increasing their vulnerability to blood-borne 
diseases such as HIV and hepatitis C, and the risk of 
overdose deaths. At the same time, the criminalisa-
tion of possession of drug use paraphernalia such 
as sterile needles and syringes and crack pipes has 
further undermined harm reduction efforts to curb 
HIV and hepatitis epidemics.4 
Police crackdowns, compulsory urine testing, drug 
user registration in official government records, or 
compulsory detention deter people from accessing 
health and social services.5 Drug law enforcement 
actions against people who use drugs, as well as 
social disapproval of drug use have exacerbated 
marginalisation and stigmatisation – breaking up 
family and community ties, and undermining access 
to employment and education. 
People with a criminal record for drug offences 
can be excluded from accessing social welfare and 
scholarships, and can even be denied the right to 
vote (as is the case in the USA). Minority groups – in 
particular ethnic minorities – are especially affected 
as they are often the primary targets of law-enforce-
ment interventions. In some areas of the world, the 
implementation of drug laws by the police has be-
come a form of social control.6
Because of the devastating effects of overly repressive 
approaches to drug control, criminalisation has come 
under increasing scrutiny. A number of international 
agencies have now explicitly called for the removal 
of criminal sanctions against people who use drugs, 
including the Joint United Nations Programme on 
HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS),7 the World Health Organisation 
(WHO),8 the United Nations Development Program 
(UNDP),9 the Office of the High Commissioner on Hu-
man Rights (OHCHR),10 UN Women11 and the Organ-
ization of American States (OAS),12 among others.13 
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At the national level, several countries have adopted 
innovative decriminalisation models.15
Legislative/policy issues 
involved 
Decriminalising drug use and possession for 
personal use
Over 40 countries and jurisdictions around the 
world have enacted some form of decriminalisation 
for certain drug offences.16 Decriminalisation pro-
cesses can be classified in two types – de jure and de 
facto. In the first type, the removal of criminal sanc-
tions takes place through a legislative process – via 
the repeal of criminal legislation, the creation of civil 
law, or a constitutional court decision leading to leg-
islative review. In a de facto model, although drug 
use remains a criminal offence in a country’s legis-
lation, in practice people are no longer prosecuted 
(for example in the Netherlands). Decriminalisation 
can focus on a specific substance (usually cannabis), 
several or all substances (as is the case in Portugal).
While decriminalisation through law reform may 
take several years to achieve, de facto decriminalisa-
tion can be implemented relatively rapidly through 
pragmatic policy adjustments. However, a de facto 
decriminalisation policy can also be more easily 
reversed, for example when there is a change in po-
litical leadership. 
Decriminalisation works best when implemented 
in conjunction with the development, funding and 
scale up of a wide array of harm reduction and evi-
dence-based drug dependence treatment services. 
In that case, people who use drugs are able to access 
these services without fear of arrest or punishment, 
stigma or discrimination.
In many instances, countries that have decrim-
inalised drug use have chosen to adopt adminis-
trative sanctions for drug use activities, including 
community service orders, fines and suspension 
of licences. It is essential that these administrative 
sanctions do not result in greater harm than crim-
inalisation (for example, the use of compulsory 
detention centres, registration of people who use 
Box  1  What is decriminalisation?
Decriminalisation entails the removal of criminal 
penalties for selected activities. In the context 
of drug use, the following activities would no 
longer constitute a criminal offence or be sub-
ject to criminal penalties: 
• Drug use
• Possession of drugs for personal use
• Cultivation and purchase of controlled plants 
for personal use
• Possession of drug use paraphernalia.
The overarching objective of decriminalisation 
is to end the punishment and stigmatisation of 
people who use drugs. After drug use has been 
decriminalised, governments may respond to 
drug use and associated activities with a variety 
of approaches, such as referrals to health and 
social services. Crucially, when implemented 
under a harm reduction-oriented approach, 
decriminalisation can provide a supporting and 
enabling legal framework within which health 
interventions can be voluntarily accessed with-
out fear of stigma, arrest and detention.14 The 
gold standard of decriminalisation is therefore 
an approach where drug use, cultivation, pur-
chase, possession for personal use and posses-
sion of use paraphernalia is no longer punished, 
and where people are able to access healthcare, 
harm reduction and treatment services. In prac-
tice, some governments have chosen to impose 
administrative sanctions against people who 
use drugs. In that case, such sanctions should 
not result in more severe punishment than those 
imposed under criminalisation – this will be dis-
cussed in more detail below.
Decriminalisation differs from legalisation, which 
is a process by which all drug-related behaviours 
(use, possession, cultivation, trade, etc.) become 
legal activities. Within this process, governments 
may choose to adopt administrative laws and 
policies to regulate drug cultivation, distribution 
and use, including limitations on availability and 
access – this process is known as legal regulation 
(see Chapter 3.2). Decriminalisation should also 
be distinguished from depenalisation, a pro-
cess by which criminal penalties are reduced or 
removed altogether for select behaviours that 
remain offences punishable by criminal law (see 
Chapter 3.3 on proportionality for more details). 
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drugs in government records, the imposition of 
high fines resulting in lengthy prison sentences if 
unpaid, etc.). 
Decriminalising cultivation for personal use
Some decriminalisation models encompass the 
cultivation of substances for personal use to ensure 
that people who use drugs do not have to resort 
to the criminal market to access their substance of 
choice. For example, in several countries, cannabis 
social clubs were born out of efforts by people using 
cannabis to move away from the black market and 
ensure good quality products.17
In Belgium, Spain and Uruguay for example, can-
nabis social clubs enable people to grow their own 
plants as part of a cooperative, and only in quan-
tities sufficient for the needs of the club members 
(these quantities are established by the members 
themselves). Cultivation and distribution are limited 
to club members, and cannabis can be consumed 
on the club’s premises or taken away. Membership 
is prohibited for people under the age of 18. Most 
clubs limit the number of members. For example, 
Uruguay established the limit at 45 members, while 
the Federation of Cannabis Associations in Catalo-
nia set a limit of 655 members – although a series 
of Supreme Court decisions in Spain have recently 
set some stricter limits to the number of members 
for social clubs (in its latest decision, the Supreme 
Court ruled that a club containing 290 members 
was unacceptable).18 
Many of the clubs have been instrumental in en-
couraging responsible consumption among their 
members, offering guidance and information 
about usage. This model has both protected peo-
ple from the black market for cannabis, and often 
helped avoid a profit-driven model, while remain-
ing within the constraints set out in the UN drug 
control conventions.19, 20  
Implementation issues involved
Following decriminalisation, policy makers have 
the choice to establish a wide array of responses 
to drug use activities, and models worldwide have 
varied greatly.21 Some of them have proven to be 
ineffective or to have exacerbated harms for people 
who use drugs. Available evidence shows that a 
successful model should focus on investing in harm 
reduction and drug dependence treatment servic-
es. Below are a set of considerations that should be 
taken into account when moving towards a decrim-
inalisation model for drug use.
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Silent march to end stop and search and racial profiling in the USA
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Box  2  The Portuguese referral model to health services
In July 2001, Portugal adopted Law 30/2000 which 
decriminalised the possession of all internation-
ally controlled drugs for personal use. Under the 
new legal regime, drug trafficking is still prose-
cuted as a criminal offence, but the possession 
of quantities of drugs for up to 10 days of use has 
become an administrative offence. The law also 
introduced a system of referral to Commissions 
for the Dissuasion of Drug Addiction (Comissões 
para a Dissuasão da Toxicodependência). When a 
person found in possession of drugs is arrested, 
the police refer them to these regional panels, 
consisting of three professionals – a social worker, 
a legal adviser and a medical professional – sup-
ported by a team of technical experts.
The Commissions use targeted responses to re-
duce drug use and encourage people depend-
ent on drugs to enter treatment. To that end, 
they can impose sanctions such as community 
service, fines, suspension of professional licenc-
es and bans on attending designated places, 
but also recommend harm reduction, treatment 
or education programmes, as well as offer social 
support for those in need.
 
Outreach testing: ‘European HIV Testing Week’ in Mouraria Harm Reduction Centre, NGO GAT, Lisbon, Portugal
Credit:  Pedro A
. Pina
Between 2002 and 2009, the Dissuasion Com-
missions facilitated approximately 6,000 ad-
ministrative processes a year. As Figure 1 below 
shows, in 2009, most cases (68%) resulted in 
suspensions of proceedings for people who 
were not dependent on drugs (i.e. no further ac-
tion was taken). As 14% of the cases resulted in 
punitive sanctions (10% were sanctions such as 
licence suspension or restrictions on movement 
and 4% were fines).21 15% of the cases were 
provisionally suspended with an agreement 
that the individual would undergo treatment. 
Approximately 76% of cases involved cannabis, 
11% involved heroin, 6% involved cocaine and 
the remaining cases involved multiple drugs. 23
Crucially, the decision to decriminalise drug use 
was accompanied by significant investments in 
health interventions, including harm reduction 
measures (with a new legal basis in the form of 
Decree-law 183/2001) and drug dependence 
treatment programmes. As a direct result of 
decriminalisation, prison overcrowding signifi-
cantly dropped, with the proportion of drug of-
fenders sentenced to imprisonment dropping 
Continued overleaf
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to 28% in 2005 from a peak of 44% in 1999 – 
taking some of the pressure off the criminal jus-
tice system.25 In the area of health, the number 
of people using drugs newly diagnosed with 
HIV decreased from 907 new cases in 200026to 
79 in 2012.27 A similar downward trend was 
observed for new cases of hepatitis B and C,28 
while the number of drug overdose deaths in 
Portugal is the second lowest in the European 
Union.29 The number of people receiving vol-
untary drug dependence treatment increased 
by more than 60% between 1998 and 2008. 
Over 70% of those seeking treatment received 
OST.30 The Portuguese decriminalisation model 
has therefore been highly successful in offering 
harm reduction and voluntary treatment servic-
es to people who use drugs, with very positive 
health outcomes.
Differentiating between use and intent to 
supply 
This is one of the main challenges of implementing 
an effective decriminalisation model. A number of 
countries have developed quantity thresholds to 
determine whether drug possession is for person-
al use or for intent to supply to others. While these 
thresholds can be useful, they have sometimes prov-
en to be problematic. In some circumstances, for ex-
ample in Mexico and Russia, the thresholds were set 
so low that they resulted in more people who use 
drugs being sent to prison for what was identified 
as being a ‘trafficking’ offence (for example, Mexico 
set out quantity thresholds at 0.5g of cocaine, 0.05g 
of heroin and one ecstasy tablet31). To be effective, 
quantity thresholds should adequately reflect mar-
ket realities – taking into account patterns of use, 
the quantity of drugs a person is likely use in a day, 
and patterns of purchasing. 
Other countries opted not to adopt thresholds and 
not to define what would be the ‘reasonable amounts’ 
or ‘small quantities’ allowed. They focused instead 
Figure 1. Application of sanctions by the Dissuasion Commissions, 2001 to 200924
on other considerations to be taken into account 
as evidence, on a case-by-case basis – for example, 
possession of several mobile phones, drugs divided 
into different packets, money, firearms, or history of 
drug dependency, etc. This approach, however, also 
presents disadvantages, including the risk of abuses 
and corruption from the police or judges. 
In order to benefit from the objectivity provided 
by thresholds, while also considering other factors, 
decriminalisation should combine indicative 
quantity thresholds with discretionary powers for 
the police, prosecutor or judge to decide on a case-
by-case basis according to all available evidence at 
hand.32 For example, a long history of drug use and 
referrals to health and harm reduction services may 
be considered as evidence that a person caught with 
a large amount of drugs was still intending them for 
personal use, and not for commercial purposes. 
Authority responsible for determining personal use
In order to reduce unnecessary burdens on the 
criminal justice system and to avoid the risk of 
pre-trial detention,33 it is preferable to leave the 
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role of determining whether possession is for per-
sonal use or intent to supply to the discretion of 
the police, ensuring that people are diverted away 
from the criminal justice system as early as possible. 
However, such an approach does present some risks 
of corruption and abuses from the police, including 
harassment, racial discrimination, the imposition of 
excessive fines, etc. 
There is also a risk of ‘net-widening’, the unintended 
effect of increasing the number of people in con-
tact with the criminal justice system as a result of 
expanded police powers and facilitated procedures 
that make it easier for the police to stop people for 
drug possession. This has been observed in Switzer-
land after cannabis possession became an adminis-
trative offence punishable with a fine, and in some 
parts of Australia.34 In this context, although drug 
use is decriminalised, people who use drugs con-
tinue to be punished with a fine, and the failure to 
pay it may result in opening criminal proceedings. 
As policy makers establish a decriminalisation pol-
icy, they should keep in mind that the overarching 
objective is to reduce the number of people being 
punished for drug use, and of those suffering from 
the consequences of criminal sanctions.
These implementation issues can be addressed 
through solid prosecutorial guidance, including a 
tight oversight and scrutiny of police behaviour, in 
particular guidance on how to assess the quantity 
thresholds (for example, on whether to take into 
account dry weight or wet weight), on how to exer-
cise police discretion, or on charging standards. This 
will also require police training on drugs and harm 
reduction, to increase awareness of the need to sup-
port a health and social approach towards drug use. 
Engaging representatives of people who use drugs 
in the process of designing, managing and evaluat-
ing decriminalisation models is also useful to help 
build trust between communities and the police.35
Identifying appropriate responses 
Here again, there is significant variance around the 
globe. Some countries, such as the Netherlands (see 
Box 4) and Belgium, do not impose any sanction on 
people caught in illicit possession of drugs for per-
sonal use. This approach presents significant bene-
fits, not least the cost savings to the criminal justice 
system, and the fact that the person does not un-
dergo any punishment – while allowing for a health 
and social response for those who need it. Indeed, 
in countries where people caught in possession of 
drugs are given a choice between an administrative 
fine, a criminal sanction or treatment (as is the case in 
Chile, Armenia, Poland or Paraguay), the person will 
often decide to undergo a treatment programme 
even if they are not dependent on drugs – creating 
an unnecessary burden on the health system and 
on public funding. 
 
Blue pills in the hand of a person who uses drugs in India, 2011
Credit: Private
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Box  3  Establishing quantity thresholds in the Czech Republic
The first drug law of the Czech Republic, adopted 
in 1993 after the fall of the Soviet Union, did not 
impose criminal penalties for drug use or pos-
session for personal use. Five years later, as drug 
markets became more visible, the Czech Repub-
lic revised its drug laws to criminalise the pos-
session of ‘greater than small’ amounts of drugs 
– without defining what quantities this would 
entail.36 People caught using drugs, however, 
were not criminalised.37 The government invest-
ed in a large-scale research project to evaluate 
the impact of the new law. The study concluded 
that the 1998 law had not managed to signifi-
cantly curb drug use, while each person kept in 
prison for drug possession cost the government 
€30,000 a year.38 
The study resulted in the adoption of a new drug 
law in 2009, leading to significant debates to 
define which amounts of drugs should be char-
acterised as ‘greater than small’. A government 
decree established quantities below which pos-
session would not result in criminal penalties but 
in a misdemeanour, subject to the imposition of 
a fine. The government study was instrumental in 
providing practical information around patterns 
of drug use and drug markets in an effort to es-
tablish adequate thresholds. For instance, noting 
that patterns of usage varied between people 
using different drugs, the authors of the study 
concluded that it would be wise to distinguish 
between types of drugs in law and policy mak-
ing.39 An attempt was made to reflect the study’s 
findings in the law, with a higher threshold being 
established for cannabis than for other drugs – 
Government Decree No. 467/2009 established 
maximum quantities of 15g for cannabis, 1.5g for 
heroin and 1g for cocaine.40 
In 2013, the directive was abolished by a ruling of 
the Constitutional Court which asserted that ‘only 
a law, not a government regulation, could define 
what a criminal offence is’. The Czech Supreme 
court then set stricter thresholds – allowing 
1.5g of methamphetamine, 1.5g of heroin, 1g of 
cocaine, 10g of cannabis and 5 units of ecstasy.41 
These quantities are significantly lower than 
what is allowed in parts of Australia or Spain (in 
Spain, the thresholds are set at 7.5g for cocaine 
and 200g for cannabis). Nonetheless, the Czech 
example shows an attempt to establish quantity 
thresholds that reflect the realities of the drug 
market so as to meaningfully reduce the number 
of people sent to the criminal justice system for 
simple possession. 
If countries decide to impose administrative fines as 
an alternative to criminal sanctions, as is the case in 
a large number of countries and jurisdictions, they 
should be mindful not to impose fines that are so 
high as to lead to prosecution and/or incarceration 
for failure to pay. Other forms of civil penalties, such 
as seizure of passport or driving licence, should be 
avoided as these can have a disproportionately neg-
ative impact on a person’s life and sometimes their 
ability to work.
When referral mechanisms are in place to encourage 
people to enter voluntary treatment programmes, 
these should offer a variety of treatment options, 
including OST. Failure to meet the conditions of the 
treatment programme should not result in the im-
position of a criminal sanction. Portugal, for instance, 
has adopted an incremental response to drug use. On 
the first instance, people caught for drug use will see 
the process suspended, but an administrative sanc-
tion may be imposed if they are caught again within 
a six-month period. However, Portugal also offers a 
wide range of health and social services to people 
brought to its Dissuasion Commissions (see Box 2), 
including referrals to harm reduction and treatment 
programmes. In the Portuguese case, treatment is 
never coercive and people who fail to adhere or com-
ply will not be imposed a criminal sanction.42 
In East and South East Asia, countries such as 
China and Vietnam have revised their drug laws 
to remove criminal sanctions for people who use 
drugs, but have instead adopted an administrative 
system whereby to people caught for drug use are 
ordered to enter compulsory drug detention cen-
tres for periods of a few months up to two years. 
Such a practice should be avoided as these com-
pulsory detention centres constitute harsh punish-
ment, do not include any form of evidence-based 
treatment or rehabilitation, and result in a range 
of human rights abuses (see Chapter 2.5 for 
more details).43 
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Box 4  The Dutch cannabis decriminalisation model 
In 1976, the Netherlands enacted a new law to 
differentiate between ‘soft’ drugs – judged to 
pose ‘acceptable’ risks to consumers and society 
(i.e. cannabis) – and ‘hard’ drugs associated with 
greater risks. This ‘separation of markets’ allowed 
the State to adopt a more lenient approach to 
cannabis sale, possession and use through de 
facto decriminalisation. Although cannabis sale 
and possession for personal use remain offenc-
es, the Dutch Ministry of Justice chose to apply 
a ‘policy of tolerance’ that translates into the 
non-enforcement of the law in certain instances. 
For example, possession of less than 5g of can-
nabis is no longer a target for law enforcement 
interventions. Since the 1980s, the sale and pur-
chase of small quantities of cannabis has also 
been permitted in licensed ‘coffee shops’ within 
strict limitations. Initially implemented in Am-
sterdam, Rotterdam and Utrecht, by the end of 
the 1990s, coffee shops could be found in almost 
every large or mid-sized city in the country.44 
The establishment of cannabis coffee shops has 
not led to an explosion in drug use in the Nether-
lands – with prevalence rates remaining broadly 
in line with the European average.45 However, 
this policy had a significant impact on reducing 
stigma, as well as arrests and convictions for illicit 
drug use and possession, which remain very low 
in the Netherlands.46
The 30 years of experience of this policy have 
also shown that the coffee shop model has suc-
cessfully enabled people who use cannabis to 
avoid exposure to ‘hard drug’ scenes and mar-
kets. Heroin and cocaine use in the Netherlands 
is reportedly lower than the European average,47 
and HIV prevalence among people who use 
drugs remains low48 – the country having also es-
tablished a series of harm reduction services in-
cluding needle and syringe programmes (NSPs), 
opioid substitution therapy (OST), heroin-assist-
ed treatment and safe injection rooms early on.49
Nevertheless, this model also presents some 
difficulties, not least the paradox around the fact 
that although the sale and possession of can-
nabis are tolerated, supply to the coffee shops 
(the so-called ‘backdoor’) continues to be crimi-
nalised, and is therefore increasingly controlled 
by criminal groups and networks. Today, a great 
majority of the Dutch population is in favour of 
the full legal regulation of the cannabis market 
‘from seed to sale’, in an effort to end reliance on 
the black market.50 And while the government 
is trying to restrict any activity that would fa-
cilitate cultivation by criminalising preparatory 
acts (such as grow shops),51 local authorities are 
increasingly in favour of regulating the backdoor 
through a new Cannabis Act. A recent report by 
the VNG – the Dutch local authorities’ platform 
– called on the government to allow regulated 
cannabis production by introducing licences for 
growers52 (see Chapter 3.2 for more details on 
legal regulation).
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Regulated drug markets
3.2
Key recommendations
• The responsible legal regulation of drug 
markets can reduce harms associated with 
the illicit drug trade and offer improved 
outcomes on a range of health, community 
safety and financial indicators – this policy 
option should therefore be actively and 
publicly debated and explored
• Policy makers exploring options for regula-
tion should consider establishing a national 
expert advisory group to design policy 
and legal frameworks tailored to meet lo-
cal needs and priorities. This panel should 
include expertise from public health, law 
enforcement, drug policy reform, evalua-
tion and monitoring, alcohol and tobacco 
regulation, prevention, treatment and harm 
reduction, as well as representation of peo-
ple who use drugs and subsistence farmers 
of crops destined for the illicit drug market
• Reforms should be phased-in cautiously, 
using solid and well-funded evaluation and 
monitoring of impacts built into any legis-
lation and process of change, along with 
a willingness to adapt approaches on the 
basis of emerging evidence
• Particular care should be taken to mitigate 
risks of over-commercialisation, with public 
health and community safety remaining the 
guiding influence for policy design, rather 
than private profit. Non-commercial mod-
els should be considered as viable options, 
whilst commercial models should mitigate 
risks of over-commercialisation by learning 
from the successes and failures of different 
approaches to alcohol and tobacco control
• Policy makers should encourage, and mean-
ingfully engage in, debates at high-level 
regional and UN forums around reforming 
the global drug control system to accom-
modate demands for greater flexibility to 
experiment with regulation models, either 
independently or alongside any ongoing 
domestic reform processes 
• Policy makers should encourage the UN 
to convene an independent expert group 
to consider the issues raised by legal reg-
ulation, implications for the existing treaty 
system and options for its modernisation 
and reform.53
Introduction
The decriminalisation of drug use has increasingly 
been adopted as policy and practice around the 
world (see Chapter 3.1) – and has assumed a central 
position in UN agency advocacy and high-level de-
bates. However, a parallel debate around the legal 
regulation of production, supply and consumption 
of certain internationally controlled substances has 
also developed rapidly in the past five years. 
The legal regulation of cannabis has been at the 
forefront of this rapidly evolving debate – particu-
larly since 2012, when cannabis was legalised for 
non-medical use in the US states of Washington54 
and Colorado.55 Soon after, Uruguay became the 
first UN member state to do the same by adopting 
Law No 19.172.56 Since then, two more US states 
(Alaska57 and Oregon58) and the District of Colum-
bia59 have followed, and several more states are 
likely to do so in the next few years – in particular 
California. In 2015, Jamaica legalised cannabis for 
medical, industrial and religious purposes,60 and 
the newly elected Canadian Government has also 
pledged to legalise cannabis61 – the first G7 country 
to do so. 
  73IDPC Drug Policy Guide
policy of legal regulation to be implemented. Under 
legal regulation, substances can be adequately con-
trolled and the regulatory regime can be effectively 
implemented by government authorities – in an 
effort to remove the drug trade from the control of 
criminal groups.62 
The last decade has seen the first detailed proposals 
emerge that offer different options for how the legal 
regulation of drugs can take place.63 These propos-
als have explored options for controls over:
• The drug products themselves (dose, prepara-
tion, price, and packaging) 
• Licensing of drug product vendors (vetting and 
training requirements)
• The outlets from which the drug products are 
available (location, outlet density, appearance)
• Marketing (advertising, branding and promotions)
• Availability and access (age controls, licensed 
buyers, club membership schemes, rationing)
• Where, when and how drugs can be consumed.
There are a number of options for how different 
regulatory tools are applied to different substances 
or among different populations. Box 1 offers a sum-
mary of the various regulatory models that could 
be implemented, with the aim of managing drug 
markets in a way that minimises the health and so-
cial harms associated with both illicit drug use and 
drug markets.64 
Other developments around the world are also 
feeding into these ongoing discussions – including 
the system of legal regulation of the coca leaf in Bo-
livia, the New Zealand model of regulation for cer-
tain lower-risk new psychoactive substances (NSP) 
(see Box 3 in Chapter 2.1), and the ongoing devel-
opment of maintenance prescribing to people de-
pendent on heroin and other controlled substances 
(see Chapter 2.5 for more details).
The move from a theoretical legalisation debate to 
real world policy development means that the global 
consensus supporting an overly prohibitionist ap-
proach to drug control is now broken. With cannabis 
at least, a tipping point has been reached. It is there-
fore important for policy makers to consider the im-
plications of this rapidly changing policy landscape, 
and the options for reform at domestic level. 
Legislative/policy issues 
involved 
There remains some confusion about what the ‘le-
galisation’ of controlled substances actually means. 
‘Legalisation’ is the process by which an illegal prod-
uct or activity becomes legal. In policy discussions, 
it is therefore more helpful to refer to the ‘legalisa-
tion and regulation’ or the ‘legal regulation’ of a con-
trolled substance (or substances), as this provides 
a clearer description of the model being proposed 
and employed. A legalisation process allows for a 
Figure 1. Spectrum of drug policy options and their likely effects65
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Implementation issues 
involved
Reducing health, social and financial costs 
The regulation of drug markets is not a ‘silver bul-
let’ solution to the problems associated with drug 
use and drug markets. In the short term, legal reg-
ulation can only seek to reduce some of the health, 
human rights, crime and security problems that 
stem from prohibition-led drug control efforts and 
those fuelled by the illicit drug market (see Box 
Box  1  Five basic models for 
regulating drug availability
• Medical prescription model with optional 
supervised consumption facilities – for the 
most risky substances and behaviours (in-
jected drugs, including heroin and cocaine, 
and more potent stimulants such as meth-
amphetamine)
• Specialist pharmacist retail model – trained 
and licensed vendors, potentially com-
bined with named/licensed user access 
and rationing of volume of sales for moder-
ate-risk drugs such as amphetamine, pow-
der cocaine, and ecstasy
• Licensed retailing – Including tiers of regu-
lation appropriate to product risk and local 
needs; this could be used for lower-risk 
drugs and preparations such as cannabis, 
khat and kratom, or lower-strength stimu-
lant-based drinks
• Licensed premises for sale and consump-
tion – similar to licensed alcohol venues 
and cannabis ‘coffee shops’ in the Nether-
lands, these could potentially also be for 
smoking opium or drinking poppy tea. 
Additional tiers of licensing and onsite su-
pervision could be introduced to cater for 
some types of psychedelic use, or the sale 
and use of certain stimulants at events and 
party settings
• Unlicensed sales – minimal regulation for 
the least risky products, such as caffeine 
drinks and coca tea.
2 on Uruguay, as well as Box 3 of Chapter 2.1 for 
an overview of the New Zealand experience with 
regards to NPS). However, legal regulation cannot 
tackle the underlying socio-economic drivers that 
may exacerbate drug problems within a communi-
ty – such as poverty, inequality and social margin-
alisation. Nevertheless, by promoting a more prag-
matic public health model and freeing up drug 
law enforcement resources for evidence-based 
health and social policy, regulatory models may 
very well create a more conducive environment for 
doing so.66
Different social environments will require differ-
ent approaches in response to the specific chal-
lenges policy makers face. The emerging range 
of regulatory options available to manage drug 
markets and use, through state and commercial 
institutions, now offer a credible option for policy 
makers if the harms facing their societies cannot 
be addressed within the current international drug 
control regime. Such reforms are likely to unfold 
in an ad-hoc basis for different substances, in 
different jurisdictions. 
The costs of developing and implementing a new 
regulatory infrastructure should be considered, but 
would likely represent only a fraction of the ever-in-
creasing resources currently directed into prohibi-
tion-led efforts to control illicit supply and demand. 
There is also an important potential for translating 
a proportion of existing criminal profits into legiti-
mate tax revenue – as has happened with some of 
the US cannabis regulation models.67 
Learning from the challenges of regulatory 
models for alcohol and tobacco
There are legitimate concerns around the fact that 
over-commercialisation of legal drug markets could 
lead to increased use and related health harms, as 
business interests seek to expand their markets and 
maximise profits. Policy makers therefore have a re-
sponsibility to ensure that public health is prioritised 
at all times over commercial interests when design-
ing any new regulatory model. This has certainly not 
been the case historically with alcohol and tobacco 
in most jurisdictions – with more responsible public 
health policy models only now being explored and 
implemented, after long-term resistance by power-
ful industry lobby groups. Policy makers have an op-
portunity and responsibility to ensure that lessons 
from the alcohol and tobacco markets are learnt, 
and built into any new drug regulatory model from 
the outset. 
Credible and functioning options for non-commer-
cial models of market regulation exist – including 
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• Uruguay has stated that its requirement to meet 
wider UN obligations to protect human rights, 
health and security take precedence over techni-
cal UN drug treaty commitments
• Bolivia has denounced the 1961 Convention and 
then re-accessed it with a reservation on the spe-
cific articles that prohibit the coca leaf
• Jamaica has regulated cannabis cultivation and 
use for religious purposes (see Chapter 4.3 for 
more details)
• New Zealand’s NPS regulation framework is only 
available to substances not controlled under the 
UN drug conventions.
In reality, this area of drug policy reform is moving 
into unchartered waters with regards to the various, 
potentially conflicting treaty obligations – and there 
are multiple outstanding questions of international 
law that are only now beginning to be explored in 
the various high-level UN forums. Whilst precisely 
how or when these can be addressed satisfactorily 
remains unclear, the fact that multiple reforms are 
already underway clearly highlights the shortcom-
ings of an outdated international framework that 
is unable to meet the needs of a growing number 
of member states. It therefore seems inevitable 
that a process of modernisation must take place to 
provide the flexibility for the evidence-based exper-
imentation and innovation that is required.74
state monopolies (or partial monopolies), not-for-
profit corporations, or not-for-profit cooperative 
‘social clubs’, or the promotion of self-cultivation. If 
a commercial market is established, lessons from 
alcohol and tobacco regulation are particularly rel-
evant. The blueprint provided by the UN Framework 
Convention on Tobacco Control,71 and World Health 
Organisation guidance on alcohol regulation72 pro-
vide useful evidence-based recommendations on 
how to mitigate such risks – for example through 
controls on sponsorship, advertising and brand-
ing (also see Box 2 on Uruguay’s regulatory model 
for cannabis).
Addressing tensions with the UN drug control 
conventions
Moves towards legal regulation will require a review 
of the substantial institutional and political obsta-
cles presented by the international drug control 
system. Specifically, the emerging trend towards 
exploring legal regulation for internationally con-
trolled substances creates a clear tension with the 
three UN drug control conventions that unambigu-
ously do not allow it.73 
Countries where regulatory regimes have so far 
been adopted have approached this problem in 
different ways:
• The USA has argued that state-level legalisation 
may be allowable under a ‘flexible interpretation’ 
of the treaties
Box 2  Uruguay’s legal regulation of cannabis markets
In 2013, Uruguay became the first country to 
pass legislation to legalise and regulate cannabis 
for non-medical uses. The argument for a legally 
regulated market was made by the government 
on the basis that it would help to protect the 
health of people who use cannabis, as well as 
minimise risks to citizen security from the crim-
inality associated with the illicit trade.68 
The Uruguayan model involves a greater level of 
government control than the more commercial 
models developed in the USA. Under the control 
of a newly established regulatory body (Institu-
to de regulación y control del cannabis, IRCCA), 
only production of specified herbal cannabis 
products by state-licensed growers is permitted. 
There is a complete ban on all forms of branding, 
marketing and advertising, and tax revenue will 
be used to fund new cannabis prevention and 
education campaigns.69
Sales are permitted only via licensed pharma-
cies, to registered adult Uruguayan residents, 
and at prices set by the new regulatory body. 
The pharmacies are allowed to sell cannabis for 
therapeutic purposes on the basis of a medi-
cal prescription, and for non-medical use up 
to a maximum of 40g per registered adult per 
month. Citizens are allowed to grow up to six 
plants in their homes for their personal con-
sumption, with a maximum harvest of 480g 
per year. They can also form cannabis clubs 
of 15 to 45 members allowed to cultivate up 
to 99 cannabis plants with an annual harvest 
proportional to the number of members and 
conforming to the established quantity for 
non-medical use.70 So far, the implementation 
of the regulatory regime has remained slow, 
in particular the licencing of pharmacies for  
cannabis sale. 
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Introduction
Disproportionate sentencing for drug offences is 
commonplace, as countries implement drug poli-
cies premised upon harsh punishment to deter the 
illicit supply and use of drugs. Non-violent drug 
offences involving small quantities of substances, 
e.g. low-level cultivation, dealing or smuggling, 
are often punished with harsher penalties than for 
other offences that cause far more harm, particu-
Proportionality of sentencing for drug offences
3.3
Key recommendations
• Existing sentencing frameworks for drug 
offences should be reviewed to ensure 
proportionality of sentencing, and address 
the consequences resulting from dispro-
portionate sentencing such as prison over-
crowding, and ineffective use of criminal 
justice resources
• A range of factors should be considered 
during sentencing to ensure that sentences 
are proportionate to the culpability and role 
of the offender, including the consideration 
of mitigating and aggravating factors, and 
the harms caused by the offence. In that 
regard, judges and prosecutors should 
adopt a gender perspective when impos-
ing penalties and considering alternatives  
to incarceration 
• Sentencing frameworks for drug offences 
should include sentencing options of no 
punishment at all (e.g. under decriminali-
sation of drug use and possession for use), 
or alternatives to conviction and imprison-
ment, for minor, non-violent offences
• Mandatory minimum penalties should  
be eliminated
• The death penalty should be abolished for 
drug offences, as an ineffective deterrent 
and a violation of international law.
larly violent offences such as murder and rape.75 
Sentences are often determined solely on the basis 
of possession and the quantity of drugs involved, 
without taking into account other factors essential 
to assessing the extent of harm caused, the culpa-
bility and role of the individual (e.g. high, interme-
diate or low-level role in a drug supply transaction), 
and mitigating factors such as being a first-time 
offender, the sole care provider for dependants, and 
not being involved in violence or connected with 
organised criminal networks.76 
In the USA, where over half of the inmates in fed-
eral prisons are sentenced with drug offences, 80% 
of drug arrests made in 2013 were for possession 
only (see Figure 1).77 In addition, the imposition of 
mandatory minimum penalties for drug offences in 
the USA restricts the exercise of prosecutorial and 
judicial discretion and excludes consideration of 
mitigating factors in individual cases, thereby in-
creasing the likelihood of disproportionately severe 
sentencing.78 In 2011, over 75% of the sentenced 
offences subject to a mandatory minimum penalty 
were for drug offences; in 2010, the average sen-
tence imposed for people convicted of a drug of-
fence subject to a mandatory minimum penalty was 
11 years.79 The high rates of imprisonment for drug 
offences in other regions of the world, especially of 
people who use drugs and women, further demon-
strate the disproportionate nature of sentencing for 
drug offences (see Chapter 3.4).80 
Despite decades of excessively severe punishment 
for drug offences, there is no evidence of their effec-
tiveness as a deterrent for the illicit use, cultivation, 
manufacturing and trafficking of drugs. In fact, suc-
cessive global reports by the United Nations Office 
on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) contain data predom-
inantly showing expanding and diversifying drug 
markets in all regions of the world.82 Drug policies 
imposing harsh punishment have not only failed in 
their objective of deterring drug-related activities, 
they have resulted in damaging outcomes for pub-
lic health, human security, and development:
• Public health – prisons are a high-risk setting 
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for the transmission of illnesses such as HIV, viral 
hepatitis and tuberculosis. HIV infection rates 
tend to be higher in prisons than in the commu-
nity as there is very poor coverage of harm re-
duction services for inmates who use drugs83 (see 
Chapter 3.6) 
• Human security – the majority of individuals 
sentenced with the most severe punishment 
for drug offences, including the death penalty, 
do not play a serious or high-level role in drug 
trafficking operations. They are often poor, vul-
nerable to exploitation, and engaged in low-level 
drug trafficking roles.84 Their incarceration does 
not impact upon the scale of the illicit market as 
they are easily replaced by others. Consequently, 
significant criminal justice resources (including 
law enforcement, prosecutors, judges, detention 
centres and the prison system) are spent on ar-
resting and incarcerating low-level offenders, 
while people engaged in high-level drug crimes 
are left largely free to continue their operations 
and recruitment of low-level actors. Dispropor-
tionate sentencing is therefore not only ineffec-
tive, it also results in the unbalanced investment 
of law enforcement and criminal justice resources 
on minor, low-level drug-related activities, there-
by diverting them from targeting serious criminal 
activity, i.e. violence, corruption, organised crime 
and money laundering, which pose a greater 
threat to human security85
• Development – Incarcerating farmers engaged in 
illicit cultivation for subsistence purposes and oth-
er low-level actors in the drug market merely ex-
acerbates the poverty and insecurity that are the 
root cause of their involvement in drug markets.86
Legislative/policy issues 
involved
Defining the concept of proportionality 
Proportionality is an internationally recognised legal 
principle, applicable to a government’s response to 
activities that cause harm to others. It requires the 
severity of any punishment imposed to be meas-
ured in accordance with the harms caused by an 
offender’s actions, and the culpability and circum-
stances of the offender. International human rights, 
crime prevention and criminal justice instruments 
contribute to setting standards of proportionality.87 
For example, article 29(2) of the Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights states that:
In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, every-
one shall be subject only to such limitations as 
are determined by law solely for the purpose 
of securing due recognition and respect for the 
rights and freedoms of others and of meeting 
the just requirements of morality, public order 
and the general welfare in a democratic society.
The International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights protects many rights relevant to sentencing 
for drug offences, notably the rights to life, liberty, 
security of the person, and privacy. In interpreting 
the application of the Covenant, the Human Rights 
Committee has found that where a state imple-
ments measures to restrict a right protected under 
Figure 1. Drug arrests in the USA, 1980 to 201381
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the treaty, it ‘must demonstrate their necessity and 
only take such measures as are proportionate to 
the pursuance of legitimate aims in order to ensure 
continuous and effective protection of Covenant 
rights’.88 The Committee has further explained that 
measures to restrict rights protected under the Cov-
enant must be the least intrusive measure required 
for achieving a legitimate aim.89 
A proportionate sentencing framework for drug 
offences should therefore primarily target people 
playing high-level roles in drug supply operations 
and causing the most harm to communities, such 
as violence and control over organised criminal 
activity. Sentencing frameworks should also aim 
to achieve improved outcomes for development, 
health, and human security, as well as protection of 
human rights. 
Applying the legal principles of proportionality 
to sentencing for drug offences
International legal principles of proportionality are 
seldom applied to sentencing for drug offences, 
due to the politically driven development of the 
international drug control system over the past few 
decades favouring excessively severe measures in 
response to controlled substances. The UN drug 
control conventions contain language emphasising 
the gravity of the world drug problem,90 thereby 
leading to the justification of imposing dispropor-
tionately severe sanctions for drug-related offences. 
For example, the preamble of the 1961 Convention 
asserts that ‘addiction to narcotic drugs constitutes 
a serious evil for the individual and is fraught with 
social and economic danger to mankind’.
However the stated objective of each of the UN drug 
conventions is to ensure the ‘health and welfare of 
mankind’, by restricting the non-medical use of con-
trolled substances whilst ensuring their availability 
for medical purposes.91 Importantly, the conven-
tions do not contain any requirement to criminal-
ise drug use (see Chapter 3.1 for more details) and 
contain explicit provisions permitting alternatives 
to conviction or punishment for offences relating 
to personal use, including possession, purchase and 
cultivation, and for ‘appropriate cases of a minor na-
ture’ not relating to personal use (see Chapter 3.4 for 
more details).92 In cases of a minor nature, states are 
encouraged to implement alternatives to conviction 
or punishment, such as education, rehabilitation or 
social reintegration, and where the offender is a 
person who uses drugs, ‘treatment and aftercare’.93 
As a result, the conventions recognise the need to 
establish sentencing frameworks for drug offences 
that distinguish between: 
• consumpion and supply offences
• minor and serious offences, and
• different types of substances, in accordance with 
the potential health harms and therapeutic value 
of a particular substance.94
The concept of proportionality of sentencing be-
comes essential when considering the application 
of the death penalty for drug offences. According 
to the UN Human Rights Committee, drug offences 
do not meet the threshold of ‘most serious crimes’ 
for which the death penalty may apply under Ar-
ticle 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, as they do not amount to inten-
tional killing.95 As a result, the imposition of death 
penalty sentences and executions for drug offences 
contravene international human rights law. The In-
ternational Narcotics Control Board (INCB) has en-
couraged ‘those States which retain and continue to 
impose the death penalty for drug-related offences 
to consider abolishing the death penalty for such 
offences’.96 However as of 2015, 33 countries retain 
the death penalty for drug offences, and at least ten 
countries impose it as a mandatory sentence, with 
seven countries still actively executing people con-
victed of drug offences.97 
Implementation issues 
involved
A number of countries, as well as the European Un-
ion, now recognise the need to address dispropor-
tionate penalties and sentencing for drug offences. 
They have taken steps to ensure more proportion-
ate outcomes, including the consideration of factors 
indicating the harms caused by an offence and the 
culpability of the offender, beyond possession alone 
or the amount of drugs involved.98 
A proportionate sentencing framework for drug 
offences should be proportionate within itself, 
and also in comparison with the sentences for 
other offences in a criminal justice system. 
Systems of penalties are disproportionate in coun-
tries where violent offences attract less severe pen-
alties than non-violent drug offences, such as the 
UK which imposes a 5-year imprisonment starting 
point for a rape conviction, and a 14-year imprison-
ment starting point for importing 10,000 ecstasy 
tablets for commercial gain.99
Distinctions should be made between offences 
related to personal use, and those with intent 
to supply, to reflect the varying degrees of an 
offender’s culpability and the harms caused to 
society by their offence.
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of sustaining his or her own drug use: alternatives 
to conviction, incarceration and punishment 
should be implemented, along with referrals to 
harm reduction and drug dependence treatment, 
in order to address the root causes of the offence 
(see Chapter 3.4)
• Supply-related offences, including dealing and 
trafficking (see below).
Distinctions should be made between the differ-
ent roles and motivations of people involved in 
supply offences.
• People engaged in subsistence-driven culti-
vation: those involved in illicit cultivation are 
mostly subsistence farmers in situation of high 
vulnerability who grow poppy, coca or cannabis 
as cash crops in order to buy food, clothes, and 
access to health and education. They should not 
be criminalised. Instead, a development-orient-
ed approach should be implemented to offer 
them opportunities for viable and sustainable 
livelihoods (see Chapter 4.2)
• Dealers engaged in the small-scale sale of con-
trolled substances within a network of friends, 
and who obtain limited financial gains – these 
individuals should be offered alternatives to 
incarceration to ensure that criminal justice 
systems and prisons are not overloaded with 
minor, non-violent cases107 (see Chapter 3.4)
• Drug couriers or ‘mules’ are individuals engaged 
in trafficking offences, usually in the transpor-
tation of controlled substances.108 They usually 
come from extremely vulnerable social back-
grounds, they put their health at serious risk in 
return for very low pay, and are often coerced 
or exploited into carrying drugs.109 For these 
offenders, severe penalties should not be im-
posed and alternatives to incarceration should 
be offered – in particular for women in charge of 
children or dependents110 (see Chapter 3.4)
• Serious or organised criminals making large-
scale profit, and playing a high-level role in a 
production or trafficking operation, or organ-
ised crime network, often using violence and 
corruption. These individuals should be im-
posed more severe penalties – keeping in mind 
the principle of proportionality across the spec-
trum of criminal offences, as described above.
Mitigating factors should be considered to de-
termine whether a sentence should be reduced.
• The socio-economic circumstances of an offend-
er: disproportionately criminalising people from 
vulnerable and poor communities exacerbates 
Box  1  Ecuador puts 
proportionality at the  
heart of its criminal code
Ecuador has long been known for its severe 
punishments against drug traffickers – as well 
for the high rates of people incarcerated for 
drug offences in the country – mainly drug 
mules. Facing a prison crisis, Ecuador issued 
a pardon for all drug mules incarcerated in 
2008.100 Nevertheless, this one-time pardon 
did not stem the influx of people entering the 
criminal justice system, and the incarceration 
rate increased significantly between 2010  
and 2014.101 
In an effort to promote more proportionate 
sentences for drug offences, Ecuador enacted 
its Comprehensive Organic Criminal Code 
(COIP, Spanish acronym)102 in 2014, which re-
asserted the decriminalisation of drug use (as 
per article 364 of Ecuador’s Constitution103) 
and introduced proportionate sentences for 
varying degrees of involvement in drug-re-
lated offences – with different penalties for 
those involved in the low levels of the traffick-
ing chain, and those that have a leading role 
within the illicit market. COIP also created four 
categories of trafficking – from minor to large 
scale, with proportionate sentences in accord-
ance to the quantity and type of substances 
being trafficked.104
Following the adoption of COIP, more than 
2,000 people were released from prison.105 
However, in September 2015, Ecuador revised 
the quantities established to differentiate 
between the levels of trafficking, by lowering 
them significantly – a political move which is 
likely to result in yet another increase in the 
prison population in the country.106 Never-
theless, Ecuador’s reform constitutes an in-
teresting example of how to introduce more 
proportionate sentencing for drug offences. 
• Personal use of drugs, and related possession, 
cultivation and purchase: alternatives to criminal-
isation and punishment should be implemented, 
along with referrals to harm reduction and health 
options such as evidence-based drug treatment 
(see Chapter 3.1)
• User-dealer offences, where a person who uses 
drugs engages in dealing for the primary purpose 
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Box  2  Costa Rica adopts more proportionate drug laws
In Costa Rica, many activities related to drug 
production and commercial supply were con-
sidered a serious offence punishable with a 
minimum of eight years of imprisonment. As 
a result by 2012, 65% of the 780 women incar-
cerated in the Buen Pastor Institutional Centre 
were held for drug offences. Of these women, 
23.5% (120) were convicted of smuggling drugs 
into prison, as first-time offenders. Most of them 
were heads of household, living in poverty and 
responsible for one or more children whose 
personal development was seriously affected 
as a result of the enforced separation from their 
primary caregiver. 
Acknowledging the need for a proportionate 
and gender-sensitive approach to its sentencing 
framework for drug offences, Costa Rica amended 
its drug law (article 77 of Law 8204) in 2013. The 
penalty for bringing drugs into prisons was re-
duced from an 8-20 years’ imprisonment term to 
3-8 years’ imprisonment. The sentencing option of 
alternatives to imprisonment was also introduced, 
for women who met the following criteria (see 
Box 3 in Chapter 3.4 for more details): 
• living in a situation of poverty 
• head of household, in a situation of  
vulnerability
• responsible for the care of minors, elderly 
people or people with any kind of disability 
or dependence
• an elderly person in a situation of vulnerability.
Following the reform, 159 women were released 
from prison. Costa Rica is now considering ex-
panding its reform to other drug offences. Costa 
Rica’s reform is particularly interesting for Latin 
America – where prison overcrowding is com-
monplace, and where a great majority of women 
are incarcerated for minor, non-violent drug of-
fences.111 The reform is also consistent with inter-
national standards on the rights and welfare of 
women, such as the United Nations Rules for the 
treatment of women prisoners and non-custodi-
al measures for women offenders (also known as 
the Bangkok Rules). Rule 61 in particular calls for 
the consideration of mitigating factors including 
first time offence, low-level crime and caretaking 
responsibilities.112
Buen Pastor prison for women in San Jose, Costa Rica
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their depressed socio-economic circumstances, 
prevent them from finding employment post-in-
carceration, and can have devastating conse-
quences for their dependent children or other 
family members113
• The caretaking responsibilities of an offender, 
especially women who are often the primary car-
egiver for children and other dependants such as 
elderly parents or people living with disabilities114
• The motivation for financial gain of the offender: 
several drug-related activities are not motivated 
by significant financial gain, as is the case for 
drug mules 
• If it is a first-time offence
• No involvement with organised crime or violence.
Aggravating factors should be considered to 
determine whether a sentence needs to be en-
hanced.
• Motivation for significant financial gain
• Involvement of minors
• Involvement in violent activities, corruption and/
or money laundering
• Involvement in organised crime.
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Alternatives to incarceration
3.4
Key recommendations
• Drug use should be considered as a health 
issue. Harm reduction and evidence-based 
treatment should be available and priori-
tised for people who use drugs, as well as 
people involved in low-level drug offences 
who are found to be dependent on drugs
• Incarceration should only be used as a 
last resort, and only for high-level, violent  
drug offenders
• Diversion mechanisms at arrest, prosecu-
tion and sentencing should be developed 
to help ensure that cases of low-level drug 
offenders do not overload and incapacitate 
criminal justice systems 
• Legislative and practical barriers to the im-
plementation of alternatives to incarceration 
for drug offenders should be removed115
• Social and community support networks 
should be established, including education-
al and employment programmes, housing, 
health services, etc. in order to address the 
socio-economic factors that led people 
to engage in the illicit drug trade in the  
first place
• Alternatives to incarceration should be 
tailored to address the specific needs and 
vulnerabilities of women
• Countries implementing or considering 
measures to increase diversion need to 
carefully review the evidence and options 
before choosing the best process/model for 
their circumstances.
Introduction
As a result of the punitive approaches that have 
prevailed in international and national drug control 
regimes, rates of incarceration have steadily in-
creased since the 1970s. The steepest rise has been 
in the USA.116 In Latin America, the rate of people 
incarcerated for drug offences has grown at a faster 
rate than the overall prison population.117 Rises have 
also taken place throughout Europe, Asia, Africa, and 
Oceania.118 Currently, although there are large dif-
ferences between individual countries and between 
regions,119 ‘persons convicted for drug offences (drug 
possession and drug trafficking) make up 21 per cent 
of the sentenced prison population worldwide’.120 
The high rates of imprisonment for drug-related 
offences have contributed to prison overcrowding, 
exacerbating serious concerns about prison condi-
tions. According to the Working Group on Arbitrary 
Detention, overcrowding ‘can call into question 
compliance with article 10 of the International Cov-
enant on Civil and Political Rights, which guarantees 
that everyone in detention shall be treated with hu-
manity and respect for their dignity’.121 
Both mass incarceration for drug offences and pris-
on overcrowding disproportionately affect the most 
vulnerable groups in society, in particular ethnic 
minorities. In Europe, for example, most prisoners 
are from poor communities, and the proportion of 
immigrants and ethnic minorities is increasing.122 
Similarly, in the USA ‘5 times as many Whites are 
using drugs as African Americans, yet African Amer-
icans are sent to prison for drug offenses at 10 times 
the rate of Whites’.123 In producing countries, incar-
cerated coca growers and small producers usually 
belong to the most marginalised sectors of society.
Drug offences have played an important role in the 
significant increase in the female prison population. 
Over 90% of prison inmates are male; however, over 
time ‘the total number of female prisoners (who 
constitute 5-8 per cent of the prison population) 
grew by 26 per cent between 2004 and 2012 — an 
increase far higher than that recorded for men (11 
per cent)’.124 A significant percentage of this increase 
is associated with drug offences125 – generally of a 
minor, non-violent nature.126 For example, ‘in Argen-
tina, Brazil, and Costa Rica, well over 60 percent of 
each country’s female prison population is incarcer-
ated for drug-related crimes’.127 In Europe, drug of-
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In this context, comprehensive and contextualised 
alternatives to arrest, sentencing and incarceration 
should be designed and implemented. Alternatives 
to incarceration provide more effective and less 
costly ways to reduce drug-related crime, while 
also promoting the health and social inclusion of 
low-level drug offenders by addressing some of the 
root causes of their involvement in the illicit market. 
Empirical evidence suggests that alternatives yield 
better cost-effectiveness than incarceration. For 
example, drug dependence treatment programmes 
operating outside of prisons yield up to US$8.87 
for every dollar invested, while drug treatment in 
prison yields a return on investment of US$1.91- 
US$2.69 for every dollar invested.134 Similarly, stud-
ies conducted in England and Wales suggest that 
alternatives including both residential treatment 
and supervised release are more cost-effective than 
incarceration and are more effective at reducing re-
cidivism.135 Finally, alternatives to incarceration can 
reduce the stigma and discrimination experienced 
by people sentenced to prison, and are instrumental 
in helping states to meet their international human 
rights obligations. 
Legislative/policy issues 
involved 
The UN drug conventions include explicit provisions 
allowing alternatives to conviction or punishment 
for offences relating to personal use, including pos-
fences account for about 28% of incarcerated wom-
en, with the highest percentages in Tajikistan (70%) 
and Latvia (68%), and the lowest in Poland (3.1%).128 
Thailand has the world’s sixth largest prison popula-
tion, and the world’s highest rate of imprisonment 
of women – in 2015, it was reported that 70% of 
the men and 80% of the women imprisoned were 
held for drug offences, mostly for possession and 
consumption offences. In addition, the number of 
arrests for drug use alone increased from 51,566 in 
2003 to 209,366 by 2013, accounting for 92% of all 
drug-related arrests in 2013 for Thailand.129
The imprisonment of mothers and caregivers can 
have crushing effects on their children, families, and 
communities.130 Infants and young children with an 
incarcerated parent become victims of the punitive 
approach to drugs.131 In many countries around 
the world, some children live with their moth-
ers in prison, generating complex situations for 
prison institutions.132 
A paradigm shift is urgently needed, in order to 
address this situation. Here again, it is important 
to recall that most prison inmates are incarcerated 
for drug offences of a minor, non-violent nature. For 
example, in the Federal District and in the state of 
Mexico, about 75% of the prisoners are detained 
for possession of small amounts of drugs; and in 
Colombia, over 98% of the prisoners incarcerated 
for drug offences ‘would not have had – or it was 
unlikely that it could be proved that they had – an 
important role in drug trafficking networks’.133 
Prison for women in Bogota, Colombia
Credit: Adam
 Schaffer, W
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Box  1  The Law Enforcement Assisted Diversion (LEAD) 
programme in Seattle136
LEAD is a police diversion programme, launched 
in October 2011 in Seattle, USA. It targets people 
arrested for minor drug offences and sex work 
who meet the eligibility criteria: i.e. individuals 
identified as suffering from ‘substance use disor-
ders’. 
The programme offers significant discretion to 
police officers, based on the assumption that 
they know the community best – LEAD therefore 
places a strong emphasis on community policing 
and strengthening community ties with the law 
enforcement authority. Thus, when the police 
officer stops a person, he/she has the power to 
decide whether or not to divert them into the 
programme. As the referral authority, police of-
ficers therefore have the ability to divert people 
to adequate services without conducting an ac-
tual arrest. 
If the person is diverted into the programme, 
he/she is connected to a case manager who 
will decide the type of monitoring arrangement 
the person will be subjected to, which usually 
includes a set of services tailored to the individ-
ual’s needs. The programme generally involves 
community-based treatment and support ser-
vices, guided by harm reduction principles. If 
the individual complies with the programme 
and its assessments, he/she is not charged and 
consequently does not get a criminal record. It is 
also important to note that the programme has 
no formal or punitive sanctions for ‘non-compli-
ance’, and a person can re-enter the programme 
if they fail on the first instance and are caught 
by the police for a similar offence. Indeed, the 
reason why the programme was initiated in the 
first place was for the police to find better ways 
to deal with the same individuals going in and 
out of the criminal justice system.137 
The programme was originally designed as a pi-
lot project, funded by private foundations. LEAD 
is now funded by the city of Seattle. The first eval-
uations of LEAD’s effectiveness were published 
in early 2015. Available data reported reductions 
in law enforcement costs, as well as increased 
effectiveness of the programme to reduce recid-
ivism when compared to the traditional criminal 
justice system. The evaluation concluded that, 
‘People in LEAD were 60% less likely than people 
in the control group to be arrested within the 
first 6 months of the evaluation’.138
LEAD caseworker Tim Candela, right, attends a LEAD meeting at the SPD West Precinct in Seattle in August 2014 
Credit: M
ike Kane, The H
uffi
ngton Post
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prosecution or to an alternative mechanism. Several 
countries have established such diversion systems 
which may vary greatly, but which usually apply to 
both people caught for low-level dealing and people 
arrested for offences motivated by drug dependence.
Diversion at arrest and pre-prosecution stages have 
two main advantages when they are compared to 
other forms of diversion. Firstly, they reduce pre-trial 
detention, which has led to a serious human rights 
crisis in several countries around the world.132 Sec-
ondly, they prevent people from having to undergo 
a lengthy and difficult criminal procedure, thereby 
reducing criminal justice overload and incarcera-
tion rates, as well as associated costs. The sooner 
the person is diverted away from the justice system, 
the better.
Diversion at prosecution 
In this diversion system, prosecutors are the key 
decision makers that determine whether the per-
son arrested should appear before a court or be 
referred to an alternative such as drug dependence 
treatment, or other health and social services. The 
Scottish diversion system, for instance, allows pros-
ecutors to divert people into social support inter-
ventions (see Box 2).
Sentencing and post-sentencing alternatives 
These alternatives include both diversion through 
the criminal proceedings and mechanisms to reduce 
session, purchase, cultivation and production, and 
for ‘appropriate cases of a minor nature’ not relating 
to personal use139 – for which states are encouraged 
to implement alternatives to conviction or punish-
ment, such as education, rehabilitation or social 
reintegration, and where the offender is found to be 
dependent on drugs, ‘treatment and aftercare’.140  
Alternatives to incarceration for drug offences can 
be defined as any measure intended to: a) limit the 
use of imprisonment as a punishment; b) reduce 
the pressure on countries’ criminal justice systems, 
particularly on prisons; and c) decrease the time 
of actual deprivation of liberty for individuals who 
have committed drug-related offences. The ultimate 
objective of alternatives to incarceration is to ensure 
that prison is used as a last resort. 
Alternatives to incarceration should be available 
for all non-violent drug offenders, such as low-level 
couriers and dealers, as well as drug dependent indi-
viduals who have committed economic/acquisitive 
offences – that is, for those who currently constitute 
the majority of the prison population today. Alter-
natives to incarceration for these individuals would 
ensure that more effective responses and resources 
are tailored towards large-scale, violent drug traf-
fickers and high-level criminals. 
People who use drugs should not be subject to 
incarceration, and a process of decriminalisation 
should be adopted for drug use, possession of 
drugs for personal use, the possession of drug use 
paraphernalia and the cultivation and purchase of 
substances for personal use (see Chapter 3.1). Small-
scale farmers involved in illicit crop cultivation 
should also be decriminalised (see Chapter 4.2). This 
ensures that people who use drugs and subsistence 
farmers do not end up in prison, and that the health 
and social dimensions of these activities are ad-
dressed within an enabling political environment. 
Other alternatives can be grouped into three main 
categories: a) diversion at arrest and pre-prose-
cution stages; b) diversion at prosecution; and c) 
alternatives at sentencing and post-sentencing. 
Diversion at arrest and pre-prosecution stages
There are a number of mechanisms at the arrest or 
pre-prosecution stages that can be used to avoid 
incarceration. These may involve referrals to an ad-
ministrative monitoring system, to evidence-based 
drug dependence treatment where required, or 
other non-punitive measures such as educational 
programmes.141 In this case, such mechanisms usual-
ly rely on police officers as the key personnel making 
decisions on whether to divert a person into criminal 
Box 2  The Scottish diversion 
system
In Scotland, Procurators Fiscals (equivalent of 
prosecutors) are responsible for identifying 
which of those accused of having committed 
a minor crime and who do not represent a 
significant risk to the public, should be di-
verted into social support interventions. Such 
interventions involve individual and/or group 
sessions as well as referrals to harm reduction 
and voluntary drug dependence treatment 
services, aiming to address a range of issues 
such as offending behaviours, alcohol and 
drug use, social skills, education, employment 
and training. An evaluation of the scheme 
highlighted the advantages of addressing 
the needs of drug offenders in a communi-
ty-based setting, which were shown to be 
more cost-effective and more likely to result 
in lower rates of reoffending.143 
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education and community work. Drug courts and 
community courts are common examples of such 
diversion mechanisms.146 
The drug court model has been widely implemented 
in the USA and in several Latin American countries 
– however, severe criticisms have emerged around 
this model, which should therefore be approached 
with caution.147 One of the main criticisms of the 
drug court model is that it continues to address 
drug dependence through the lens of the criminal 
justice, instead of a health and social issue. Drug 
courts were also heavily criticised for:
• The fact that, in some regions of the world, drug 
courts focus on simple drug use, instead of peo-
ple dependent on drugs who have committed 
other offences
• Pushing people who are not necessarily depend-
ent on drugs to accept treatment instead of go-
ing to prison – leading to an ineffective use of 
available resources 
• The absence of health professionals for the deter-
mination of whether the person is dependent or 
not
• The fact that the person has to admit culpability 
to access the treatment programme
• The practice of imposing sanctions for people 
failing to complete their treatment programme – 
these sanctions are sometimes more severe than 
if the person had gone through the traditional 
criminal justice system.148 
A person may also be diverted away from incar-
ceration after he/she has been convicted, through 
mechanisms that substitute or reduce the prison 
sentence. These include probation programmes, 
conditional sentencing, clemency, etc.149 Although 
such diversion schemes have a more limited impact 
on reducing criminal justice overload – since drug 
offenders will have already gone through the crim-
inal justice system – it does impact both on prison 
overcrowding, as well as on people’s ability to rein-
tegrate in society. These diversion mechanisms can 
also help reduce the harms caused by the incarcer-
ation of people in charge of children, elderly and 
people with disabilities. 
Implementation issues 
involved
A set of guiding principles should underpin the 
design and implementation of alternatives to 
incarceration: 
the length of incarceration. In these cases, judges 
decide whether to initiate the referral process – and 
when. 
Diversion mechanisms can be initiated at the mo-
ment when a person has entered the criminal jus-
tice system, for example through a suspension of 
criminal proceedings under judicial supervision. 
The diverted person must comply with certain 
conditions such as treatment for drug dependence 
and/or a series of social interventions, including 
Box 3  Costa Rica’s Restorative 
Justice Project 
In parallel with its 2013 legislative reform 
(presented in Box 2 of Chapter 3.3), Costa 
Rica has adopted a Restorative Justice Project. 
The project includes several measures aiming 
to reduce the prison population. It created a 
drug treatment court adapted to the Costa 
Rican legal system – where drug use is de-
criminalised. Targeted populations include 
low-level and first-time offenders, who have 
committed an offence related to their drug 
dependence. An interdisciplinary and special-
ised group of restorative justice (composed of 
physicians, psychologists and social workers, 
among others) tailors their response to the 
needs of the beneficiary, focusing on residen-
tial or outpatient treatment. 
Furthermore, Costa Rica has developed alter-
natives to incarceration with a gender per-
spective. The 2013 legislative reform enables 
women accused of introducing drugs in pris-
on and who are living in conditions of pover-
ty, are heads of household living in conditions 
of vulnerability, or have custody of minor 
children, older adults or persons with some 
form of disability, to be granted the benefit of 
home arrest, supervised release, residence in 
a halfway house, or electronic monitoring.144 
Most interestingly, Costa Rica is currently de-
veloping an institutional network of health 
and social services to assist former female 
offenders to reintegrate into society. The net-
work offers psychological support, help to 
find employment, social services, childcare, 
etc. in an effort to address the underlying 
causes of involvement in the drug trade, as 
well as to reduce recidivism.145 
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Adopting a human rights approach
Alternatives to incarceration have to meet interna-
tional human rights standards. Compliance with the 
rights to health, life and the prohibition of torture 
is a central purpose of promoting alternatives.150 
Therefore, any alternative involving ill treatment, in-
cluding compulsory detention centres, should not 
be implemented. 
Using incarceration and punishment as a last 
resort
The objective of alternatives to incarceration is to re-
duce the overall use of prison. However, care should 
also be taken to ensure that alternatives to incarcer-
ation do not lead to an increase in the overall volume 
of sanctions and punishments (e.g. the so-called 
‘net-widening effect’ described in Chapter 3.1).151 
Approaching drug use as a health issue
The harms associated with drug control should not 
outweigh the harms of the substances themselves. 
A change in focus is therefore needed where drug 
use is dealt with as a health and social issue, instead 
of a criminal one – and is therefore decriminalised 
(see Chapter 3.1). As explained above, the UN drug 
conventions152 and several international human 
rights instruments153 support this approach. 
Avoiding coercive treatment
Not all people who use drugs require treatment. 
As explained in Chapter 2.5, only about one in 10 
people who use drugs experience problems with 
their drug use and as a result may require treatment. 
When an offender is dependent on drugs, he/she 
should be offered appropriate and evidence-based 
treatment as an alternative to incarceration. When 
the offender uses drugs but is not dependent, alter-
natives such as referrals to harm reduction services 
should be available. 
Adopting a gender perspective
This entails dealing with both the vulnerabilities of 
women and their children and the effects that incar-
ceration may have on their lives. It also means that 
more research should be conducted on the scale of 
women’s involvement in the drug trade, the number 
of women incarcerated for drug offences, which 
offences they are incarcerated for, data on their situ-
ation (age, education, employment history, whether 
they have children, etc.), and who has benefited from 
alternatives to incarceration. Diversion mechanisms 
should also be based on a gender perspective to en-
sure that alternatives are effective at addressing the 
specific needs of women and children.154 
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Angela, 24 years old, sent to six years in prison in Bogota, Colombia, for bringing drugs into a prison
  89IDPC Drug Policy Guide
Promoting proportionate penalties for drug  
offences
Drug offences should reflect the seriousness of the 
crime and the likely impact of punishment on the 
overall illicit drug market. Alternatives to incarcer-
ation are but one component of a proportionate 
regime (see Chapter 3.3 for more details). 
Developing a wide range of health and social 
services 
The successful implementation of alternatives to 
incarceration depends on the accessibility and qual-
ity of health and social services such as healthcare 
services, including harm reduction and treatment, 
as well as social interventions. Networks of services, 
agencies and NGOs working together to address 
health and/or social and/or economic issues that 
the offender is facing are essential to develop the in-
stitutional support necessary to prevent recidivism 
and promote social reintegration.
Key resources
• European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug 
Addiction (2015), Alternatives to punishment for 
drug using offenders, https://dl.dropboxusercon-
tent.com/u/64663568/library/EMCDDA-alter-
natives-to-punishment-for-drug-using-offend-
ers-2015.pdf 
• Giacomello, C. (2013) Women, drug offenses and 
penitentiary systems in Latin America (London: 
International Drug Policy Consortium), https://
www.unodc.org/documents/congress//back-
ground-information/NGO/IDPC/IDPC-Brief-
ing-Paper_Women-in-Latin-America_ENGLISH.
pdf
• Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission 
(2014), Technical report on alternatives to incarcer-
ation for drug-related offenses, http://www.cicad.
oas.org/apps/Document.aspx?Id=3203
• Transnational Institute & Washington Office on 
Latin America (December 2010), Systems over-
load: Drug laws and prisons in Latin America, http://
www.wola.org/publications/systems_overload_
drug_laws_and_prisons_in_latin_america_0
• United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (2007), 
UNODC handbook of basic principles and promising 
practices on alternatives to imprisonment, http://
www.unodc.org/pdf/criminal_justice/07-80478_
ebook.pdf
• Washington Office on Latin America, International 
Drug Policy Consortium, DeJusticia, Inter-Ameri-
can Commission on Women (2016), Women, drug 
policy and incarceration: A policymaker’s guide for 
adopting, reviewing and implementing reforms 
related to women incarcerated for drug offenses, 
http://www.wola.org/commentary/women_
drug_policies_and_incarceration_in_the_ameri-
cas
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Modernising drug law enforcement
3.5
Key recommendations
• Illicit drug markets cannot be fully eradicat-
ed, but can be managed in a way to reduce 
the most harmful effects of the drug trade. 
Drug law enforcement should therefore 
focus on wider social objectives instead 
of merely trying to reduce the size of the 
black market
• A new and more comprehensive approach 
should focus on tackling organised crime 
more broadly, notably corruption and 
money laundering, as well as other types 
of smuggling (tobacco, alcohol, weapons, 
etc.) and criminal activities (extortion, kid-
napping, etc.)
• With this in mind, cross-government ap-
proaches should be established – police 
authorities should partner with justice, 
health, education, welfare services, youth 
ministries, as well as civil society organ-
isations and representatives of affected 
communities
• Efforts should be strengthened on arms 
control, through disarmament initiatives 
and initiatives against arms trafficking to 
help mitigate the harmful effects of the 
drug trade, given the overwhelming scien-
tific evidence than fewer guns leads to less 
violence, deaths, and crime
• New metrics and indicators of drug law 
enforcement performance – focused on 
social outcomes rather than interdiction 
process indicators – should be developed 
and independently evaluated. delivery.
Introduction 
The UN drug conventions are based on the ‘belief 
that that there [is] a simple linear relationship be-
tween the scale of the drug market and the level of 
harm to human health and welfare (i.e., the smaller 
the market, the fewer the harms)’.155 Partly as a result 
of that, national drug policies have largely focused 
on the overall objective of decreasing the size of the 
illicit drug market, with the ultimate goal a ‘drug-free 
world’.156 In this context, crop eradication (including 
through aerial spraying with glyphosate), drug sei-
zures, and arrests have been seen as positive steps 
towards this goal, and therefore often used as indi-
cators of policy success. 
This approach has proved largely ineffective and 
harmful. Globally, the average price of controlled 
substances has decreased while their purity has in-
creased.157 Meanwhile, drug policies have not man-
aged to cut down overall illicit drug consumption 
worldwide,158 while people have switched from one 
substance to another, partly in response to changes 
in price and availability. Illicit drug production has 
also remained high. Afghanistan, which produces 
an estimated 90% of the world’s opium, has had 
record-high cultivation levels in recent years.159 Suc-
cesses in curbing production in some countries have 
often shifted production to nearby areas, including 
from China to the Golden Triangle, from Thailand to 
Myanmar, from Turkey, Iran and Pakistan to Afghan-
istan,160 and more recently between Bolivia/Peru 
and Colombia.161
Drug law enforcement practices have had nu-
merous negative impacts that have outweighed 
their benefits. First, law enforcement crackdowns 
on certain drug trafficking routes have led to the 
emergence of other routes. For instance, until the 
1990s, the Caribbean was the primary transit route 
for cocaine planes, often stopping for refuelling en 
route to Florida. When US law enforcement stepped 
up, the Pacific, Central America and Mexico became 
increasingly used instead, while more cocaine was 
directed to the European market by air and sea. Of-
ficials from Europol and the United Nations Office 
on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) also noted that more 
recent law enforcement efforts in the Netherlands, 
including a total controls policy on flights from spe-
cific Latin American countries in the early 2000s, may 
have led traffickers to use different routes, notably 
through West Africa, a transit area increasingly af-
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robbery by 42%.168 While changes in the balance of 
powers between the six main ‘drug cartels’ as well as 
an increased availability of weapons from the USA 
constituted other important factors in the increased 
violence in the country, the military response certain-
ly aggravated the situation on the ground. The Mexi-
can government’s military gains against the ‘drug car-
tels’ La Familia Michoacana and Los Zetas led to the 
emergence of a new and highly violent group, Los 
Caballeros Templarios (Knights Templar). Meanwhile, 
Los Zetas were not defeated but merely displaced to 
new areas, including Monterrey, Nuevo León and fur-
ther south near the border with Guatemala.169 
High-level targeting (also called leadership removal 
or decapitation) against organised crime groups has 
proved even less effective in reducing violence than 
in the case of terrorist organisations. Notably, stud-
ies have demonstrated that ‘leadership removals 
are generally followed by increases in drug-related 
murders’,170 and that the ‘competitive structure of 
the illicit drug market in Mexico has created the par-
adoxical result that state crackdowns increase incen-
tives for [drug trafficking organisations] to fight turf 
wars by reducing the costs of fighting against the 
decapitated [drug trafficking organisation]’.171 Inter-
estingly, arresting leaders can result in less violence 
than killing them,172 and the short-term reduction 
of violence is even more robust when a mid-level 
leader, instead of a high-level one, is arrested.173
Third, in a context of budgetary pressures, a dispro-
portionate law enforcement focus on drug interdic-
tion has created opportunity costs, diverting crucial 
law enforcement resources away from prevention 
fected by the transatlantic cocaine trade.162 As long 
as there is demand and profit to be made, traffickers 
have shown great adaptability and sophistication in 
their tactics as well. In particular, the vast profits to 
be gained from illicit drug markets have constituted 
important economic incentives for criminal organ-
isations’ continued involvement in the drug trade. 
Second, national drug policies focused on reducing 
the size of the drug market have led to more violence 
and instability. Retail drug markets are not inherent-
ly violent; there are a number of more important 
factors in levels of violence, including ‘demographic 
factors, such as the age of criminal capos and the 
geographic concentration of minority groups, levels 
of poverty, the balance of power in the criminal mar-
ket as well as the capacity of policing agencies and 
their choice of strategies’.163 A 2011 study found that 
‘gun violence and high homicide rates may be an in-
evitable consequence of drug prohibition and that 
disrupting drug markets can paradoxically increase 
violence’.164 Examples of drug law enforcement 
contributing to more violence include Colombia be-
tween the mid-1980s and the mid-1990s;165 Mexico, 
whose homicide rate nearly tripled between 2007 
and 2012;166 and Brazil, where police officers killed 
over 11,000 people between 2008 and 2013.167 
Militarised interventions have proven to be even 
more problematic. In Mexico, as part of the mili-
tary crackdown carried out under President Felipe 
Calderón (2006-2012), over 70,000 people died in 
drug-related killings, and more than 26,000 disap-
peared. Between 2007 and 2010, kidnapping in-
creased by 188%, extortion by 100%, and aggravated 
Credit: Issouf Sanogo, A
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and investigation. Because of this, murders, kidnap-
pings, sexual violence, and corruption, have argua-
bly been neglected. Mexico’s National Institute for 
Statistics and Geography estimated that in 2013 
almost 94% of crimes were not investigated.174 
Similarly, at least 600,000 murders have gone un-
solved in the USA since the 1960s.175 In Colombia, 
95% of the 3,000 cases of assassination of trade un-
ion members of the past 30 years remain unprose-
cuted.176 In Guatemala, impunity for perpetrators of 
rape and domestic violence stood at approximately 
98% in 2012.177
Fourth, mano dura (or ‘tough on crime’) policing has 
been a key factor in overcrowding prisons. Incar-
cerating low-level drug offenders has proved most 
controversial, damaging their economic and social 
prospects in the long-term, and making their par-
ticipation in drug dealing and other types of crime 
more likely following their release. Former prisoners 
face low career prospects, and effective rehabilita-
tion and reintegration programmes remain rare in 
many countries (see Chapters 3.4 and 3.6). 
Fifth, mano dura approaches have contributed to 
the emergence of oversimplifying the links between 
drug trafficking and terrorism, as reflected in the 
term ‘narcoterrorism’, often used to describe situa-
tions in countries such as Afghanistan, Mali, Mexico, 
and Peru. The term is problematic in that it suggests 
a ‘symbiotic relationship’ between drug traffickers 
and terrorists, rarely confirmed in practice. The term 
oversimplifies an extremely complex situation and 
diverts attention from other important issues, such 
as corruption, state abuses, arms trafficking, human 
trafficking and other types of organised crime and 
violence. Overestimating the importance of the 
drug trade in funding terrorism, and of the use of 
terrorist tactics by drug traffickers, may lead to dis-
proportionate and counterproductive policies.178 
Lastly, heavy-handed drug law enforcement has 
caused massive human rights violations, such as il-
legal detention, forced treatment and forced labour, 
physical and sexual abuse, as well as the moral and 
social stigmatisation of low-level drug offenders, in-
cluding subsistence farmers179 (see Policy principle 3).
Legislative/policy issues 
involved
In order to address those limitations, drug law en-
forcement needs to be refocused and modernised 
to target those most harmful aspects of the illicit 
drug market. 
Box 1  Social programmes in 
Boston and Chicago 
In the mid-1990s, the Boston police put in 
place one of the first applications of the con-
cept of community-based deterrence. Oper-
ation Ceasefire prioritised its efforts on the 
most violent gangs in the city, and involved 
local community leaders. A coalition of reli-
gious groups held forums for gang members, 
police officers, church ministers, and social 
services staff to discuss relevant issues, and 
to give an opportunity for offenders to re-
ceive education and training in exchange 
for leaving the gangs.180 Studies found that 
Operation Ceasefire ‘was associated with sta-
tistically significant reductions in all time se-
ries, including a 63% decrease in the monthly 
number of youth homicides in Boston, a 
32-percent decrease in the monthly number 
of citywide shots-fired calls, a 25% decrease in 
the monthly number of citywide all-age gun 
assault incidents, and a 44% decrease in the 
monthly number of District B–2 youth gun 
assault incidents’.181 
Similar initiatives in High Point, North Caroli-
na and Santa Tecla, El Salvador have proved 
effective as well.182 More recently, interven-
tions carried out in parts of South Side and 
West Side, Chicago aiming at improving the 
outcomes of low-income youth by teaching 
them to be less automatic in their behav-
iour, showed promising results. Cognitive 
behaviour therapy was used to help youth to 
overcome their difficulties by changing their 
thinking, behaviour, and emotional respons-
es.183 In a series of randomised controlled 
trials, a programme called Becoming a Man 
developed by Youth Guidance showed that 
‘participation improved schooling outcomes 
and reduced violent-crime arrests by 44%’ 
and ‘reduced overall arrests by 31%’.184 
Prioritising violence reduction 
National drug policies have largely placed priority 
on reducing the size of the drug market at all costs. 
Instead, policing designed to proactively shape the 
drug markets towards more benign, less violent 
forms, is a more realistic and effective way to miti-
gate the harms caused by the drug trade, as demon-
strated by effective programmes put in place in Bos-
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ton and Chicago (see Box 1). Stronger actions on the 
number of weapons in circulation and against arms 
trafficking are key in that regard.
Focusing on wider social objectives 
A focus on improving the socio-economic circum-
stances of populations affected by the drug trade 
would go a long way in addressing some of the root 
Box 2  Police support to health services: Switzerland, 
Vancouver, Australia and the UK
In the early 1990s, Switzerland reformed its drug 
policy around a ‘Four Pillars’ approach (preven-
tion, treatment, harm reduction and law en-
forcement), endorsed by the Federal Council in 
1994. Police authorities, initially reticent, came 
to accept the shift in perspective from public 
order to public health. They were made equal 
partners with public health officials as the new 
drug policy was developed and implemented. 
A cross-government drug committee helped 
improve communication and coordination be-
tween services towards a common strategy. The 
new drug policy and the introduction of harm re-
duction programmes contributed to a significant 
drop in the number of HIV deaths among people 
who use drugs from the early 1990s to 1998.185
Based on the Swiss model, a similar drug strategy 
emerged in the early 2000s in Vancouver, Cana-
da. The strategy has centred on harm reduction, 
including measures such as condom distribution, 
needle exchange, and North America’s first safe in-
jection site, opened in 2003. Despite political diffi-
culties, police authorities have supported Insite in 
practice, and diverted people using heroin to the 
site.186 ‘Protocols between police and harm reduc-
tion service providers ensure drug trafficking laws 
are enforced – open drug dealing is discouraged, 
while drug users are encouraged to access needed 
services’, the Ministry of Health of British Columbia 
noted.187 Since 2003, numbers of overdose deaths 
and new HIV infections among people who inject 
drugs went down to the lowest on record, and 
treatment levels have increased considerably.188 
Measures put in place in Australia in the early 
1990s offer another relevant example of benefi-
cial cooperation between law enforcement and 
health services at the national and local levels, 
including through harm reduction courses for 
the police, greater use of police discretion, direct 
involvement in harm reduction efforts, and the 
creation of a Drug Programs Co-ordination Unit 
‘responsible for fostering a harm reduction ap-
proach to drug law enforcement by both gener-
alist and specialist police’.189 
A similar multi-disciplinary approach emerged 
in the mid-1990s in the UK, involving drug law 
enforcement cooperation with community polic-
ing, health and social authorities, and the justice 
system. Drug Action Teams were created, and 
tasked with identifying problems, coordinating 
the local response and reporting back to rele-
vant national public health authorities. This led 
to more harm reduction trainings for the police, 
increased awareness of their role and responsi-
bilities, and greater cooperation between servic-
es.190 In 2013, an Independent Commission on 
Drugs convened by the Safe in the City Partner-
ship also highlighted the benefits of collabora-
tion between police, council, health services and 
community organisations in Brighton & Hove.191
causes of the problem, while mitigating the unintend-
ed, yet entirely foreseeable negative consequences of 
mano dura policing. Recent experiences in Seattle pro-
vide a relevant case study (see Box 1 in Chapter 3.4).
Promoting community policing 
Community policing concentrating on crime pre-
vention should be inclusive and welcome participa-
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tion and input from the local population, civil socie-
ty organisations and affected communities. Lessons 
can be learnt from the experience of the Police 
Pacification Units (UPPs), launched in Rio de Janeiro, 
Brazil in 2008. In particular, the UPPs’ objective to de-
liver social services and new infrastructure to boost 
social and economic development in the favelas 
could be useful elsewhere. However, the UPPs have 
also been criticised because of the militarisation of 
some of the favelas’ communities, leading to tight 
police controls, arbitrary searches and harassment. 
Others have raised concerns about the capacity of 
the UPPs to truly tackle drug-related violence – in 
fact, out of the 1,000 favelas of Rio de Janeiro, only 
17 have been pacified so far, often leading organ-
ised criminal groups to move to neighbouring 
favelas to resume their activities.192 The UPPs’ mixed 
results demonstrate the need for sustained efforts 
in the long term, accompanied by measures such 
as those designed to reduce economic and social 
inequalities, improve work conditions, and decrease 
school dropout rates.
Building partnerships with health and social 
authorities 
As part of this new approach, police authorities 
should work in close cooperation with health au-
thorities, to divert people dependent on drugs 
towards treatment and other harm reduction ser-
vices available. In particular, the successful expe-
riences of Switzerland and Vancouver, with police 
notably informing and directing people who inject 
drugs towards supervised injection sites, are worth 
building upon (see Box 2). In addition, partnering 
with social organisations focusing on rehabilita-
tion and reintegration, through welfare support, 
career counselling, cognitive behaviour therapy, or 
social skills training, is likely to have a stronger pos-
itive impact than punitive measures for low-level 
drug offenders.
Tackling corruption and money laundering 
Going after the main enablers of the drug trade 
and organised crime are key dimensions of an ef-
fective drug law enforcement approach. Ultimate-
ly, corruption is a leading factor behind violence 
and organised crime. A concerted effort at the 
local, regional, national and international levels, 
and support from civil society on the matter, are 
essential, and could learn from previous experi-
ences in Georgia, Croatia and Sierra Leone (see 
Box 3). Preventing criminals from easily spending, 
investing and hiding proceeds from the drug trade 
is another crucial element of the law enforce- 
ment response.193
Building up investigation capacity and 
strengthening the criminal justice system 
Much of the foreign aid and national investments 
in drug law enforcement have targeted screening 
and interdiction capabilities. While some of these 
are needed, an important tool has often been ne-
glected: the authorities’ capacity to investigate and 
prosecute drug cases and their associated networks. 
This not only requires tackling corruption amongst 
government, police, and the judiciary, but also a 
renewed focus on education, training, more system-
Box 3  Anti-corruption 
initiatives in Georgia, Croatia 
and Sierra Leone 
A World Bank report highlighted a num-
ber of measures behind achievements in 
Georgia: ‘exercising strong political will; 
establishing credibility early; launching a 
frontal assault; attracting new staff; limiting 
the state’s role; adopting unconventional 
methods; coordinating closely; tailoring in-
ternational experience to local conditions; 
harnessing technology; and using communi- 
cations strategically’.194 
In Croatia, the government created the Bu-
reau for the Suppression of Corruption and 
Organised Crime, a specialised prosecution 
service. After early struggles, the Bureau now 
holds a conviction rate higher than 95%, and 
has successfully prosecuted a former prime 
minister, a former vice president, a former 
top-level general, and other high-level offi-
cials. Strengthened legislation, popular sup-
port, media scrutiny, and the perspective of 
European Union membership have been con-
sidered as key factors behind this progress.195
A 2013 report on Sierra Leone pointed out 
that effective anti-corruption efforts may 
include the creation of institutions specifi-
cally dedicated to tackling corruption, the 
development of oversight processes led by 
civil society, parliamentary committees or the 
judiciary, a focus on education, accountability 
and transparency, especially regarding asset 
disclosure and political party financing, and 
engagement with the private sector (learning 
for instance from the South African Initiative – 
Business Against Crime South Africa).196
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atic and comprehensive data gathering processes, 
personnel, budgets, and international cooperation.
Mid-level targeting 
Targeting low-level, non-violent drug offenders 
has led to a dramatic increase in prison popula-
tions, and negative socio-economic effects in the 
long term. ‘Kingpin’ strategies to remove top lead-
ers often make little impact on the work of their 
organisations, and may lead to cycles of violence 
for succession. Instead, investigating and arresting 
mid-level leaders are likely to have a stronger im-
pact on violence reduction and the drug trafficking 
organisations themselves. 
Implementation issues 
involved
Reforming drug law enforcement is an arduous task, 
affected by a number of factors. These include:
• Sunk cost fallacy, or ‘the idea that a company 
or organization is more likely to continue with 
a project if they have already invested a lot of 
money, time, or effort in it, even when continuing 
is not the best thing to do’.197 In other words, we 
have invested so much money, time and effort 
in the current drug law enforcement approach, 
that reforming it is seen by many as a waste, or 
giving up, while related bureaucracies are now 
embedded in our law enforcement budgets and 
infrastructures.
• A third-rail issue: Although the debate has sig-
nificantly evolved in recent years in several coun-
tries, a reform of drug law enforcement strategies 
remains a politically controversial topic. Many 
politicians remain unwilling to champion more 
liberal policies by fear of being labelled as ‘soft on 
drugs’ or ‘weak on crime’. 
• Counter-narcotics aid: Foreign assistance and 
training has also disseminated and perpetuated 
outdated and inadequate drug law enforcement 
approaches across the world.198
There is thus a clear need to work with law enforce-
ment officials, politicians, the media and the greater 
public to explain that the current approach is not 
only largely ineffective but also harmful, and explain 
the merits of the new approach and the scientific 
evidence behind it. 
Crucially, change will only occur if the objectives 
and performance indicators to incentivise effective 
practice are amended (see Box 4). These should no 
longer focus on the number of seizures, arrests, 
Box 4  Examples of new drug 
law enforcement performance 
indicators 
Indicators of drug markets that focus more 
on the outcomes of law enforcement oper-
ations:
• Have law enforcement operations reduced 
the availability of a particular substance to 
young people (measured by the level of use 
or ease of access)?
• Have law enforcement operations affected 
the price or purity of drugs at the retail lev-
el? If so, has this had positive or negative 
effects on the drug market and people who 
use drugs?
Indicators measuring drug-related crime:
• Have the profits, power and reach of organ-
ised crime groups been reduced?
• Has the violence associated with drug mar-
kets been reduced?
• Has the level of crime committed by peo-
ple to support, or as a consequence of, their 
drug use been reduced?
Indicators measuring the law enforce-
ment contribution to health and social 
programmes:
• How many people dependent on drugs 
have law enforcement agencies referred to 
drug dependence treatment services?
• How many people have achieved a sus-
tained period of stability as a result of treat-
ment? 
• Has the number of overdose deaths been 
reduced?
• Has the prevalence of HIV and hepatitis 
among people who use drugs declined?
Indicators evaluating the environment and 
patterns of drug use and dependence: 
• How did law enforcement activities impact 
affected communities’ socio-economic en-
vironment and people’s feelings of safety 
and security?
• Have patterns of drug use and dependence 
changed as a result of law enforcement  
actions?
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crops eradicated, or extraditions (processes), but 
rather on evidence of fewer harms associated with 
the drug trade, and an improved quality of life (out-
comes), independently evaluated.199 
Key resources
• Brookings Institution (2015), Improving glob-
al drug policy: Comparative perspectives and 
UNGASS 2016, http://www.brookings.edu/re-
search/papers/2015/04/global-drug-policy 
• International Drug Policy Consortium, Interna-
tional Institute for Strategic Studies & Chatham 
House (2012-2013), Modernising Drug Law 
Enforcement publication series, http://idpc.net/
policy-advocacy/special-projects/modernis-
ing-drug-law-enforcement 
• Organization of American States (2013), 
Report on the drug problem in the Americas, 
http://www.oas.org/en/media_center/
press_release.asp?sCodigo=E-194/13 
• Werb, D. Rowell, G., Guyatt, G., Kerr, T. & 
Montaner, J. (2011), ‘Effects of drug market 
violence: A systematic review’, International 
Journal of Drug Policy, 22(2): 87-94, http://
www.ijdp.org/article/S0955-3959(11)00022-
3/abstract 
• West Africa Commission on Drugs (2014), 
Not just in transit: An independent report of 
the West Africa Commission on Drugs, http://
www.wacommissionondrugs.org/report/ 
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Health-based policies in prisons and other  
closed settings
3.6
Key recommendations
• Governments should consider bringing 
prison health under the control of the Min-
istry of Health rather than ministries of jus-
tice, interior or corrections 
• An understanding of the level and nature 
of drug use and drug dependence among 
prisoners is needed to design appropriate 
policies and programmes; and services 
should be designed, implemented and eval-
uated with the meaningful involvement of 
people who use drugs
• A range of interventions and programmes 
should be developed and properly resourced 
in custodial settings, including treatment and 
harm reduction services. These programmes 
should be gender sensitive, and be stringently  
evaluated and adapted if necessary
• NSPs in prisons are needed to avoid the risks 
related to sharing injection equipment. The 
introduction of NSPs should be carefully 
prepared, including providing information 
and training for prison staff. The mode of de-
livery of needles, syringes and other equip-
ment (for example, by hand or dispensing 
machine) should be chosen in accordance 
with the environment of the prison and the 
needs of its population200
• Additional harm reduction programmes 
– such as information and education pro-
grammes, naloxone distribution, HIV testing 
and counselling, ART, crack pipe distribu-
tion, etc. – should also be provided
• A person’s participation in drug treatment 
programmes should not be used as a reason 
to discriminate against them
• Effective links with community-based 
services should be established to ensure 
continuity of care so that the benefits of 
treatment started before or during impris-
onment are retained.
Introduction 
The best estimate of the current world prison 
population is 10.2 million, a figure excluding at 
least 650,000 persons reported to be in pre-trial 
or ‘administrative’ detention in China and 15,000 
in North Korea.201 The number of people impris-
oned for drug-related offences has been growing 
in the past few decades irrespective of imprison-
ment for offences such as theft, robbery and fraud 
committed to raise money to fund drug purchases. 
As already mentioned in previous chapters of the 
Guide, the global increase in drug-related crime is 
driven mainly by a rising number of offences relat-
ed to drug possession – with offences related to 
drug possession currently comprising 83% of total 
global drug-related offences. Criminal offences re-
lating to drug trafficking, however, have remained 
relatively stable over time (see figure 1),202 and the 
vast majority of traffickers in prison are low-level 
offenders.203 
The proportion of drug-related offences among fe-
male prisoners is typically higher than for their male 
counterparts.024 This trend has been attributed to the 
greater ease with which low-level crimes can be pros-
ecuted,205 as well as gender disparities in the enforce-
ment of drug laws and policies.206 Overall, however, 
the vast majority of prisoners the world over are adult 
men, although the number of women prisoners is 
increasing at a much faster rate than for men.207 
In most countries, prisoners are drawn from the 
poorest and most marginalised strata of society, 
with low education, high unemployment rates, and 
histories of physical or sexual abuse, broken homes 
and relationships.208 Many prisoners may have 
used alcohol and/or controlled substances as a 
coping mechanism, including to ‘escape’ childhood 
abuse and violence. In prison, drugs are widely 
available, and are often used to escape the misery, 
brutality, lack of privacy, anxiety and chronic inse-
curity that frequently characterise life within these 
institutions. Boredom and lack of constructive ac-
tivities in prison can also increase the likelihood of 
drug use.209
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by, in European prisons it was found in 2006 that 
tuberculosis infection was 17 times more likely in 
prisons than in the general population, and up to 
81 times more likely in Eastern Europe.218
The sharing of needles and syringes is a major 
factor for the spread of blood-borne diseases in 
prison, driven by the lack of availability of sterile 
equipment via harm reduction services and by fear 
of detection of drug use. Statistics show that a high 
number of prisoners who inject drugs share nee-
dles and other injecting equipment: for example, 
56% in Pakistan, 66% in Russia, 70-90% in Austral-
ia, 78% in Thailand and 83-92% in Greece.219 Other 
factors for the transmission of infections are rape 
and sexual violence as well as consensual unpro-
tected sex. Where the use of drugs is particularly 
stigmatised, those at the bottom of the prison’s 
informal hierarchy are most prone to being victims 
of such assaults.220
Based on these data, it is clear that prisons are an in-
adequate place to deal with drug use and depend-
ence; rather, such settings result in additional health 
risks, even more so when facilities are overcrowded 
and under-resourced. There are therefore a number 
of reasons why an effective prison policy is essential, 
notwithstanding the need for broader drug policy 
reforms that seek to divert low-level drug offenders 
away from prisons in the first place (see Chapters 3.1 
to 3.4):
• Public health: Prisons constitute an unsuitable 
Although data are difficult to obtain and compare, 
studies indicate that approximately 50% of prison-
ers in the European Union, and more than 80% in the 
USA, have a history of drug use, and that this number 
is increasing.211 Estimates show that approximately 
one in three people detained have used drugs at 
least once while in prison,212 with the prevalence 
of drug use varying considerably from country to 
country. There is also evidence that many prisoners 
initiate injecting drugs for the first time in prison.213 
While the number of people who inject drugs in the 
community is only 0.26% of people aged 15-64, the 
rate is considerably higher in prison. For example, a 
study found that 23% of prisoners in Australia had 
injected drugs at some point in prison, as had 39% 
of male prisoners in Bangkok, Thailand.214 
While the rate of infections in prisons within and 
across countries varies considerably, the preva-
lence of HIV, sexually transmitted infections (STIs), 
hepatitis B and C as well as tuberculosis is much 
higher in prison populations as compared to the 
general population. HIV prevalence has been 
found to be 50 times higher in some prison set-
tings than in the general population.215 In Europe, 
the World Health Organisation (WHO) estimated 
that one in four detainees (an estimated 2.2 mil-
lion people) are living with hepatitis C, compared 
to one in every 50 in the broader community.216 
Similarly, the prevalence of tuberculosis is ‘multi-
ple times higher’ in prisons than it is in the general 
population.217 While statistics are hard to come 
Figure 1. Global trends of selected crimes, 2003 to 2013210
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Legislative/policy issues 
involved
The right of everyone to the enjoyment of the 
highest attainable standard of physical and mental 
health is enshrined in article 12 of International Cov-
enant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights225 and 
reflected in Principle 9 of the Basic principles for the 
treatment of prisoners.226 The right to health cannot 
be curtailed because a person is caught using drugs 
or ends up in prison.227 
States bear a particular duty of care for those de-
tained, as prisoners have no alternative but to rely 
on prison authorities to promote and protect their 
health.228 The Special Rapporteur on torture has 
held that states ‘must provide adequate medical 
care, which is a minimum and indispensable materi-
al requirement for ensuring the humane treatment 
of persons in its custody’, and that ‘omissions on the 
part of the authorities can amount to ill-treatment 
and even torture’.229 
People in custody are entitled to the same standard 
of healthcare found outside of prisons, including 
with regard to prevention, harm reduction and 
antiretroviral therapy (ART).230 The Special Rap-
porteur on the right to health has clarified that the 
right to health is violated if harm reduction and evi-
dence-based treatment programmes are available to 
the general public, but not to people in detention.231
The most comprehensive guidance on healthcare 
in prisons is enshrined in the revised UN Standard 
minimum rules for the treatment of prisoners, also 
known as the Mandela Rules (Rules 24 to 35).232 The 
place for dealing with drug use and depend-
ence,221 but rather incubate health problems such 
as blood-borne viruses and overdose. Such health 
problems are not sealed away, they impact on the 
rest of the community as prison staff, service pro-
viders and visitors enter and exit the institutional 
setting, and prisoners are ultimately released. 
Consequently, effective healthcare in prison is in 
the vital interest of society.
• Human rights obligations: International human 
rights obligations include the right to the high-
est attainable standard of physical and mental 
health,222 and prisoners retain their human rights 
while detained. Governments bear a particular 
responsibility towards those they deprive of 
their liberty.
• Improve drug treatment and prevent recidi-
vism: Effective treatment for drug dependence 
in prisons – including opioid substitution therapy 
(OST) – improves health outcomes and can help 
to prevent a return to crime after release.223 With-
out treatment and a continuum of care, evidence 
shows a high rate of overdoses, relapse to drug 
use and recidivism among people who use drugs 
after they are released from prison.224
• Economics: Responding to drug-related crime, 
overdose and blood-borne infections can be 
very expensive, in particular for illnesses such 
as HIV that are chronic and may require life-long 
treatment. There is therefore a powerful eco-
nomic case to be made for harm reduction and 
evidence-based drug treatment measures in pris-
ons, as well as in community settings.
Bandung prison, Indonesia
Credit: International H
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medical interventions. As the Special Rapporteur on 
the right to health emphasized, ‘informed consent is 
not mere acceptance of a medical intervention, but 
a voluntary and sufficiently informed decision’.238
Professional healthcare requires the maintenance 
of medical files. However, the confidentiality of 
such information is reflected in Mandela Rule 26, 
including the prisoners’ access to it and the duty to 
transfer medical files to another facility along with 
the prisoner. 
The lack of gender-sensitive provisions relating to 
healthcare provision in prison settings has been 
revised Rules clarify that the provision of healthcare 
for prisoners is a state responsibility, free of charge 
and without discrimination on the grounds of their 
legal status (Rule 24).233 The same standards apply 
in prison as they do in the community (based on 
the principle of equivalence of care), and health-
care services in prison should be organised ‘in a 
way that ensures continuity of treatment and care, 
including for HIV, tuberculosis and other infectious 
diseases, as well as for drug dependence’ (Rule 24). 
The revised Rules also call for ‘particular attention 
to prisoners with special healthcare needs or with 
health issues that hamper their rehabilitation’ (Rule 
25). The role of healthcare personnel is to evaluate, 
promote, protect and improve the physical and 
mental health of prisoners, through ‘an interdiscipli-
nary team with sufficient qualified personnel acting 
in full clinical independence’ (Rule 25, see also the 
Dual Loyalty Guidelines,234 the Declaration of Tokyo 
of the World Medical Association235 and the UN 
Rules for the treatment of women prisoners – the 
‘Bangkok Rules’236).
Healthcare staff in prisons are subject to the same 
ethical and professional standards as for patients 
in the community, including adherence to prison-
ers’ autonomy with regard to their own health, in-
formed consent in the doctor-patient relationship, 
and confidentiality of medical information – unless 
maintaining such confidentiality would result in a 
real and imminent threat to the patient or to others 
(Rule 32, see also General Comment No. 14 of the 
UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights237). Information is a precondition for pris-
oners to be able to give their informed consent to 
Prison medical facility in Kazakhstan
Credit: Penal Reform
 International
Box 1  Principles for the 
provision of healthcare in 
prison239
• State responsibility
• Without discrimination
• Equivalence of healthcare
• Clinical independence
• Same ethical principles as in the community
• Medical screening upon admission
• Drug dependence treatment
• Mental healthcare
• Continuity of care
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acknowledged and rectified by the adoption of the 
Bangkok Rules.240 
While the Mandela Rules and the Bangkok Rules do 
not constitute legally-binding treaties, they carry the 
weight of unanimously adopted standards at the in-
ternational level. At the regional level, provisions on 
healthcare in prisons have been incorporated in the 
European prison rules241 and the Principles and best 
practices on the protection of persons deprived of 
liberty in the Americas.242 
The WHO and the UNODC have been at the fore-
front of developing guidance relating to prisoner 
healthcare and the treatment of drug dependencies 
(see Key Resources below). The WHO guidelines243 
on controlled substances have been endorsed by 
the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB), 
who also advised in 2007 that, ‘Governments have 
a responsibility to (...) provide adequate services 
for drug offenders (whether in treatment services 
or in prison)’.244
Implementation issues 
involved
Prison authorities have usually focused on pre-
venting drug use in prison through stringent secu-
rity measures and drug-testing programmes, while 
dedicating little attention and resources to the 
provision of healthcare, drug dependence treat-
ment and harm reduction programmes. Countries 
who focus on mandatory drug testing245 argue 
that this measure deters prisoners from using 
drugs in prison and allows them to identify indi-
viduals for treatment. However, the practice has 
shown a number of problems, including the diver-
sion of financial and staff resources away from evi-
dence-based treatment and prevention services, a 
negative effect on the prison regime246 and the risk 
of prisoners switching to more harmful drugs be-
cause these are not being tested for or are harder 
to detect (e.g. prisoners may switch to the use of 
heroin or new psychoactive substances rather than 
cannabis, as the latter can be detected in the body 
for a longer period of time).247
Implementing a comprehensive package of 
services in prison
A comprehensive package recommended by the 
UNODC, the International Labor Organization (ILO), 
the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), 
the WHO and the Joint United Nations Programme 
on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) for HIV prevention, treatment 
and care in prisons and other closed settings com-
prises 15 key interventions (see Box 2).248
Bandung prison, Indonesia. Credit: Vincent Rumahloine, International HIV/AIDS Alliance
Box 2  The UN comprehensive 
package of interventions in 
prison249
The comprehensive package consists of 15 in-
terventions that are essential for effective HIV 
prevention and treatment in closed settings. 
While each of these interventions alone is use-
ful in addressing HIV in prisons, they have the 
greatest impact when delivered as a whole. 
Although by no means truly ‘comprehensive’, 
this package is a useful start to address HIV in 
closed settings. 
1. Information, education and communica-
tion
2. Condom programmes
3. Prevention of sexual violence
4. Drug dependence treatment, including 
OST
5. Needle and syringe programmes (NSPs)
6. Prevention of transmission through medi-
cal or dental services
7. Prevention of transmission through tat-
tooing, piercing and other forms of skin 
penetration
8. Post-exposure prophylaxis
9. HIV testing and counselling
10. HIV treatment, care and support
11. Prevention, diagnosis and treatment of 
tuberculosis
12. Prevention of mother-to-child transmis-
sion of HIV
13. Prevention and treatment of STIs
14. Vaccination, diagnosis and treatment of 
viral hepatitis
15. Protecting staff from occupational hazards
A combination of measures that address drug use, 
drug dependence and related health risks in prison 
includes:
Education and information – As prisoners typically 
come from the most marginalised groups of socie-
ty and may have had limited access to healthcare 
before admission to prison, they are less likely to 
be aware of health and infection risks. However, the 
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efits254 (see also the Madrid Recommendations255). 
Drug dependence treatment programmes showed 
additional positive effects on institutional behav-
iour and reduced violence.256 As in the community, 
however, more attention should be given to substi-
tution treatment options for stimulant dependence 
(see Chapter 2.5 for more detail).
Several studies have also acknowledged that other 
forms of treatment, such as psychosocial therapy, 
are effective at reducing drug dependence in pris-
ons.257 Structured therapeutic programmes have 
been shown to move a proportion of prisoners 
away from drug dependence, with resulting reduc-
tions in crime and health problems. Prison author-
ities should aim to make available a full range of 
evidence-based treatment programmes, based on 
the following principles:
• Screening procedures need to be in place to iden-
tify those in need of treatment, while respecting 
the principle of informed consent258 
• As long as the treatment programmes provided 
are voluntary, humane and of good quality, pris-
oners will be likely to participate
• Programmes should be organised so that prison-
ers are able to move between services through-
out their time in prison, according to their needs 
and when they choose to do so
• Compliance and success rates of treatment for 
drug dependence in prisons can be improved by 
linking treatment progress to prisoner incentives, 
such as consideration for early release
• Careful attention needs to be paid to continuity 
of treatment upon admission and post release
spread of infectious diseases can only be prevented 
if prisoners are given information about means of 
protection and prevention in a diction that is appro-
priate to their language skills and education. Health 
education has also shown to improve adherence to 
treatment and rises in cure rates.250 Some prison ad-
ministrations have used educational videos or lec-
tures to deliver health education, leading to higher 
levels of awareness. Information material should be 
developed in consultation with prisoners and pris-
on staff, as it ‘makes the information more sensitive 
and appropriate to the prison context, increases the 
sense of ownership among prisoners and contrib-
utes to the continuity of the programme’.251
Drug dependence treatment – With a large num-
ber of people dependent on drugs held in custody 
at any one time, prisons can be an effective set-
ting for a range of evidence-based treatment pro-
grammes (for more information on treatment, refer 
to Chapter 2.5). OST – in particular with methadone 
and buprenorphine – has proven to be feasible 
and beneficial in a wide range of prison settings for 
people dependent on opioids. Yet only 43 countries 
provided OST in prison settings in 2014.252 OST has 
proven to lower rates of heroin use, reduce drug 
injection, reduce the sharing of injecting equip-
ment, lower rates of fatal overdose (especially 
post-release), increase adherence to ART, and lower 
re-incarceration rates.253 For example, a review of 
21 studies on OST in prisons found that it provided 
an effective way to get people into treatment pro-
grammes, reduce risk behaviours, and lower over-
dose risks upon release. It also found that, where 
liaison with community-based programmes existed, 
the prison programmes ensured longer-term ben-
Buen Pastor prison in Bogota, Colombia
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• Treatment success and recovery should not be 
understood solely as abstinence from drug use. 
Individuals should be encouraged to identify and 
strive towards their own recovery, which may or 
may not require abstinence but will always in-
clude progressive steps to improve their health 
and well-being (see Chapter 2.5). 
Needle and syringe programmes – While there 
has been great reluctance to introduce NSPs in 
prison settings, programmes involving the distribu-
tion of sterile injecting equipment to people who 
inject drugs have been effective at preventing HIV 
and hepatitis infection. Fears included the possibil-
ity that prisoners would use needles as weapons 
against staff or other prisoners, that discarded nee-
dles would present an infection risk, and that the 
availability of sterile needles and syringes would 
increase the prevalence of drug injecting in prisons. 
However, these concerns have not materialised in 
practice and the outcomes of such programmes 
have been very positive in reducing the sharing of 
injecting equipment.259 Yet, in 2014, only 8 countries 
provided NSPs in prisons (three less than in 2012), 
compared to 90 countries where such programmes 
were available in the community.260 The UNODC, the 
WHO and UNAIDS recommend that both NSPs and 
OST be accessible in prisons.261 
Access to measures for safer sex – A number of 
countries provide free access to condoms in prison 
settings, including in Western Europe, parts of Eastern 
Europe and Central Asia, as well as Australia, Canada, 
Indonesia, the Islamic Republic of Iran,262 South Afri-
ca and the USA.263 Research in a Los Angeles county 
prison found that condom distribution prevented a 
quarter of HIV transmissions among sexually active 
inmates, and that the averted future medical costs 
far exceeded the programme costs.264 No security 
problems or other negative consequences have been 
reported, and evidence shows that the provision of 
condoms has not led to an increase in security issues, 
sexual activity or drug use.265 Further measures have 
also included providing information, education and 
communication programmes for prisoners and pris-
on staff on STIs, consisting of voluntary counselling 
and testing for prisoners or measures to prevent 
rape, sexual violence and coercion.  
Vaccination programmes – Effective vaccina-
tions exist to protect people against hepatitis B, 
and incarceration does provide an opportunity to 
encourage people to take up these vaccinations. 
However, vaccination schemes should remain vol-
untary.266 The UK, for example, established an ‘opt-
out’ testing programme for hepatitis B in prisons, 
whereby all prisoners are offered the chance to 
be tested for infection, and recommended that all 
prisoners be vaccinated against hepatitis B.272 Most 
prison administrations that have targeted hepati-
tis A and B vaccination programmes at drug-us-
ing prisoners report high levels of engagement 
and compliance.
Establishing responsibility / prison 
management
It is now widely recognised that prison health ser-
vices should be integrated into public national 
health policies and systems.273 It is also increasingly 
acknowledged that this can be done most effective-
ly, and that continuity of care is best achieved, when 
the responsibility for prison healthcare is assumed 
by the Ministry of Health.274 Healthcare staff em-
ployed by prison services may not be sufficiently in 
touch with clinical and professional developments 
in the wider society, may lack independence, or may 
not be trusted by inmates.275 Countries such as Italy, 
In Moldova, OST for prisoners dependent on 
drugs was introduced in 2005, and recipients 
are provided with methadone each day in 
the prison pharmacy after signing a register. 
There is also an NSP in prison.267 Research 
documented a decline in overdoses268 and a 
positive impact of the treatment on the health 
and general well-being of prisoners.269 Initial 
challenges with the programme have been 
addressed, for example by providing staff 
with specific health and safety information in-
cluding the type and scope of risks to staff.270 
Concerns about methadone being used to 
bribe medical personnel or prisoners have 
been successfully addressed by administering 
the methadone under strict supervision, as 
well as by self-regulation by the participants 
of the programme.
As of 2009, more than two-thirds of adult 
sentenced prisoners had access to harm 
reduction services in Moldovan prisons and 
the results have been wholly positive. HIV 
and hepatitis C incidence have decreased, 
there has not been any recorded case of nee-
dles being used as weapons against prison 
staff or fellow prisoners, and drug use has 
not increased.271
Box  3  Moldova’s harm 
reduction programme  
in  prison
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Norway, France, England and Wales and most parts 
of New South Wales in Australia have already taken 
this step, with broadly positive results.276 
Ensuring gender sensitivity
Drug dependence has been consistently found to 
be over-represented in female prison populations, 
compared to the general population.277 This is linked 
to the background of these women, including the 
high rates of domestic and sexual violence they may 
have experienced prior to arrest and detention.278 
HIV and other sexually-transmitted and blood-
borne diseases are also more prevalent among fe-
male prisoners than their male counterparts,279 due 
to the combination of gender inequality, stigma and 
women’s higher vulnerability to contracting STIs, 
limited access to information and inadequate health 
services.280 This background as well as physiological 
differences result in greater and different healthcare 
needs, and mean that drug dependence treatment 
and other measures need to be gender-sensitive in 
order to be effective. Treatment programmes need 
to take into account prior victimisation, diverse cul-
tural backgrounds, any history of abuse or domestic 
violence, mental health problems common among 
female prisoners and the special needs of pregnant 
women and women with children. However, many 
prison systems discriminate against women when 
it comes to drug treatment and harm reduction 
programmes – i.e. by only providing them in male 
prisons. 281 Where these programmes exist, they are 
often not tailored to women.282 
Rule 6 of the Bangkok Rules283 recommends that 
the health screening of female prisoners shall in-
clude ‘the existence of drug dependency’ and ‘the 
presence of sexually transmitted diseases or blood-
borne diseases’. Depending on risk factors, female 
prisoners should also be offered voluntary testing 
for HIV and other blood-borne diseases, with pre- 
and post-test counselling.
Gendered differences in drug use and dependence 
and related complications are acknowledged by 
Bangkok Rule 15, which highlights the need for 
‘specialised treatment programmes designed for 
women substance abusers’. The UN Committee on 
the Elimination of Discrimination against Women 
has also recommended that states provide gen-
der-sensitive and evidence-based drug treatment 
services as well as harm reduction programmes for 
women in detention.284 
With regard to HIV, Bangkok Rule 14 recommends 
programmes that are ‘responsive to the specific 
needs of women, including prevention of mother-to-
child transmission’, encouraging ‘the development 
of initiatives on HIV prevention, treatment and care, 
such as peer-based education’. Further measures 
should include gender-sensitive support groups, 
drug education, and psychosocial programmes. 
Preventing overdoses
Overdose is a common experience for many peo-
ple who use drugs, in particular opioids, and is a 
leading cause of death among people who inject 
drugs. The period immediately following release 
from prison poses a significant risk of (fatal) over-
dose.288 This is because former prisoners may 
resume similar doses as prior to detention, when 
their body can no longer cope with these doses 
due to reduced tolerance following abstinence, 
reduced use or the use of other drugs while in pris-
on.289 For instance, a UK study showed that male 
prisoners were 29 times, and female prisoners 69 
times more likely to die from an overdose during 
the week following their release compared to the 
general population.290 In another study of Wash-
ington state prisons, former prisoners were found 
to be 129 times more likely to die from a drug over-
dose in the first two weeks after release than their 
counterparts in the general population.291
Box 4  Spain’s harm reduction 
programme in prison reduces 
HIV and hepatitis C infections
In the late 1990s, the rate of HIV infection 
among prisoners who injected drugs in Spain 
was reported to be around 30% – one of the 
highest in Europe. The country therefore 
launched a prevention and control programme 
for communicable diseases in prison, mirrored 
in the community. A comprehensive harm re-
duction approach was adopted based on vol-
untary testing, confidentiality, free distribution 
of condoms, OST, NSPs, health-related educa-
tion, prisoners’ training as health mediators, 
and parole for terminally-ill prisoners.285
The impact was significant. Spain has report-
ed that HIV prevalence among prisoners fell 
from 22.4% in 1995 to 6.3% in 2011,286 and in 
one particular prison in the Ourense region, 
a 10-year review of the NSP found that be-
tween 1999 and 2009 the prevalence of HIV 
infection decreased from 21% in 1999 to 8.5% 
in 2009, and hepatitis C prevalence from 40% 
to 26.1%.287
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Because of this elevated risk, prison services should 
seek to provide training and information on over-
dose prevention and emergency responses – both 
for people who use drugs and for prison staff. Upon 
release and/or while in prisons, people who use 
opioids should also be provided with naloxone – a 
WHO Essential Medicine which quickly and safely 
reverses the respiratory depression from an opioid 
overdose (see Chapter 2.4 for more details).
Addressing post-release issues
Upon transferral to or release from prison, continui-
ty of drug-related programmes, in particular OST, is 
essential to ensure that people who stopped using 
drugs do not relapse into drug use or suffer from an 
overdose, that a former inmate does not suffer from 
opioid withdrawal, and that those on ART or other 
forms of medication do not develop resistance to 
such medications if their treatment is suddenly in-
terrupted.
As set out by the UNODC, UNAIDS and the WHO, ‘In 
order to ensure that the benefits of treatment (…) 
started before or during imprisonment are not lost, 
as well as to prevent the development of resistance 
to medications, provision must be made to (…) 
continue these treatments without interruption’.292 
This continuity of care is best achieved when com-
munity services can provide support to a prisoner 
in custody and after release and accompany his/her 
re-entry into the community.293 Several studies have 
suggested that aftercare is needed to optimise the 
effects of in-prison treatment for drug dependence 
on reducing drug re-offending.294 Continuity of care 
also requires that medical files follow the prisoner to 
the relevant public health service upon release (see 
Rule 26 of the Mandela Rules). 
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Chapter 4: 
Drugs, 
development 
and the rights of 
indigenous groups
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Chapter overview
There are clear links between development and 
illicit drug production, trafficking and consump-
tion. Generally, drug control efforts have focused 
on drug law enforcement and prohibition in an 
effort to reduce the scale of the illicit drug mar-
ket. Today, however, the drug trade is worth hun-
dreds of billions of US dollars a year and affects 
all aspects of the world economy and the lives of 
vulnerable groups – while production, trafficking 
and drug dependence continue to be largely con-
centrated among some of the poorest and most 
marginalised communities across the world. 
Efforts have been made to move towards a de-
velopment-oriented approach to drug control at 
international level, with attempts to link up UN 
drug control debates with the Sustainable Devel-
opment Goals. At national level, this has some-
times translated into policies seeking to improve 
governance, increase security, protect health, 
provide sustainable livelihoods and develop 
new goals and indicators to evaluate the success 
of drug policy. These issues will be explored in 
Chapter 4.1.
Chapter 4.2 will further analyse the key aspects 
and challenges of providing sustainable liveli-
hoods in rural areas affected by illicit crop cul-
tivation. The concept of sustainable livelihoods 
has evolved over time to encompass a broader 
development approach underpinned by the fol-
lowing considerations: the need to decriminalise 
farmers engaged in illicit crop cultivation and en-
gage them as key partners in development pro-
grammes, the need to ensure proper sequencing 
in reducing illicit crop cultivation, to prioritise 
small-scale rural development and to integrate 
programmes into broader development plans, 
and the necessity of promoting good govern-
ance and the rule of law. 
Finally, Chapter 4.3 considers the need to 
protect the rights of indigenous groups, in 
particular their ancestral, traditional, cultural 
and religious right to grow and use interna-
tionally controlled plants. This chapter offers 
an overview of the jurisprudence, legislative 
exceptions, constitutional rules and legal reg-
ulatory regimes that have been established 
across the world to protect traditional uses of 
psychoactive plants for indigenous groups – and 
which may serve as guidance for policy makers 
as they seek to advance the human rights of 
indigenous people. 
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Key recommendations
• A thorough review of drug laws and policies 
should be conducted in the context of the 
SDGs to ensure that drug control addresses 
the underlying social and economic drivers 
of engagement in the drug trade. This should 
include an analysis of how drug policies af-
fect the capacity of communities, territories 
and countries to reach the SDG targets
• Drug policies should no longer aim at re-
ducing the overall scale of the drug market 
but aspire to reduce the harms associated 
with these markets – including insecurity, 
corruption, violence, health harms, etc.
• Drug laws and policies should be reviewed 
to ensure access to essential medicines, as 
well as to harm reduction and treatment 
services 
• Policies and practices in illicit crop cultiva-
tion areas should be revised to move away 
from forced eradication towards a long-
term development approach focused on 
sustainable livelihoods
• Criminal sanctions should be removed 
for people who use drugs and small-scale 
farmers engaged in illicit crop cultivation, 
and proportionality of sentencing should 
be ensured for all drug offences
• A gender-sensitive approach to drug con-
trol should be adopted to address the spe-
cific vulnerabilities of women engaged in 
the drug trade
• Mechanisms to protect and promote hu-
man rights, as well as end impunity for hu-
man rights abuses, should be established 
and strengthened 
• A new set of development-oriented met-
rics and indicators should be adopted to 
measure the success of drug control based 
on human development.
A development-oriented approach to drug control
4.1
Introduction 
Until recently, the connection between drugs, drug 
policy and development has been largely ignored 
by both development agencies and UN drug control 
bodies. Yet, the relationship between drug control 
and development goals is undeniable, albeit a com-
plex and multifaceted one. The sheer scale of the 
illicit drug market – estimated at between US$449 
to US$674 billion a year, using the World Bank rank-
ing table for 20141 – can affect many aspects of the 
world economy, such as shaping the creation of 
jobs, determining access to land and markets, sway-
ing trends in banking, driving cross-border financial 
flows, affecting public services, as well as influenc-
ing political decisions.2 
Today, millions of people survive because of the il-
licit drug trade – a context that development agen-
cies and drugs agencies alike can no longer afford 
to ignore. In some areas of the world, such as in Af-
ghanistan, Mali or Colombia, the division between 
licit and illicit economies has become blurred, with 
organised criminals providing the jobs, investment, 
stability and security that the state is unable to 
provide, while drug lords get elected onto local 
and national governments.3 This can significantly 
impact upon the credibility and long-term stability 
of states, the provision of security and the creation 
of a strong licit economy. 
Development-sensitive drug policies have gener-
ally been limited to alternative development pro-
grammes, while most drug control strategies have 
focused on law enforcement efforts that have tend-
ed to exacerbate poverty and marginalisation, and 
impede sustainable development. 
In drug cultivation areas, crop eradication cam-
paigns have led to the destruction of farmers’ only 
means of subsistence, as well as of legal crops culti-
vated near coca and opium poppy fields. The use of 
chemical spraying has had a severe impact on the 
health of affected communities, as well as on the 
environment and fragile ecosystems, affecting food 
security, contaminating water supplies and causing 
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long-term degradation of land and further deforest-
ation to plant new crops.4 Affected farmers, their 
families and sometimes entire communities are 
often left with no other choice but to move to more 
remote areas, where access to schools, employment 
and other health and social services may be unavail-
able – leading conflict and supply reduction efforts 
to spread to other territories and communities. In-
digenous and ethnic communities are particularly 
affected by these policies. 
Even when alternative development programmes 
have been established, they have focused on crop 
reduction rather than sustainable development as 
a primary goal, and as a result have failed to offer 
long-term investments, or to ensure local owner-
ship, access to markets and infrastructure, or the 
meaningful engagement of farmers and indigenous 
groups as partners in development.5
Drug trafficking hubs usually emerge in fragile, con-
flict-affected and under-developed regions, where 
governance is weak, and organised crime groups are 
in a position to corrupt, influence or elude state insti-
tutions. In these areas, drug traffickers are in a posi-
tion of power, offering the basic health, security and 
social services the local population needs, including 
employment in the illicit economy in exchange for 
free lodgings, transportation, information and a 
form of local cooperation that protects traffickers 
from law enforcement actions. In such contexts, 
the illicit drug trade is strongly woven into the very 
fabric of communities.6 A law enforcement-oriented 
approach that disregards this situation often ends 
up fuelling more violence (for example, in Mexico 
and Brazil), corruption, prison overcrowding, and 
exacerbating the poverty and social marginalisation 
of vulnerable communities. 
Women are particularly vulnerable to engaging in 
illicit drug activities due to the gender inequality 
that continues to mark societies across the world, as 
well as gender discrimination in access to education 
and employment.7 Their incarceration for lengthy 
periods of time for minor, non-violent drug offenc-
es (often as drug mules or micro-traffickers) has a 
significant impact on their lives, but also on that of 
their children and other dependents who are then 
left in a situation of dire poverty – with no other 
choice but to go to prison with their mother or to 
end up in the street.8
Drug use is a global phenomenon, yet drug-related 
harms are often concentrated in poor and marginal-
ised areas, where access to harm reduction and drug 
dependence treatment services may be limited. The 
criminalisation of people who use drugs has led 
to significant stigma and discrimination, as well as 
widespread human rights abuses. Women who use 
drugs suffer an additional level of stigma in many 
regions of the world as they are seen as contraven-
ing the ‘natural’ roles of women in society as moth-
ers and caretakers.9 They also face heightened levels 
of violence. Tough drug law enforcement practices 
Credit: Tom
 Kram
er, Transnational Institute
Ethnic Wa children in an opium field, Myanmar
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deter people from accessing the harm reduction, 
treatment and other healthcare that they need, af-
fecting their health and well-being, but also leading 
to significant preventable health and social costs. 
Legislative/policy issues 
involved 
A development-oriented approach to drug control 
requires moving beyond a drug law enforcement-fo-
cused approach, with the objective of addressing 
the root causes of engagement in the illicit drug 
trade, such as poverty, inequality and weak govern-
ance. Although there are no simple solutions, below 
are some suggestions on how to address some of 
these underlying issues.
Improving governance
Strengthening democratic governance and account-
ability, legislative oversight, transparency of public 
accounts, improving public spending on health and 
social services, promoting participatory processes 
for citizens (including for communities affected by 
drug policies),10 and building the capacities of local 
authorities to deliver basic services are important 
steps towards reducing corruption and infiltration of 
government institutions by organised crime.11
Such policies should eventually aim at reinforcing 
the rule of law, improving citizen security, and en-
suring adequate access to justice.12 The latter should 
include revising the laws and policies which have led 
to the mass incarceration of people who use drugs, 
subsistence farmers and low-level, non-violent drug 
offenders, to ensure proportionality of sentencing 
and promote alternatives to imprisonment (see 
Chapters 3.3 and 3.4 for more information). Improv-
ing governance also entails putting an end to im-
punity by building solid mechanisms to ensure that 
victims of human rights abuses resulting from drug 
control have adequate access to justice. 
Initiatives resulting in higher levels of employment 
and income, more equitable access to land and 
other resources, and better protection against eco-
nomic crises can also build resilience among vul-
nerable communities to limit their involvement in 
illicit activities.13 
Sometimes, however, improving governance in the 
short term may only be guaranteed by granting organ-
ised criminals and traffickers concessions and compro-
mises in order to reduce levels of violence and public 
disorder – this is sometimes the only way to strengthen 
governance mechanisms in the longer term.14
Improving security
Development is simply impossible in a context 
of violence and insecurity. This is particularly the 
case in zones affected by, or coming out of, armed 
conflicts. In some instances, drug law enforcement 
efforts – especially where the military gets involved 
as a repressive tool against drug cultivators and 
traffickers – have tended to exacerbate insecurity 
and drug market-related violence. In areas where 
A client speaking with a healthcare professional at an NSP at the Humanitarian Action Fund’s mobile clinic in  
St. Petersburg, Russia, where the government remains strongly opposed to harm reduction
Credit: Lorena Ros, O
pen Society Foundations
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services – in particular the criminalisation of people 
who use drugs (see Chapter 3.1). 
Providing sustainable livelihoods
There is ample evidence to show the severe impacts 
of forced eradication campaigns on local populations. 
Laws and regulations should be urgently reviewed to 
ensure adequate access to natural resources and to 
a fair and equitable distribution of benefits arising 
from the sustainable use of biodiversity by local com-
munities, including indigenous groups. 
Fumigation campaigns should be immediately halt-
ed considering the lack of success achieved so far in 
reducing the scale of crops cultivated and the long-
term impact of the use of chemicals on lands and 
communities, the displacement of affected groups 
as a result of the campaigns, and the deforestation 
of new areas (sometimes natural parks or other pro-
tected lands) to re-grow crops destined for the illicit 
drug market. 
Finally, it is essential to recognise that in drug culti-
vation areas, people are currently only able to sur-
vive, not because they are targeted by development 
programmes, but because they have become part 
of the illicit drug economy. Alternative development 
programmes should be enshrined in a comprehen-
sive development policy which includes protecting 
the environment, developing strong infrastructure 
and adequate access to legal markets, and engag-
ing local communities as equal partners (see Chap-
ter 4.2 for more information). 
state presence is only seen as a repressive machin-
ery against the local population, the government 
can lose credibility in the face of organised crime 
groups which are often better able to provide safety 
and protection to the communities within which 
they operate. Improving human security in areas 
strongly affected by illicit drug production and traf-
ficking should therefore be a top priority of a devel-
opment-centred approach to drug control.15 
Evidence clearly indicates that illicit drug markets 
are not inherently violent.16 A number of strategies 
have led to a decrease in drug-related violence – a 
modernised drug law enforcement strategy can 
help shape the illicit markets in a way that is the 
least harmful for the local population, and most 
beneficial for supporting development efforts (see 
Chapter 3.5 for more details). 
Protecting health
Lack of access to health services can seriously 
hamper people’s ability to access education and 
employment, and therefore to participate in a coun-
try’s economy. The spread of infections such as HIV 
and hepatitis can also create a significant burden 
on a country’s healthcare system and economy. 
Ensuring adequate access to harm reduction and 
evidence-based drug dependence treatment pro-
grammes is therefore an important component of 
a development-oriented approach to drug control 
(for more information, see Chapters 2.5 and 2.6). This 
also implies the removal of legislative and political 
barriers to accessing harm reduction and treatment 
Nor Yungas (Bolivia) coca leaf farmer sweeps up freshly picked leaves for taking to the legal market after being  
sun-dried on a slate patio, called a kachi in Aymara
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Box  1  A drug policy enshrined in the Sustainable Development 
Goals17
In September 2015, governments met in New 
York to adopt the Sustainable Development Goals 
(SDGs).18 These goals replace the Millennium Devel-
opment Goals, which came to an end in 2015. The 
SDGs set out 17 ambitious goals that will frame the 
development agenda until 2030. Although interna-
tionally controlled substances are only mentioned 
once within these goals – as Target 3.5 to ‘Strength-
en the prevention and treatment of substance 
abuse, including narcotic drug abuse and harmful 
use of alcohol’ – there is ample room to link drug 
control policies with the SDG targets.19 However, 
there are a number of contradictions between the 
targets established by the SDGs and current drug 
policies.20 The SDGs cannot be achieved unless 
drug control policies and strategies are subjected 
to thorough review:
Goal 1: ‘End poverty in all its forms every-
where’: Ending poverty will only be achieved if 
governments address the underlying social and 
economic factors that lead people to engage in 
the drug trade, instead of exacerbating cycles of 
poverty and marginalisation by destroying crops 
and incarcerating large segments of society for 
low-level and non-violent drug offences.
Goal 2: ‘End hunger, achieve food security and 
improved nutrition and promote sustainable 
agriculture’: Sustainable agriculture and food 
security will only be achieved when alternative 
development programmes are fully enshrined 
within a comprehensive and long-term develop-
ment strategy in areas of concentrated illicit crop 
production, involving small-scale farmers and in-
digenous groups as equal partners in the design 
and implementation of these policies.
Goal 3: ‘Ensure healthy lives and promote 
well-being for all at all ages’: Ensuring ‘healthy 
lives and promoting the well-being for all at all 
ages’ will only be achieved when drug laws and 
policies are revised to ensure adequate and 
affordable access to internationally controlled 
substances, such as morphine for pain relief and 
palliative care. Similarly, universal health coverage 
will only be achieved if people who use drugs are 
able to access the harm reduction, treatment and 
other health services they need without fear of 
arrest or discrimination. 
Goal 5: ‘Achieve gender equality and empower 
all women and girls’: Gender equality will only 
Sustainable Development Goals
Credit: CA
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be achieved if governments recognise the many 
factors of vulnerability that push women to en-
gage in the drug trade.
Goal 15: ‘Protect, restore and promote sustain-
able use of terrestrial ecosystems, sustainably 
manage forests, combat desertification, and 
halt and reverse land degradation and halt bio-
diversity loss’: Halting land degradation will only 
be achieved if governments permanently put an 
end to aerial and manual fumigation campaigns. 
Protecting the homes of the indigenous popu-
lation will not be achieved unless governments 
establish strong laws that protect the rights of 
indigenous groups to grow and use plants such 
as coca and opium for traditional and ancestral 
purposes.
Goal 16: ‘Promote peaceful and inclusive so-
cieties for sustainable development, provide 
access to justice for all and build effective,  
accountable and inclusive institutions at all 
levels’: The provision of access to justice for all and 
the building of effective, accountable institutions 
will only be achieved when impunity for human 
rights violations related to drug law enforcement 
(such as extra-judicial killings, disappearances, 
etc.) comes to an end.
Goal 17: ‘Strengthen the means of implemen-
tation and revitalize the global partnership for 
sustainable development’: A global partnership 
for development will only be achieved when 
affected communities – including people who 
use drugs and small-scale farmers engaged in 
illicit crop production – are considered by govern-
ments as equal partners in the design and imple-
mentation of drug laws and policies at all levels of 
government. This goal underscores the necessity 
to remove criminal penalties for people who use 
drugs and small-scale farmers.
Implementation issues 
involved
One of the main issues to consider for the imple-
mentation of a development-oriented approach to 
drug control is how success will be measured and 
evaluated. Traditionally, metrics and indicators used 
to measure success in drug control focused on pro-
cess indicators such as numbers of seizures, hectares 
of illicit crops eradicated, numbers of people arrest-
ed and/or incarcerated. These indicators have done 
little to measure the real impact of drug control on 
development outcomes. 
We propose the development of a new set of met-
rics and indicators that can truly measure the full 
spectrum of drug-related health issues, as well as 
the impact of drug policy on human rights, security 
and development. These could include:
• Goals that address the root causes of engage-
ment in illicit drug production, distribution and 
consumption – for example:21 
• Reducing poverty
• Improving food security and access to licit 
markets 
• Addressing land tenure issues
• Improving security
• Increasing gender equality
• Reducing corruption and impunity
• Improving community well-being via better 
access to healthcare, education and employ-
ment, etc.
• Indicators based on the Human Development 
index22 – which offers a useful set of tools that 
could be adapted on drug control. New indica-
tors could include:23 
• % of people living above the poverty line in 
communities affected by the drug trade
• % of people having access to land tenure in 
areas vulnerable to, or affected by, the drug 
trade
• % of people having access to stable housing in 
communities affected by the drug trade
• % of people having access to primary, second-
ary and higher education
• % of people working in the licit economy
• Number of people having access to healthcare 
information and services – including harm re-
duction and drug dependence treatment
• Number of women who use drugs accessing 
harm reduction and drug dependence treat-
ment services
• Number of deaths by drug overdose
• Incidence of HIV, hepatitis, tuberculosis among 
people who use drugs – and % of infection 
among people who use drugs compared to 
the general population
• % of people suffering from moderate to severe 
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pain who have access to pain relief
• % of victims of human rights abuses initiating 
judicial proceedings against their perpetrators
• Number of people (disaggregated by gender) 
incarcerated for drug offences – and % of in-
mates (disaggregated by gender) condemned 
for drug offences within the overall prison 
population
• % of drug offenders who benefited from alter-
natives to incarceration and/or punishment
• Reduction in levels violence and corruption in 
areas affected by production and trafficking
• Reduction in the number of people displaced 
from their land due to crop eradication activ-
ities and other drug law enforcement efforts
• Mechanism(s) established for the participa-
tion of affected communities in policy making 
and implementation.
Key resources 
• Gutierrez, E. (2015), Drugs and illicit practices: 
Assessing their impact on development and 
governance (Christian Aid), http://www.
christianaid.org.uk/Images/Drugs-and-illicit-
practices-Eric-Gutierrez-Oct-2015.pdf 
• Health Poverty Action & International Drug Policy 
Consortium (November 2015), Drug policy and the 
sustainable development goals, http://idpc.net/
publications/2015/11/drug-policy-and-the-sus-
tainable-development-goals 
• Martin, C. (February 2015), Casualties of war: How 
the war on drugs is harming the world’s poorest, 
http://idpc.net/publications/2015/02/casualties-
of-war-how-the-war-on-drugs-is-harming-the-
world-s-poorest 
• Melis, M. & Nougier, M. (October 2010), IDPC 
Briefing Paper - Drug policy and development: How 
action against illicit drugs impacts on the Millen-
nium Development Goals (London: International 
Drug Policy Consortium), http://idpc.net/publi-
cations/2010/10/idpc-briefing-drugs-and-devel-
opment 
• United Nations Development Program (June 
2015), Addressing the development dimensions 
of drug policy, http://www.undp.org/content/
undp/en/home/librarypage/hiv-aids/address-
ing-the-development-dimensions-of-drug-poli-
cy.html
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Key recommendations
Promoting sustainable livelihoods
4.2
Introduction
The Latin American countries of Colombia, Peru and 
Bolivia are the primary source of coca, the raw mate-
rial for cocaine.25 From 2002-2010, Colombia led the 
region in coca cultivation, though in recent years, 
Peru has emerged as the global leader in hectares 
of coca under cultivation. In 2013, the most recent 
year for which there is reliable data, the United Na-
tions Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) reported 
that Colombia had 48,000 hectares to Peru’s 49,800. 
Bolivia, meanwhile, has seen consistent reductions 
in recent years, dropping from 30,900 hectares in 
2009 to 20,400 in 2014, likely due to its innovative 
Key recommendations
• Decades of experience in promoting alter-
native development show that reducing the 
cultivation of coca and opium poppy crops is 
a long-term problem that needs a long-term 
solution, involving broader nation-building 
and development goals. Government strat-
egies need to be based on promoting eco-
nomic growth and providing basic services; 
democratic institution building and the rule of 
law; respect for human rights; and improved 
security in the impoverished rural areas where 
coca and poppy cultivation flourishes
• Forced eradication of crops deviated to illicit 
markets should be replaced by alternative 
livelihoods efforts, which should be main-
streamed into local, regional and national 
development plans and carried out in close 
collaboration with the intended beneficiaries
• The cultivation of crops destined for the illicit 
drug market should not be criminalised; and 
farmers should be involved as partners in pro-
moting rural development
• Local communities should be involved in 
the design, implementation, monitoring 
and evaluation of development efforts. This 
includes community leadership, and the 
involvement of local organisations such as 
producer groups and the farmers themselves. 
Government officials can play a key role in mo-
bilising, coordinating and supporting commu-
nity participation
• Governments should advance towards reg-
ulatory models for coca, opium poppy and 
cannabis cultivation, respecting traditional 
and licit uses of such crops and allowing for 
small-scale and industrialised transformation 
into products for licit use
• Governments should protect biological, cultur-
al and intellectual property rights with regards 
to the plants, seeds and other derivatives of the 
communities where these crops are traditional-
ly cultivated and used
• Results should not be measured in terms of 
hectares of crops eradicated. Rather, alter-
native livelihoods programmes should be 
evaluated using human development and 
socio-economic indicators that measure the 
well-being of society.24
‘social control’ model, which prioritises cooperative 
coca reduction and sustainable development over 
forced eradication. The country has set a target of 
20,000 hectares under cultivation to leave a supply 
of coca leaf for traditional and other licit uses.
Cultivation of the opium poppy, the raw material 
for opium and heroin, has shifted over time. The 
Golden Triangle of Thailand, Lao People’s Demo-
cratic Republic, and Myanmar once produced more 
than 70% of the world’s opium, most of which was 
refined into heroin. Since 1998, dramatic decreases 
in opium cultivation have taken place in the Golden 
Triangle; cultivation is now concentrated in what is 
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known as the Golden Crescent, the poppy-growing 
areas in and around Afghanistan. According to the 
UNODC,26 in 2014 Afghanistan had 224,000 hectares 
of poppy under cultivation, followed by Myanmar 
with 57,600. As Afghanistan increased cultivation 
by over 100% since 1999, alternative livelihoods 
programmes in South East Asia contributed to im-
portant gains. Thailand has effectively eliminated 
its small poppy crops, and Lao People’s Democratic 
Republic has seen considerable reductions as well, 
with 6,200 hectares in 2014. Myanmar saw marked 
reductions from a peak of 128,642 hectares in 
2000 to 24,000 in 2006, but has recently seen a rise 
in cultivation.
Supply reduction efforts have typically been meas-
ured according to the areas of crops cultivated, the 
amounts of cocaine and opium produced, and the 
number of hectares eradicated. These figures, how-
ever, are not without controversy. While the UN data 
on cultivation tends to be the most accurate, the US 
Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) also 
publishes its own annual cultivation estimates.27 
The ONDCP figures are far more opaque, and are 
published without any explanation of methodol-
ogy. Their findings are particularly questionable in 
their divergence from the UNODC figures in Bolivia, 
where the ONDCP has retroactively changed esti-
mates from years prior.28 Some of their post-facto 
adjustments include changing potential cocaine 
production estimates, again without any expla-
nation for methodology. In Colombia, the ONDCP 
brought forward its regular release date for coca 
cultivation estimates to point to an increase in culti-
vation, at a time when the country debated ending 
the harmful practice of aerial spraying.29 It is also 
important to point out that as crop yields and pro-
duction techniques have improved, less cultivation 
is needed, rendering eradication indicators increas-
ingly irrelevant.
Efforts to reduce the cultivation of crops destined 
for the illicit drug market have been a cornerstone 
of the supply-side approach to drug control and are 
closely aligned with national and public security ob-
jectives. They have mainly consisted of forced crop 
eradication campaigns, which rely on manual eradi-
cation or aerial spraying and are conducted without 
the consent of the growers. 
Decades of evidence show that, while this approach 
may achieve short-term reductions in cultivation of 
crops such as coca or opium poppy, in the medium- 
to long-term farmers, lacking other viable sources of 
cash income, are forced to replant. As a result, culti-
vation can be spread to new areas. In addition, crop 
eradication campaigns are associated with violence, 
conflict, and displacement, as well as a number of 
health, environmental and socio-economic harms.30 
In short, forced eradication has pushed some of the 
world’s poorest people deeper into poverty and is 
counter-productive. Even when conducted hand-
in-hand with alternative development programmes, 
eradication campaigns undermine cooperation 
with the local community, which in turn compro-
mises the effectiveness of the development agenda. 
In other words, it causes distrust between donors, 
state agencies and recipient communities, and 
undermines the very development efforts needed 
to wean subsistence farmers off the cultivation of 
crops destined for the illicit drug market. The crimi-
nalisation of cultivation and hence of small farmers 
is tantamount to the criminalisation of poverty.
Credit: Transnational Institute
Opium poppy field in Afghanistan
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Legislative/policy issues 
involved
The cultivation of crops that are used to produce 
internationally controlled substances tends to take 
place in very remote and extremely poor regions of 
the world where there is often little or no effective 
state presence. It also tends to be in areas where 
conflict and violence are rampant. The fundamental 
drivers of such cultivation are poverty and insecuri-
ty: farmers living in extreme poverty see cultivation 
of opium poppy, coca or cannabis as a means of 
providing some income to complement subsist-
ence-level agriculture. Simply put, it is a way for 
basic needs to be met. The United Nations Develop-
ment Program (UNDP) points out that: ‘Conditions 
of scarcity, displacement, state neglect, economic 
and geographic isolation and livelihoods insecurity, 
including in situations of conflict, increase the vul-
nerability of peasants and poor farmers to engaging 
in drug crop production’.31
In recognition of this, several decades ago policy 
makers began incorporating ‘crop substitution’ pro-
grammes into drug control efforts, usually carried out 
hand-in-hand with forced eradication. However, little 
attention was paid to the problems that led farmers 
to resort to cultivation in the first place, such as lack 
of roads and transportation infrastructure, lack of ac-
cess to credit and markets, etc. This led to the devel-
opment of the concept of ‘alternative development’, 
a more integrated approach. That, in turn, subse-
quently evolved towards the principle of ‘alternative 
livelihoods’, which focuses on improving the overall 
quality of life in these rural areas. Today these efforts 
are referred to by many terms such as ‘development 
in a drugs environment’, ‘development-oriented drug 
control’ or even ‘food security’. These efforts seek to 
promote equitable economic development in the 
rural areas used for illicit crop cultivation.
This approach recognises that farmers will only be 
able to reduce their dependence on income from 
coca and poppy crops if they are provided with al-
ternative livelihoods through long-term multi-sec-
torial development. It is designed to improve the 
overall quality of life of farmers, including: ensuring 
food security and access to land; improved access 
to healthcare, education and housing; the devel-
opment of infrastructure and other public services; 
and both on-farm and off-farm income generation.32 
Such programmes are no longer purely focused on 
reducing the production of crops destined for the 
illicit drug market, but are incorporated, or main-
streamed, into comprehensive strategies for rural 
development and economic growth. Specifically, 
they call for embedding strategies for reducing 
coca and opium poppy crops in local, regional and 
national development initiatives.
Implementation issues 
involved
This broader concept of alternative development 
is now widely recognised and is enshrined in the 
UN International principles on alternative devel-
opment.33 However, not all countries implement 
these policies in the same way; indeed, many, such 
as Peru and Colombia, continue to prioritise forced 
Credit: Adam
 Schaffer, W
O
LA
Field of coca crops fumigated in Guaviare, Colombia
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eradication. In a major setback for small-scale farm-
ers, in 2015 the Peruvian government implemented 
a legal reform that criminalises growers who replant 
following forced eradication with three to eight 
years in prison. 
The following reforms should be put into place to 
ensure that alternative development achieves its 
desired outcomes of reducing cultivation of such 
crops while improving the livelihoods of vulnera-
ble farmers. 
Decriminalising crop cultivation 
The criminalisation of subsistence farmers involved 
in the cultivation of crops destined for the illicit 
drug market has caused significant harm, often 
impacting on entire communities. Although some 
claim that the decriminalisation of these farmers is 
contrary to the international drug control treaties, 
their continued punishment constitutes a breach 
of international human rights law and a significant 
barrier to development. In 2012, the Colombian 
parliament initiated discussions on a bill that aimed 
to decriminalise the cultivation of crops destined for 
the illicit drug market.34 Although this bill is on hold, 
discussions have continued and constitute a key 
challenge in the peace discussions between the Co-
lombian government and the Revolutionary Armed 
Forces of Colombia (FARC). In the framework of the 
peace process, cultivators of crops destined for the 
illicit drug market have proposed the creation of an 
organisation to support the creation of a mecha-
nism to regulate the cultivation of such crops.35 
Ensuring proper sequencing
In order to avoid the replanting described above, vi-
able, sustainable livelihoods must be in place prior 
to significant crop reductions. Once economic de-
velopment has taken root and alternative sources of 
income are in place, governments and international 
donor agencies can work with local communities to 
encourage the gradual elimination of crops used to 
produce internationally controlled substances. Crop 
reductions should always be voluntary and conduct-
ed in collaboration with the local community. Both 
Thailand (see Box 1) and Bolivia (see Box 3) provide 
examples of how a focus on economic development 
and proper sequencing has led to steady reduc-
tions in the cultivation of opium poppy and coca 
crops, respectively. 
Including farmers as key partners in 
development programmes
Alternative livelihoods programmes require that 
small-scale farmers should no longer be considered 
as criminals but should instead be viewed as key 
stakeholders in the design and implementation of 
the development programmes that affect them (see 
Box 2).38 The involvement of farmers is necessary, 
both because local farmers have a better knowledge 
and understanding of the local geographical condi-
tions, and in order to protect the rights and cultural 
Box  1  The Thai alternative 
livelihoods model36
Beginning in 1969, the Thai government 
sought to integrate highland communities 
into national life and therefore carried out 
sustained economic development activities 
over a 30-year period. Over time, it became 
clear that agricultural alternatives alone were 
insufficient. As a result, increasing emphasis 
was placed on providing social services such 
as healthcare services and schools, as well as 
infrastructure development such as roads, 
electricity and water supplies. Alternative live-
lihoods programmes were integrated into lo-
cal, regional and national development plans. 
This led to steady improvement in farmers’ 
quality of life, and increased opportunities for 
off-farm employment. A focus on local com-
munity participation emerged over time.
The Thai experience points to the impor-
tance of proper sequencing. Efforts for crop 
reduction only started in 1984, after about 15 
years of sustained economic development. 
While some forced eradication did take place 
initially, the adoption of proper sequencing 
allowed farmers to reduce poppy cultivation 
gradually, as other sources of income devel-
oped, avoiding the problem of re-planting 
that inevitably frustrates crop eradication ef-
forts. Although the entire process took about 
30 years, the results of the Thai strategy have 
proved sustainable; however, on the negative 
side, there has been an increase in metham-
phetamine use and production in the region 
since the 1990s.37
The Thai experience also underscores the 
importance of local institution building and 
community involvement in the design, im-
plementation, monitoring and evaluation of 
development efforts. Local know-how be-
came the basis for problem solving, and local 
leadership was fully integrated into project 
implementation.
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traditions of local communities (see Chapter 4.3). 
As evident in the Thai experience, community buy-
in and involvement is also a key factor in ensuring 
project success and continuity (see Box 1). 
Prioritising small-scale rural development
Decades of neo-liberal and pro-urban economic 
development models, free-trade agreements and 
government efforts to promote agro-business have 
proven to be seriously detrimental to the world’s ru-
ral poor. Rural development efforts should prioritise 
promoting sustainable production on small farms, 
advance land reform, promote crop diversification, 
and encourage the development of domestic pro-
cessing industries, and regulate imports and exports 
in order to protect vulnerable populations and 
resources.39 They should also respect the rights, cus-
toms and farming practices of indigenous peoples.
Promote good governance and the rule of law
Nation building and promoting good governance 
and the rule of law are also essential components 
of an alternative livelihoods approach. These are 
particularly necessary to foster the legitimacy and 
credibility of the government in areas where state 
presence is often limited to security and/or eradica-
tion forces. A growing body of academic literature 
now points to the absence of violent conflict as a 
pre-condition for sustainable development and drug 
control efforts (see Chapter 4.1 for more details).44
Integrating alternative development into local, 
regional and national development plans
Alternative livelihoods goals should be integrated 
at all levels and should in particular incorporate 
those involved in rural development, including 
multilateral and international development agen-
cies, relevant government ministries, regional and 
local officials, and community and civil society or-
ganisations. Some donor agencies refer to this as 
‘mainstreaming counternarcotics into development 
programs’.47
Using human development indicators
To date, most crop eradication and alternative de-
velopment projects have primarily evaluated their 
success by reductions in the cultivation of crops des-
tined for the illicit drug market. However, in an eval-
uation report to the Commission on Narcotic Drugs 
(CND) in 2008, the UNODC stated that, ‘there is little 
proof that the eradications reduce illicit cultivation 
Box  2  Farmers’ involvement  
in decision making processes
The participation of subsistence farmers in 
the elaboration and implementation of drug 
policies and development programmes in 
illicit crop cultivation areas remains a major 
challenge, as in most areas of the world this 
group remains heavily criminalised. However, 
attempts have been made across the world to 
improve farmers’ participation in the decision 
making processes that affect them. 
In Bolivia, for example, subsistence farmers 
are now involved as key strategic partners by 
the government in coca reduction strategies, 
as part of an approach based on social control 
(see Box 3).40 Similarly, in Colombia coca farm-
ers have been heavily engaged in the peace 
talks between the Colombian government 
and the FARC, and a bill is currently being 
discussed to decriminalise the cultivation of 
crops destined for the illicit drug market.41 
In South Asia, community participation has 
been a major factor of success for the Thai 
alternative development programme (see 
Box 1). In Myanmar, however, opium farmers 
continue to be excluded, criminalised and 
harassed by the police and military. In Sep-
tember 2015, opium farmers and representa-
tives from the Kayah State, Shan State, Kachin 
State and Chin State, came together in Upper 
Myanmar to adopt a statement highlighting 
the issues they face and calling for reform.42 
At global level, the International Forum of 
Producers of Crops Declared Illicit (FMPCDI 
in Spanish) adopted a political declaration 
calling for farmers to be able to ‘take part in 
debates, decision making at all levels, with 
their own governments, donors and the UN’.43 
Nutritionist Maria Eugenia Tenorio displaying her 
recipes using coca “flour” (finely ground leaves) at the 
2004 Coca y Soberania Fair in El Alto, Bolivia
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Box  3  The Bolivian economic development model45
Upon taking office in 2006, President Evo Mo-
rales extended a cooperative coca reduction 
programme, which had been in place since Oc-
tober 2004. The policy allows each registered 
coca grower to cultivate one cato of coca, which 
is 1,600 square meters or about one-third the 
size of a football field. Any coca grown beyond 
that is subject to elimination. The government 
has put into place a sophisticated coca monitor-
ing system that includes land titling, a biometric 
registry of growers authorised to grow the cato, 
periodic measurements of coca fields, and im-
plementation of a sophisticated database, SIS-
COCA. Local coca grower unions work with gov-
ernment officials to ensure compliance with the 
cato agreement, a policy known as ‘cooperative  
coca reduction’.
Allowing limited coca cultivation – and thereby 
ensuring a steady flow of cash income – has 
allowed farmers to risk investing in other eco-
nomic income generating activities. At the same 
time, the Morales administration has invested 
in transportation infrastructure (including an 
international airport), education and health-
care, improving the overall quality of life of local 
residents. The government is also investing in 
productive enterprises, such as fisheries and ag-
ricultural products such as pineapples.
To date, this approach has produced positive re-
sults and the possibility of long-term reductions 
in coca cultivation, while virtually eliminating 
the violence and social conflict associated with 
the forced coca eradication campaigns pursued 
by previous governments. For the fourth consec-
utive year, the UNODC reported a decline in coca 
cultivation in Bolivia; the country has achieved a 
34% net reduction in coca cultivation between 
2010 and 2014.46 Bolivia now lags far behind Peru 
and Colombia in its supply of the coca leaf.
The Bolivia model shows that it is possible to reg-
ulate cultivation, improve people’s living stand-
ards, and promote traditional and licit uses of the 
coca leaf, while seeking to prevent the deviation 
of coca to the illicit market.
Aymara women collectively harvest the coca leaf in Bolivia’s Nor Yungas province
Credit: Caroline S. Conzelm
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in the long term as the crops move somewhere 
else’, adding that, ‘alternative development must 
be evaluated through indicators of development 
and not technically as a function of illicit production 
statistics’.48 Improved indicators include measuring 
improvements in education, health, employment, 
income generation and the like (see Chapter 4.1 for 
more details on development indicators). 
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Rights of indigenous groups
4.3
Key recommendations
• Governments should repair the discrepan-
cies between the UN drug conventions and 
international human rights agreements, to 
ensure that the rights of indigenous peo-
ples are upheld and fully protected
• Indigenous communities should be mean-
ingfully involved in the design and imple-
mentation of any policies and regulations 
that affect them
• Governments should set up data collection 
mechanisms to review the impact of drug 
policies and in particular drug law enforce-
ment strategies on indigenous groups, 
and review any harmful drug law, policy or 
practice
• The historical, cultural and traditional 
character and potential benefits of plants 
controlled at the national and international 
level should be recognised
• Where the use of psychoactive substances 
is part of people’s traditional and religious 
practices, the right to cultivate, trade and 
use such plants for these purposes should 
be allowed and protected 
• Aerial fumigation campaigns should be 
immediately stopped as they cause sig-
nificant harm on the health of farmers 
and indigenous communities, and on the 
environment. Any crop reduction or alter-
native development programme should be 
undertaken in full collaboration and part-
nership with affected communities, and 
take specific care to protect the rights of 
indigenous people, including access to and 
use of their lands and natural resources in 
a way that is respectful of their culture and 
traditions.
Introduction
The 1989 International Labor Organization’s Con-
vention concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples 
in Independent Countries49 defines indigenous peo-
ple as those who, ‘on account of their descent from 
the populations which inhabited the country at the 
time of conquest, colonisation, or the establishment 
of present state boundaries and who, irrespective of 
their legal status, retain some, or all, of their own 
social, economic, cultural and political institutions’, 
or ‘tribal peoples in independent countries whose 
social, cultural and economic conditions distinguish 
them from other sections of the national communi-
ty, and whose status is regulated wholly or partially 
by their own customs or traditions or by special laws 
or regulations’.
In practical terms, this means that in addition to the 
universal human rights recognised in international 
conventions (see Policy principle 2), indigenous peo-
ple enjoy specific rights that protect their identity, 
culture, traditions, habitat, language and access to 
ancestral lands. These rights are enshrined in the 2007 
UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples50 
which notably recognises indigenous peoples’ right 
to self-determination and autonomy; to maintain, 
protect and develop cultural manifestations of the 
past, present and future, as well as their cultural 
heritage, traditional knowledge and manifestations 
of their science, technology and culture (articles 11 
and 31); to maintain their traditional medicines and 
healing practices (article 24); to participate in deci-
sion making in matters that would affect their rights 
(article 18); and to the conservation and protection of 
the environment and the productive capacity of their 
lands or territories and resources (article 29). 
For generations, people worldwide have used psy-
choactive plants such as coca, cannabis, opium, kra-
tom (Mitragyna speciosa), khat (Catha edulis), peyote 
(Lophophora williamsii), chamico (Datura ferox), San 
Pedro (Echinopsis pachanoi), Salvia Divinorum and 
ayahuasca or yahé (Banisteriopsis caapi), among 
many others, for traditional, cultural and religious 
purposes. In the Andean region and Amazon basin, 
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spread damage to the health, habitat and traditions 
of coca-growing indigenous communities52 – and 
only serve to remove vulnerable communities’ only 
means of subsistence in a context of market-driven 
crop prices, where many licit crop alternatives are 
not profitable enough to ensure survival, hence ex-
acerbating their poverty.53
In some countries, violent clashes have erupted be-
tween armed groups fighting for control of the drug 
trade and between those armed groups and drug 
law enforcement agencies, placing local affected 
communities in the crossfire. Forced eradication 
campaigns have exacerbated the harms caused by 
armed conflict, impacting particularly on indige-
nous groups. For instance, Plan Colombia launched 
in 1999 has not only had disastrous consequences 
on the lives, health, environment and economy of 
indigenous people and farmers, but has also put 
them in the crossfire between government forces, 
insurgent groups and paramilitaries fighting to con-
trol the territory. The plan did not achieve an overall 
reduction in cocaine production in Colombia, but 
has led instead to a serious humanitarian crisis, con-
tributing heavily to the displacement of 3.6 to 5.2 
million people54 and increased levels of poverty and 
insecurity. Colombia’s constitutional court estimat-
ed that at least 27 indigenous groups were at risk of 
disappearing as a result of armed conflict.55 
In locations where alternative development pro-
grammes have been implemented, no local knowl-
edge, know-how or cultural traditions have been 
contemplated or considered, and indigenous groups 
have been excluded from these programmes. Fur-
thermore, land grabbing processes and macroeco-
for example, the coca leaf has a wide application in 
social, religious, spiritual and medical areas for indig-
enous people, and is also used by the general pop-
ulation. Similarly in India, cannabis and opium have 
been bound to faith and mysticism in Hindu and 
Islamic traditions for centuries, and are enshrined in 
countless cultural practices. In Jamaica, cannabis has 
played a central part in the religious ceremonies of 
the Rastafarian community (see Box 1). Other plants, 
such as khat in Eastern Africa and kratom in South 
East Asia, have also been used for traditional and so-
cial purposes for centuries. Some of these substances 
have also been employed medicinally, especially 
for the treatment of rheumatism, migraine, malaria, 
cholera and other gastrointestinal complaints, to 
reduce pain from opioid withdrawal symptoms, and 
to facilitate births and surgery.51 These plants can 
also provide food grain, oil seed or fibre for manu- 
facturing products. 
However, and despite the significant advances in in-
ternational human rights law to protect traditional 
and medicinal practices of indigenous populations, 
those involved in the cultivation and use of plants 
destined for the illicit drug market have been crim-
inalised, marginalised and discriminated against by 
harsh drug laws and policies. 
Regions where crops destined for the illicit drug 
market thrive are usually characterised by extreme 
poverty, state abandonment, limited infrastruc-
ture, restricted access to basic services, and often 
conflicts. Instead of addressing these underlying 
issues, governments have tended to focus on forced 
crop eradication campaigns. In the Andean region, 
for instance, these campaigns have caused wide-
Morning mist in a Yungas coca field outside of Coroico, Bolivia
Credit: Caroline S. Conzelm
an
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The 1971 UN Convention on Psychotropic Sub-
stances does not control any plant, but does impose 
controls on several of the active ingredients of some 
plants. This is the case for mescaline, contained in 
peyote and the San Pedro cactus; for psilocybin 
and psilocin, responsible for the stimulating effect 
of khat; for DMT, the psychedelic compound in aya-
huasca; and for THC, the psychoactive constituent 
of cannabis, among others.58 This level of control 
creates confusion for substances such as khat, pe-
yote or ayahuasca, since some of their psychoactive 
compounds are internationally controlled, but the 
plants themselves remain outside the remit of the 
conventions. As for cannabis, the plant species itself 
(cannabis and cannabis resin) is included in Sched-
ule I of the 1961 Convention, but THC is scheduled 
in the 1971 Convention – also leading to inconsist-
encies for drug control. 
Article 32, para. 4 of the 1971 Convention states 
that: ‘A State on whose territory there are plants 
growing wild which contain psychotropic substanc-
es from among those in Schedule I and which are 
traditionally used by certain small, clearly deter-
mined groups in magical or religious rites, may, at 
the time of signature, ratification or accession, make 
reservations concerning these plants’59 – thereby 
allowing member states to make a reservation to 
allow the traditional use of some plants in delim-
ited geographic locations, during ceremonies or 
rituals. These provisions are important as they have 
been used in some countries to legitimise the use 
of ayahuasca, for example in Brazil, Peru, Colombia, 
or among the ‘Ceu do Montreal’ Church members in 
Canada,69 as will be further discussed below. 
nomic ‘development’ projects such as monoculture, 
hydroelectric dams, open mining and petrol and gas 
exploitation in ancestral territories affect indigenous 
people’s access to medicinal plants which are often 
grown within the native biodiversity of their terri-
tory56 – jeopardising indigenous people’s access to 
health, cultural and spiritual practices. It is essential 
that these programmes are developed in collabora-
tion with affected populations after a careful assess-
ment of the local cultivation possibilities and market 
access, and with full respect for the rights and tradi-
tions of indigenous people (see Chapter 4.2).
Legislative/policy issues 
involved 
The 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs has 
classified three psychoactive plants – cannabis, 
coca and opium poppy – as subject to controls that 
limit their production, distribution, trade and use 
to medical and scientific purposes. The premise 
behind this policy is that it would be impossible 
to achieve a significant reduction in the illicit pro-
duction of internationally controlled substances so 
long as large-scale local consumption of raw mate-
rials for these drugs continued. This led to pressure 
on producing countries to end traditional usage of 
these plants. Opium poppy, cannabis and coca were 
placed under the same strict levels of control as ex-
tracted and concentrated alkaloids such as heroin 
and cocaine, under Schedule I of the 1961 Conven-
tion – with a deadline of 15 years for the abolition of 
opium smoking, and 25 years for coca leaf chewing 
and cannabis use (article 49, para. 2).57 
Ayahuasca brewing
Credit: Creative Com
m
ons Paul Hessell
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Box  1  The right of Rastafarians to use cannabis in Jamaica
Cannabis (known in Jamaica as ganja) is regard-
ed as sacred by members of Jamaica’s Rastafarian 
community. The plant was first introduced in Ja-
maica in the 19th century, originating from India, 
and quickly gained popularity as a recreative and 
medicinal herb. Its use spread among poor com-
munities in the 1930s with the founding of the 
Rastafarian religion, a spiritual movement based 
on the Old Testament and Pan-Africanism.60 Of all 
the herbs, cannabis occupies a special, spiritual 
place in the Rastafari celebrations. First and fore-
most is its place in the ceremonial rituals held 
five or six times a year, known as a nyabinghi, or 
‘binghi’. But for Rastafarians, the herb is part of a 
way of life. The plant is often smoked, but can also 
be drunk or eaten. Knowledge about Rastafarian 
culture and traditions – drawn directly from testi-
monies among the Rastafarian community – was 
collated in a report by the National Commission 
on Ganja published in 2001, in which the Com-
mission recommended the decriminalisation of 
the plant.61 As a community, the Rastafari have 
been advocating for cannabis legalisation, or at 
the very least for a removal of its criminal status, 
for over half a century. 
It was not until April 2015, however, that the 
Jamaican government adopted the Dangerous 
Drug (Amendment) Act, amending Section 7(c) 
of para. 6. This reform constitutes a positive at-
tempt at protecting the religious and cultural 
rights of the Rastafarian community. The amend-
ment authorises cannabis sacramental use by 
any person aged above 18 adhering to the Ras-
tafarian faith, or to a Rastafarian organisation. 
Members of the Rastafarian community can also 
apply for authorisation to cultivate cannabis for 
religious purposes as a sacrament in adherence 
to the Rastafarian faith. Finally, they can apply for 
an event to be declared exempt from cannabis 
prohibition rules, as long as the event is primarily 
organised for the purpose of the celebration of 
the Rastafarian faith.62
The amendment is broader in scope, also de-
criminalising the possession of up to 2 ounces 
(56g) of cannabis, as well as possession for med-
ical and therapeutic purposes as recommended 
or prescribed by a registered medical doctor 
or health practitioner. However, the Rastafari-
an community benefits from broader rights in 
terms of cultivation and use than the broader 
community, demonstrating a clear attempt at 
protecting the cultural and ancient traditions of 
this community. 
Rastafari Rootzfest 2015 in Jamaica
Credit: Creative Com
m
ons Beverly Yuen Thompson
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Box  2  Bolivia, coca leaf chewing and the protection of 
indigenous culture
Coca has been sacred to the indigenous peoples 
of the Andean region for thousands of years. In 
Bolivia, the Quechua and Aymara peoples make up 
the majority of the rural population, and use of the 
coca leaf is widespread among them. The practice 
is associated with social and cultural solidarity, eco-
nomic activity and work, medicinal factors (such 
as adding nutrients to the diet and providing pro-
tection against altitude sickness or stomach pains), 
and spirituality, restoring the balance between 
natural and spiritual realms.63 For those involved in 
coca cultivation, this activity often constitutes their 
only means of subsistence.
The first Western attempts at prohibiting coca 
came with colonisation in the 16th century, when 
the Catholic church became aware of the plant’s 
role in native religious ritual. An agreement with 
coca was achieved, however, recognising the 
plant as a means of first necessity – this agreement 
lasted until the 20th century. Following World War 
II, the UN led a drive for ‘modernisation’, which 
identified the practice of coca chewing as being 
primitive and outmoded. A report of the ECOSOC 
Coca Leaf Inquiry Commission published in 1950, 
supported the assumption that coca chewing was 
a harmful habit, a form of ‘drug addiction’ and a 
degenerative moral agent causing malnutrition.64 
This report resulted in the scheduling of the coca 
leaf in the same schedule as for cocaine and heroin 
in the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs 
(Schedule I) and a provision for the abolition of 
coca chewing within 25 years. Since then, the re-
port has been criticised for being biased, scientifi-
cally flawed, culturally insensitive and even racist. 
A 1995 study by the World Health Organisation 
(WHO) concluded that the ‘use of coca leaves ap-
pears to have no negative health effects and has 
positive therapeutic, sacred and social functions 
for indigenous Andean populations’.65 This study, 
however, was never made public. 
The international prohibition of the coca leaf 
demonstrates a clear misunderstanding of indige-
nous customs and traditions. Andean and Amazo-
nian coca consumers often feel ignored, insulted 
and humiliated by the call by the international 
community and the UN to abolish what they con-
sider to be a healthy ancestral tradition. 
In order to repair this historical error, Bolivia made 
an attempt at amending the 1961 Convention to 
remove the obligation to ban coca leaf chewing – 
an initiative that was blocked by a coalition led by 
the USA. As a response, in June 2011, Bolivia with-
drew from the 1961 Convention, announcing its 
intention to re-accede with a reservation to align 
its treaty obligations with its constitution.66 Bolivia 
re-acceded the Convention on 10 January 2013, 
its reservation stating that: ‘The Plurinational State 
of Bolivia reserves the right to allow in its territory: 
traditional coca leaf chewing; the consumption 
and use of the coca leaf in its natural state for cul-
tural and medicinal purposes; its use in infusions; 
and also the cultivation, trade and possession of 
the coca leaf to the extent necessary for these licit 
purposes’.67 Since then, Bolivia has developed an 
innovative community control approach to coca 
production, with a strong focus on partnership 
working with coca producing communities to 
ensure that subsistence farmers are not affected 
by a sudden and forced removal of their means of 
subsistence (see Chapter 4.2).68
 
Aymara yatiri (shaman) performing a coca leaf reading on the summit of Mt. Uchumachi near Coroico, Bolivia 
on the winter solstice or Aymara New Year
Credit: A
li M
argeaux Pfenninger
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Box  3   Khat: The dangers of 
prohibition
Khat has been used for hundreds – if not thou-
sands – of years in the highlands of Eastern 
Africa and Southern Arabia. Traditionally, khat 
has been chewed communally, after work or 
on social occasions, in public spaces or ded-
icated rooms in private houses. Global khat 
markets have been driven by demand from di-
aspora populations settling in Europe, particu-
larly from Somalia. So far, there has been little 
cross-over from migrants to the mainstream 
European population – khat use remains con-
centrated among Eastern African migrant com-
munities who consume khat in commercial 
establishments, and communal centres where 
social and community bonds remain strong. 
This enables consumers to control the quality 
of the khat they use and to perpetuate cultural 
and social traditions among their community. 
A number of studies have demonstrated that 
the potential for dependence associated with 
khat, and the physical and mental health 
risks related to khat use, remain very low.73 
Evidence also suggests that prohibiting 
khat use can lead to a number of negative 
consequences, including expanding the 
isolation and vulnerability of immigrant 
populations, and impacting negatively on 
livelihoods and economic development in  
producer countries.74 
For instance, the recent prohibition of khat in 
the UK – adopted against the expert advice 
of the scientific community75 (see Chapter 
2.1) – is likely to generate an important illicit 
criminal market, and may alienate certain 
ethnic minorities in the country.76 Beyond the 
UK itself, the ban had devastating impacts on 
khat producing areas in Africa, in particular  
in Kenya.77
thereof from the application of all or any of the pro-
visions of the Act or the regulations if, in the opinion 
of the Minister, the exemption is necessary for a 
medical or scientific purpose or is otherwise in the 
public interest’.78 Although this exemption is rarely 
applied to protect indigenous rights, an exception 
was made for the import and use of ayahuasca by 
the Ceu do Montreal followers a small group of 
religious leaders using ayashuasca (which they call 
Daime) for traditional purposes.79
Another condition for the traditional use of inter-
nationally controlled plants was stipulated in arti-
cle 14, para. 2 of the 1988 UN Convention against 
Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic 
Substances, which provides that drug policies 
should ‘respect fundamental human rights’ and 
‘take due account of traditional licit uses, where 
there is historical evidence of such use’. However, 
this clearly contradicts the obligations included in 
articles 14.1 and 25 of the 1988 Convention, which 
state that the treaty’s provisions should not dero-
gate from any obligations under the previous drug 
control treaties, including the 1961 obligation to 
abolish any traditional uses of coca, opium and 
cannabis.70 This lack of clarity around traditional 
uses of these plants has enabled governments to 
place strict control mechanisms on cannabis, coca 
and opium, but also on traditional psychoactive 
plants that have not been classified by the UN, 
such as khat and kratom. In order to ensure that 
the rights of indigenous groups are adequately 
protected, there should be an explicit recognition 
of the traditional use of internationally controlled 
substances – and the UN drug control conventions 
should be revised to accommodate this obligation. 
Implementation issues 
involved 
Indigenous rights protected in courts
In exceptional cases, jurisprudence has recognised 
the rights of indigenous people to use internation-
ally controlled plants to protect their traditional 
cultural and religious rights. This was the case, for 
instance, in Italy where a drug conviction was re-
versed on appeal on the grounds that the lower 
court had not considered the religious rights of 
a Rastafarian defendant to use cannabis.71 Simi-
larly, in March 2015, the Oral Tribunal of Arica in 
Chile recognised the right to use the coca leaf for 
cultural purposes.72
Legal exceptions to protect indigenous rights 
Some governments have revised their drug laws and 
policies – often as a result of favourable court decisions 
– in order to include provisions within their national 
legal systems to allow the traditional use of certain 
psychoactive plants, under specific circumstances. 
This is the case for example in Canada, where Sec-
tion 56 of the Canadian Controlled Drugs and Sub-
stances Act stipulates that: ‘The Minister may, on 
such terms and conditions as the Minister deems 
necessary, exempt any person or class of persons or 
any controlled substance or precursor or any class 
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A similar rule exists in Section 1307.31 of the US 
Code of Federal Regulations with regards to peyo-
te – a small, spineless cactus containing the psy-
choactive alkaloid mescaline (controlled under the 
1971 Convention), which is used by members of the 
Native American Church during religious ceremo-
nies. The rule states that: ‘The listing of peyote as a 
controlled substance in Schedule I does not apply 
to the nondrug use of peyote in bona fide religious 
ceremonies of the Native American Church’. As for 
Canada, this provision is limited in scope, but it ef-
fectively enables Native Americans to perpetuate 
their religious traditions and rituals by using peyote 
without fear of prosecution.
Peru, Colombia and Argentina also have domestic 
legal exemptions for a coca leaf market. Indeed, Peru 
has always maintained an internal legal coca market 
under the state monopoly of the National Coca En-
terprise, ENACO.80 Peru has also recognised the tra-
ditional use of ayahuasca as part of its cultural herit-
age.81 Colombia introduced specific exemptions for 
coca in indigenous territories.82 As for Argentina, in 
1989 it introduced the following provision in Article 
15 of its Criminal Law, N23.737: ‘The possession and 
consumption of the coca leaf in its natural state, 
destined for the practice of “coqueo” or chewing, 
or its use as an infusion, will not be considered as 
possession or consumption of narcotics’.83 
The latest country to date to have adopted an ex-
ception to its drug law is Jamaica, with regards to 
the right of Rastafarians to use cannabis in their reli-
gious ceremonies (see Box 1).
Constitutional protections of indigenous rights 
Bolivia is no doubt the country that has gone fur-
thest in seeking to protect the rights of indigenous 
groups to produce and use coca for traditional pur-
poses. In 2009, Bolivia adopted a new constitution, 
in which it recognised the traditional use of the coca 
leaf as a cultural heritage,84 therefore ensuring that 
the right of Bolivian indigenous communities and 
all its citizens to chew coca is protected (see Box 2). 
Regulating plants not placed under 
international control
As mentioned above, some plants containing psy-
choactive substances are not included in the UN 
drug control conventions, therefore placing no 
obligations on governments to schedule them – 
but some did nonetheless. This is the case, for in-
stance, for kratom, khat and ayahuasca. Kratom is 
currently prohibited under national laws in several 
Asian countries (including Thailand, Australia or 
Myanmar), while the national legal status for khat 
varies considerably from country to country. As 
for ayahuasca, there are three broad legal statuses 
for the plant: 1- countries in which there is a legal 
vacuum, and where the plant’s status might be 
decided by court decision and jurisprudence; 2- 
countries where the plant is specifically prohibited 
(as is the case in France); and 3- countries that allow 
and sometimes regulate certain uses of ayahuasca, 
while other uses remain outside the remit of the law 
(for example in Peru).85 
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Abstinence State of refraining from using drugs. 
Alternative livelihoods Also known under the concepts of ‘development in a drugs environment’, develop-
ment-oriented drug control’ or ‘food security’, alternative livelihoods programmes 
aim to promote equitable economic development in the rural areas where crops 
used in the production of internationally controlled substances are cultivated. The 
objective is to improve the overall quality of life in these rural areas. 
Controlled substance A psychoactive substance, the production, sale, possession and use of which is re-
stricted to those authorised by the international drug control regime. This term is 
preferred to ‘illicit drug’ or ‘illicit substance’ as it is not the drug itself that is illicit, 
but its production, sale, possession or consumption in particular circumstances in 
a given jurisdiction. ‘Illicit drug market’, a more exact term, refers to the production, 
distribution, sale and use of any substance outside legally sanctioned channels.
Decriminalisation The decriminalisation of drug use refers to the removal of criminal penalties for 
drug use, and for the possession of drugs, possession of drug use equipment, as 
well as the cultivation and purchase of drugs for the purpose of personal consump-
tion. Decriminalisation may involve the removal of all penalties. Alternatively, while 
civil or administrative (as opposed to criminal) penalties may be imposed following 
decriminalisation, they should be less punitive than those imposed under crimi-
nalisation, and lead to increased voluntary access to evidence- and human rights-
based harm reduction, health and social services.
Under de jure decriminalisation, criminal penalties for selected activities are formal-
ly removed through legal reforms.
Under de facto decriminalisation, the selected activity remains a criminal offence 
but, in practice, the criminal penalties are not applied.
Demand reduction A general term used to describe policies or programmes directed at reducing the 
demand for internationally controlled substances. It particularly refers to preven-
tion, educational, treatment and rehabilitation strategies, as opposed to law en-
forcement strategies that aim to interdict the production and distribution of drugs. 
Depenalisation Depenalisation is the reduction in severity of penalties for a criminal offence. De-
penalisation may involve reducing the maximum and/or minimum lengths of sen-
tences, or amounts of fines, for certain drug offences, or replacing imprisonment 
with alternative sentencing options for minor offences. 
Diversion / alternatives 
to incarceration
Diversion refers to measures that provide alternatives to criminal sanctions or incar-
ceration for people who are arrested for minor, non-violent drug offences. Diversion 
measures can be implemented through policies, programmes and practices that 
aim to refer people to social and health interventions such as harm reduction and 
drug dependence treatment, rather than subject them to criminal justice processes 
involving arrest, detention, prosecution, judicial sentencing and imprisonment. Di-
version measures can be conducted by police (before or after arrest), prosecutors, 
or judges (prior to, at the time of, or after sentencing). 
Drug control/drug policy The regulation, by a system of laws and agencies, of the production, distribution, 
sale and use of specific controlled substances locally, nationally or internationally. 
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Drug dependence Drug dependence remains a contested concept. The World Health Organisation 
defines it as a ‘chronic, relapsing medical condition with a physiological and ge-
netic basis’. However, some drug user activists have rejected terms describing drug 
dependence as a medical condition as this approach seems to define drug use as 
an illness – whereas the UN reports that only about 10% of those who use drugs 
have problems related to their drug use. This is often referred to as ‘pathologising’ 
drug use. Policy makers and practitioners interacting with groups and networks of 
people who use drugs should be aware that some activists may be uncomfortable 
with language or models that promote such a definition.
For the purposes of this Guide, drug dependence refers to a range of behaviours 
that include a strong desire to use drugs, the difficulty in controlling consumption, 
and the continued use of the substance despite physical, mental and social prob-
lems associated with drug use. It is often characterised by increased tolerance over 
time, and withdrawal symptoms if substance use is abruptly stopped. 
Drug dependence 
treatment
Drug dependence treatment describes a range of interventions – both medical and 
psychosocial – that support people who have a problem with their drug use to stabi-
lise or recover control over their consumption, or seek abstinence. The complexity of 
drug dependence is such that the response, setting and intensity of treatment need 
to be tailored to each person. A comprehensive menu of services should therefore be 
made available to suit the differing characteristics, needs, preferences and circum-
stances of each person wishing to access treatment. The objective of treatment is to 
enable an individual to live a healthy and socially constructive lifestyle.
Drug testing The analysis of body fluids (such as blood, urine or saliva), hair or other tissue for 
the presence of one or more psychoactive substances. Drug testing is employed to 
monitor abstinence from drug use in individuals pursuing drug rehabilitation pro-
grammes, to monitor surreptitious drug use among patients on maintenance ther-
apy, and where  employment is conditional on abstinence from such substances. 
Drug testing is not an effective method to deter drug use and has led to a number 
of negative consequences, such as users moving to more harmful substances to 
avoid detection.
Drug use Self-administration of a psychoactive substance.
Harm reduction Policies, programmes and practices that seek to reduce physical, psychological 
and social problems associated with drug use without necessarily stopping that 
use. Some people are unable or unwilling to cease their drug use, yet still require 
healthcare and other interventions to optimise their health and well-being. Harm 
reduction is, consequently, a pragmatic set of responses directed toward these 
objectives, rather than an ideology that seeks to stop drug use as its fundamental 
priority. The best known harm reductions interventions are Needle and Syringe Ex-
change (NSPs), Opioid Substitution Therapy (OST), Drug Consumption Rooms, etc., 
measures which embody a pragmatic approach toward the reality of drug use. 
Heroin-assisted 
treatment 
Heroin-assisted treatment (HAT) is a therapeutic option that has been added to 
the range of OST in a growing number of countries in the past two decades, as 
its evidence base has grown more extensive and secure. It involves the provision 
of diamorphine to patients, usually those who have not gained benefit from more 
traditional OST employing methadone or buprenorphine. Diamorphine doses are 
given under clinical supervision in a safe and clean medical setting, and the med-
ication elements are combined with intensive psychosocial support mechanisms. 
HAT is currently provided with positive outcomes in Switzerland, Germany, the UK, 
Denmark, Spain, Canada and the Netherlands.
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Injecting drug use Injections may be intramuscular (into a muscle), subcutaneous (under the skin), 
intravenous (into a vein), etc.
Legal regulation Legal regulation refers to a model whereby the cultivation, manufacture, transpor-
tation and sale of selected drugs are governed by a legal regulatory regime. This 
regime can include regulations on price, potency, packaging, production, transit, 
availability, marketing and/or use – all of which are enforced by state agencies.
Legalisation Legalisation is a process by which all drug-related behaviours (use, possession, 
cultivation, production, trade, etc.) become legal activities. Within this process, gov-
ernments may choose to adopt administrative laws and policies to regulate drug 
production, distribution and use, limiting availability and access – this process is 
known as ‘legal regulation’.
New psychoactive 
substance
Also known as ‘legal high’ – a substance with psychoactive properties (capable of 
altering mood and/or perception), whose production, distribution, possession and 
consumption is not subject to international drug control. 
Proportionality of 
sentencing
Proportionality is an internationally recognised legal principle, applicable to a gov-
ernment’s response to activities that cause harm to others. It requires the severity of 
any punishment imposed to be measured in accordance with the harms caused by 
an offender’s actions, and the culpability and circumstances of the offender. Inter-
national human rights, crime prevention and criminal justice instruments contrib-
ute to setting standards of proportionality. It represents the legislative equivalent of 
the popular belief that ‘the punishment should fit the crime’.
Recidivism The tendency to repeat an offence and/or to keep on returning to prison. 
Recovery Recovery encompasses any positive step or change that leads to the improvement 
of a person’s health, well-being and overall quality of life. It should therefore not be 
limited to, understood solely as, abstinence from drug use. Recovery is incremental, 
and it is up to each individual to decide what their goal towards recovery will be 
(e.g. controlled usage of substances, substitution therapy, etc.). 
Rehabilitation The process by which an individual dependent on drugs achieves an optimal state 
of health, psychological functioning and social well-being. Rehabilitation follows 
the initial phase of treatment (which may involve detoxification, medical and psy-
chiatric treatment). It encompasses a variety of approaches, including group thera-
py, specific behaviour therapies to prevent relapse, involvement with a mutual help 
group, residence in a therapeutic community or halfway house, vocational training, 
and work experience. It can also include long-term OST. 
Scheduling The international drug control system assigns drugs to a particular set of controls 
termed ‘schedules’. The objective is to place a given drug within an appropriate set 
of controls according to its level of harms and medical utility. The act or process of 
assigning the ‘narcotic’ or ‘psychotropic’ substances (as the treaties describe them) 
to its place within the control regime is known as ‘scheduling’. The more dangerous 
the drug, the tighter the controls – at least in theory. The WHO recommends on 
what the appropriate schedule is (if any), while the CND makes the final decision. 
WHO recommends on scientific and medical grounds, while CND takes into account 
social, economic and other factors. National legal systems include systems of clas-
sification based on the international one, sometimes using alternative terminology 
to represent their schedules.
Supply reduction Policies or programmes aiming to reduce and eventually eliminate the production 
and distribution of drugs. Historically, the international drug control system has 
been focused on supply-side strategies based on crop eradication, interdiction by 
law enforcement, etc. Evidence demonstrates that these strategies have been un-
successful in curbing the global drug market. Some countries have now turned to 
an approach based on alternative livelihoods. 
UN drug conventions/
treaties
International treaties concerned with the control of production, distribution, pos-
session and use of psychoactive drugs. The first international treaty dealing with 
controlled substances was the Hague Convention of 1912: its provisions and those 
of succeeding agreements were consolidated in the 1961 Single Convention on 
Narcotic Drugs (amended by a 1972 protocol). To this have been added the 1971 
UN Convention on Psychotropic Substances and the 1988 Convention Against Illicit 
Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances.
2  IDPC Drug Policy Guide
The IDPC Drug Policy Guide brings together 
global evidence, best practice and experiences 
to provide expert analysis across the spectrum 
of drug policy (including public health, criminal 
justice and development). In each chapter, IDPC 
offers recommendations and further reading 
in an effort to promote effective, balanced and 
humane drug policies at the national, regional 
and international levels. 
The International Drug Policy Consortium (IDPC) 
is a global network of NGOs that promotes 
objective and open debate on the effectiveness, 
direction and content of drug policies at national 
and international level, and supports evidence-
based policies that are effective in reducing 
drug-related harms. IDPC members have a wide 
range of experience and expertise in the analysis 
of drug problems and policies, and contribute to 
national and international policy debates. IDPC 
offers specialist advice through the dissemination 
of written materials, presentations at conferences, 
meetings with key policy makers and study tours. 
IDPC also provides capacity building and advocacy 
training for civil society organisations. 
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